Italian Politics & Society

The Review of the Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society

#71 | Fall 2012

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Please send your information to the relevant CONGRIPS European Politics and Policy Liaison Officers:
- for North America: Raffaella Nanetti rnanetti@uic.edu
- for Europe: Marco Brunazzo marco.brunazzo@unitn.it

ITALIAN AFFAIRS

Short articles (3 to 6,000 words) in English or Italian commenting the most recent issues of contemporary Italian politics & society.
Please submit your proposal to christophe.roux@gmail.com

RESEARCH TRENDS

Short research articles (3 to 6,000 words) in English or Italian about modern Italian politics & society.
Please submit your proposal to christophe.roux@gmail.com

IERI E OGGI / THE STUDY OF ITALIAN POLITICS

Short articles (3 to 6,000 words) in English about departments, research centers, research groups, publishers, books series, journals, database, PhD programs (The Study of Italian Politics) or past works or individual scholars who contributed to the development of the study of Italian politics (*Ieri e oggi*).
Please contact christophe.roux@gmail.com before submission.

BOOK REVIEWS

Books for review should be sent to the Jeffrey Hamill, *IPS* Book Review Editor (see cover page).

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Moving Beyond Hurricane Isaacs: APSA 2013 CONGRIPS Events

As everyone knows, the 2012 APSA annual conference in New Orleans was cancelled because hurricane Isaacs which decided to land right in the New Orleans area precisely on the first day of the conference. APSA Director, Michael Brintnall, consequently decided to cancel the event – an obviously wise decision. It was a pity, nevertheless. On September 1, 2012 we had planned to hold our CONGRIPS panel entitled "Silvio Berlusconi and the Problems of Representation in Italy" (how foreboding!) and to hold our business meeting that evening. For the previous evening we had also planned, together with the Association Française de Science Politique (AFSP), the French Politics Group and Sciences Po Bordeaux, to host a reception at which we would hand out prizes and awards. We were particularly proud to be able to give Prof. Sidney Tarrow of Cornell University the Lifetime Achievement Award which CONGRIPS awards every other year to scholars who have made an outstanding contribution to the study of Italian politics and society. Well, that too had to be cancelled, much to the disappointment of everyone involved.

This year, we hope to be able to make up for that. While no reception has been planned, we are still going to award Sid the CONGRIPS the Lifetime Achievement Award at the CONGRIPS business meeting on Friday August 30, at 6:15 while we will hold this year's CONGRIPS panel on Sunday September 1, at 8:00 am. This year's panel is entitled "Rocks and Hard Places: The Political Economy of Italy in Comparative Perspective" – an early rise to hard facts! We very much hope that Sid will be able to personally get his plaque and listen to the accolade that we are preparing for him. It would be great to get together and celebrate one of the leading political science scholars who much contributed not just on Italy, but also on France and more generally on Europe, and who has helped to make Italian politics just a little more understandable for our colleagues across the Atlantic. This year we will also partly renew our Executive Committee: Professor Vincent della Sala of the University of Trento has completed his term: we are looking for an enthusiastic colleague willing to replace him. This year, I will also complete my term as President, so allow me anticipate my best wishes to the next President who will be elected at the CONGRIPS Business meeting on Friday.

Looking forward to seeing many old and new friends, *arrivederci a Chicago*.

Simona Piattoni
University of Trento simona.piattoni@unitn.it

A Word from the General Editor

Readers of *IPS* will be reassured: the CONGRIPS review did not disappear because hurricane Isaac forced organizers to cancel the 2012 APSA meeting in New Orleans. However it suffered from a delay for which I would like to apologize to all CONGRIPS members. The challenge ahead is to be back on track despite the difficulties of different kinds that affected the working of the review. *IPS* will carry on with its activity along the main lines it recently defined: 'news and announcements' about the most recent academic news in our field, 'Italian affairs' with academic experts shedding light onto Italy's current politics and public policies, 'Research trends' with short pieces of research in the making and '*Ieri e oggi*: the study of Italian politics' with articles about works, personalities and institutions that significantly contributed to the field. Let me remind readers that they are very welcome to contribute: do not hesitate to submit an article! Your support is crucial to make *IPS* a place where scholars can share ideas and arguments.

Christophe Roux, University of Nice
IPS General Editor

Conferences

APSA 2013 Annual Meeting, August 29 - September 1, Chicago, Illinois
CONGRIPS Panel – Rocks and Hard Places:
The Political Economy of Italy in Comparative Perspective

Sunday, Sep 1, 2013, 8:00 AM-9:45 AM.
Chair: Julia Lynch (University of Pennsylvania), jflynch@sas.upenn.edu
Discussant: Simona Piattoni University of Trento, simona.piattoni@unitn.it
Scheduled Papers:
- The Institutional Roots of Economic Decline, by Marco Simoni, London School of Economics and Political Science, m.simoni@lse.ac.uk
- Territorial Disparities in Italy and the Case of Campania: Appraising the Successes and Failures of 25 years of Cohesion Policy Support, by Laura Polverari, University of Strathclyde, laura.polverari@strath.ac.uk
- Austerity over Time: Examining Out-of-Pocket Payment in Italy and Spain, by Isabel Maria Perera, University of Pennsylvania, iperera@sas.upenn.edu
- Social Capital and Historical Legacy. Southern Italy in Comparative Perspective, by Emanuele Ferragina, University of Oxford, emanuele.ferragina@spi.ox.ac.uk

XVII SISP Annual Conference
University of Florence, 12 – 14 September 2013 http://www.sisp.it/conference

The SISP Annual Meeting offers the opportunity to explore and discuss core issues, new theoretical and methodological perspectives and recent research results in political science. The programme includes a plenary event, the Assembly of SISP members and numerous panels, divided

in thematic sections, in which participants present and discuss recent research and analyses of high scientific impact and visibility.

The meeting is organized by the Department of Political and Social Sciences and the Interuniversity Research Center on Southern Europe at the University of Florence. The activities will take place in Florence at D6 and D15 buildings – 50127 Florence.
For more information on how to reach the Department, please click here. For a map of the Novoli Campus, please click here. Several exhibitions and sale stands of different publishers will be located in the hall of the Department of Political and Social Sciences.

Call for Papers

2013 Italian General Election : Italian Politics at a Crossroads ?
One-day conference, 17 January 2014, University of Birmingham
Organised with the support of the Political Studies Association and the PSA's Italian Politics Specialist Group

Info provided by Jim Newell and Arianna Giovannini

The Italian general election of February 2013 can fairly be described as a watershed event, resulting as it did in a political stalemate. With the country more or less divided into three equal segments among which there appeared to be no viable governing combination it was not until the end of April that a government could be formed, and then it was only thanks to the fact that the election's aftermath coincided with the need to elect a new President of the Republic. The centre-left appeared to have won the election by a wafer-thin margin – but it had no Senate majority and, most importantly, it emerged in front only by virtue of the fact that the haemorrhage in its votes was slightly smaller than the haemorrhage of votes for the centre right. Support for the populist Five- star Movement (M5s), at its first general-election outing, exploded dramatically, to make it the largest single party. As a consequence of the outcome, neither of the logics on which government formation had been based in the 'First' and 'Second Republics', the consensual and the majoritarian respectively, was any longer available. If therefore, the election seemed to mark the end of an era, the one that appeared to be being ushered in pointed in the direction of a highly uncertain future. The grand coalition that was eventually formed had as its main protagonists two parties that had hitherto found it difficult in the extreme to accord each other legitimacy as potentially governing actors while they were under pressure as never before to bring about reform of the institutions whose mal-functioning had to a significant degree been responsible for the 2013 crisis in the first place.

Against this background papers are invited which in one way or another provide reflection on the effects that such a momentous election have had and are likely to have on the Italian political system and beyond. The organisers are keen to encourage submissions focussing on a wide range of perspectives/topics, but conceivably proposals might offer to examine:

- specific parties, their performances and prospects, the most obvious example to mention here being the M5s;
- political campaigns – e.g. strategies (including the use of new-media) and impact;
- the party system as a whole – bearing in mind the extent to which the events leading up to the election, and its outcome, were so closely bound up with the parties' loss of authority thanks to disappointment of the expectations that had arisen from the political upheavals of the early 1990s and the initiation of the so-called 'Second Republic';

- popular attitudes – and especially the anti-political sentiments to which the parties' loss of authority had given rise;
- government and policy-making, including the formation and programmes of the governments that immediately preceded and followed the election – both executives, in their different ways, representing novelties;
- the role of Italy's place in Europe (and beyond) – both from the perspective of its significance as a campaign issue and a factor in the election run-up and from the perspective of the implications for it of the election outcome.

Paper proposals (max 300 words) should be submitted by 18 October to Jim Newell (j.l.newell@salford.ac.uk) and Arianna Giovannini (a.giovannini@leedsmet.ac.uk) from either of whom further details about the conference can be obtained. The event is supported by the Italian Politics Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association (PSA), the University of Birmingham and the Political Studies Association (special activities fund). Journalists from the Italian, the UK and international media will be invited to attend, together with prestigious keynote speakers.

Publications

By Alessandro Cagossi and Christophe Roux

Books

Albertazzi, Daniele, Clodagh Brook, Charlotte Ross and Nina Rothenberg (eds.) 2009. *Resisting the Tide: Cultures of Opposition Under Berlusconi (2001-2006)*, London: Continuum.

Baldassar, Loretta and Donna R. Gabaccia (eds.) 2011. *Intimacy and Italian Migration: Gender and Domestic Lives in a Mobile World*, New York: Fordham University Press.

Baldoli, Chiara. 2009. *A History of Italy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Baliani, Marco. 2012. *Body of State, A Nation Divided*, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Behan, Tom. 2009. *The Italian Resistance: Fascists, Guerrillas and the Allies*, London: Pluto Press.

Burdett, Charles. 2007. *Journeys through Fascism: Italian Travel Writing between the Wars*, New York: Berghahn Books.

Cento Bull, Anna. 2011. *Italian Neofascism: The Strategy of Tension and the Politics of Nonreconciliation*, New York: Berghahn.

Chirumbolo, Paolo, Mario Moroni and Luca Somigli. 2011. *Neoavanguardia. Italian Experimental Literature and Arts in the 1960s*, Toronto: University of Toronto press.

Corner, Paul (ed.) 2009. *Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism, Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davis, John. 2010. *The Jews of San Nicandro*, New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

Edwards, Phil. 2009. *'More Work, Less Pay'. Rebellion and Repression in Italy, 1972-7*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Furlong, Paul. 2011. *Social and Political Thought of Julius Evola*, London: Routledge.

Gilbert, Mark and K. Robert Nillson. 2010. *The A to Z of Modern Italy*, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow.

Guarino, Gabriel. 2010. *Representing the King's Splendour. Communication and Reception of Symbolic Forms of Power in Viceregal Naples*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hauschild, Thomas. 2010. *Power and Magic in Italy*, translated by Jeremy Gaines, New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books.

Ieraci Giuseppe. 2008. *Governments and Parties in Italy: Parliamentary Debates, Investiture Votes and Policy Positions (1994-2006)*, Leicester: Troubador Publishing.
Kreuzer, Gundula. 2010. *Verdi and the Germans. From Unification to the Third Reich*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marino, John A. 2011. *Becoming Neapolitan: Citizen Culture in Baroque Naples*, Baltimore MD, John Hopkins.
Martin, Simon. 2011. *Sport Italia: The Italian Love Affair with Sport*, London and New York: I.B. Tauris.
Mascitelli, Bruno, Rory Steele and Simone Battiston. 2010. *Diaspora Parliaments: How Australia faced the Italian challenge*, Ballan Victoria: Connor Court Publishing.
McLaren, Lauren M. 2010. *Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe. A Comparative analysis of Italy, Spain and Turkey*, London: Routedge.
Naddeo, Barbara Ann. 2011. *Vico and Naples. The Urban Origins of Modern Social Theory*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Nencioni, Giuseppe. 2010. *The Italians in the Arctic Explorations – A Critique of the Reinterpretation of Nationalism*, Umeå: Umeå University and the Royal Skyttean Society.
Parati, Graziella. 2012. *New Perspectives in Italian Cultural Studies, Vol. 1*, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
Pezzotti, Barbara. 2012. *The Importance of Place in Contemporary Italian crime Fiction*, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
Polzonetti, Pierpaolo. 2011. *Italian Opera in the Age of the American Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Prévost, Jean-Guy. 2009. *A Total Science. Statistics in Liberal and Fascist Italy*, Montreal: McGill University Press.
Reale, Luigi. 2011. *Mussolini's Concentration Camps for Civilians. An Insight into the Nature of Fascist Racism*, Portland: Vallentine Mitchell.
Ruzza, Carlo and Stefano Fella. 2009. *Re-inventing the Italian Right: Territorial politics, populism and 'post-fascism'*, Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge.
Sabatino, Michelangelo. 2010. *Pride in Modesty: Modernist Architecture and the Vernacular Tradition in Italy*, Toronto: University of Toronto press.
Sabetti, Filippo. 2010. *Civilization and Self-Government: The Political Thought of Carlo Cattaneo*, Lanham MD: Lexington Books.
Scuderi, Antonio. 2011. *Dario Fo: Framing, Festival, and the Folkloric Imagination*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Smith, Shirley Ann. 2012. *Imperial Designs, Italians in China 1900-1947*, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
Smith, W. Rand. 2012. *Enemy Brothers: Socialists and Communists in France, Italy, and Spain*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Tcharos, Stephanie. 2011. *Opera's Orbit: Musical Drama and the Influence of Opera in Arcadian Rome*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Verbeek, Bertjan and Giampiero Giacomello. 2012. *Italy's Foreign Policy in the twenty-First Century,* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Verney, Susannah ed. 2012. *Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A Diachronic Perspective*, London and New York: Routledge.
Vico, Giambattista. 2011. *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians. Drawn From the Origins of the Latin Language*, trans. Jason Taylor, Intro. Robert Miner, New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
Wilson, Alexandra. 2007. *The Puccini Problem: Opera, Nationalism and Modernity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Journal Contents

Bulletin of Italian Politics

http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/socialpolitical/research/politics/journals/bulletinofitalianpolitics/

4 (1) Summer 2012

James L Newell and Maurizio Carbone, "Waiting for Godot: Italian Politics and Society in the Summer of 2012".
Francesca Conti, "The Present Significance of National Identity Issues: The Case of Italian Graduates in the UK".
Samantha Owen, "Writing a History of Broken Continuity: The One Hundred Years of Italian Unification Celebrations".
Simon Martin, "Sport Italia: 150 years of Disunited Italy?".
Claudio M. Radaelli and Samuele Dossi, "Four Funerals and a Party: The Political Repertoire of the Nonviolent Radical Party".
Marinella Belluati and Giuliano Bobba, "Postmodern Mayors: The 2011 Local Elections in Milan and Turin in and beyond the Media".
Fabio Serricchio, "Italian Citizens and Europe: Explaining the Growth of Euroscepticism".
Francesco Marangoni, "Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office".
Elisabetta De Giorgi, "Alter or Anti? How the Media See the Opposition in Italy".
Albertina Pretto and Loris Gaio, "Orientations to Work in Italy".

Journal of Modern Italian Studies http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmis20

17 (1) 2012

John A. Davis, "Editor's introduction".
Sabino Cassese, "The Italian constitutional architecture: from unification to the present day".
Sergio Fabbrini, "The institutional odyssey of the Italian Parliamentary Republic".
Paolo Ricci, "Explaining standing order reforms in the Camera dei Deputati during the liberal age".
Simona Troilo, " 'A gust of cleansing wind': Italian archaeology on Rhodes and in Libya in the early years of occupation (1911–1914)".
Stavroula Pipyrou, "Commensurable language and incommensurable claims among the Greek linguistic minority of Southern Italy".
Giacomo Lichtner, "Allegory, applicability or alibi? Historicizing intolerance in Ettore Scola's Concorrenza sleale".
Olindo De Napoli, "The origin of the Racist Laws under fascism. A problem of historiography".

17 (2) 2012 - Special Issue: The Transformation of Republicanism in Modern and Contemporary Italy

Nadia Urbinati, "The transformation of republicanism in modern and contemporary Italy".
Anna Maria Rao, "Republicanism in Italy from the eighteenth century to the early Risorgimento".
Adrian Lyttelton, "Sismondi, the republic and liberty: between Italy and England, the city and the nation".
Nadia Urbinati, "Mazzini and the making of the republican ideology".
Michele Battini, "Carlo Rosselli, 'Giustizia e Libertà' and the enigma of justice".
Mariuccia Salvati, "From the republic of antifascists to the republic of parties".

17 (3) 2012 - Special Issue: Italia Barbara: Italian Primitives from Piero to Pasolini

Emily Braun, "Italia barbara: Italian primitives from Piero to Pasolini".

Jonathan R. Hiller, “The enduring vision of biodeterministic Sardinian inferiority in the works of Grazia Deledda”.
Vivien Greene, “The ‘other’ Africa: Giuseppe Pitrè's Mostra Etnografica Siciliana (1891–2)”.
Lindsay Harris, “Photography of the ‘primitive’ in Italy: perceptions of the peasantry at the turn of the twentieth century”.
Andrée Hayum, “Lionello Venturi, Roberto Longhi and the Renaissance ‘primitives’”.
Lucia Re, “‘Barbari civilizzatissimi’: Marinetti and the futurist myth of barbarism”.

17 (4) 2012 - Special Issue: Opera and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Italy

Axel Körner, “Opera and nation in nineteenth-century Italy: conceptual and methodological approaches”.
Carlotta Sorba, “National theater and the age of revolution in Italy”.
Emanuele Senici, “ ‘An atrocious indifference’: Rossini's operas and the politics of musical representation in early-nineteenth-century Italy”.
Roger Parker, “Verdi politico: a wounded cliché regroups”.
Mary Ann Smart, “Magical thinking: reason and emotion in some recent literature on Verdi and politics”.
Jutta Toelle, “Opera as business? From impresari to the publishing industry”.
Benjamin Walton, “Italian operatic fantasies in Latin America”.
Felia Allum, “Il Coltello e il mercato, La Camorra prima e dopo l'unità d'Italia; Alleanza nell'ombra, mafie ed economie locali in Sicilia e nel Mezzogiorno”.

Modern Italy http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cmit20

17 (1) 2012

David Lebovitch Dahl, “The antisemitism of the Italian Catholics and nationalism: ‘the Jew’ and ‘the honest Italy’ in the rhetoric of La Civiltà Cattolica during the Risorgimento”.
Federica Falchi, “Democracy and the rights of women in the thinking of Giuseppe Mazzini”.
Massimo Vittorio, “Reflections on the Croce–Dewey exchange”.
Zana Vathi, “Local identities, identification and incorporation of Albanian immigrants in Florence”.
Jomarie Alano, “Anti-fascism for children: Ada Gobetti's story of Sebastiano the rooster”.
Alan R. Perry, “ ‘Io sono qui muto e solitario’: Giovannino Guareschi's prison writings, 1954–1955”.
Martin J. Bull, “The Italian transition that never was”.
Gillian Ania, “11 September 2001: the Italian writers’ response”.

17 (2) 2012 – Special Issue: Emotions

Penelope Morris, Francesco Ricatti & Mark Seymour, “Introduction: Italy and the emotions”.
Susanna Ferlito, “Hysteria's upheavals: emotional fault lines in Cristina di Belgiojoso's health history”.
Vanda Wilcox, “‘Weeping tears of blood’: Exploring Italian soldiers’ emotions in the First World War”.
Catherine O’Rawe, “Avanti a lui tremava tutta Roma: opera, melodrama and the Resistance”.
Giacomo Lichtner, “The age of innocence? Child narratives and Italian Holocaust films”.
Rebecca Clifford, “Emotions and gender in oral history: narrating Italy's 1968”.
Maud Anne Bracke, “Building a ‘counter-community of emotions’: feminist encounters and socio-cultural difference in 1970s Turin”.
Matthew Klugman & Francesco Ricatti, “ ‘Roma non dimentica i suoi figli’: love, sacrifice and emotional attachment to football heroes”.
John Dickie, “Falcone and Borsellino: the story of an iconic photo”.
Vittorio Mete & Rocco Sciarrone, “Overcoming the ’Ndrangheta: contrasting methods and continuities of action: a report from the ‘La ferita’ conference, Reggio Calabria, November 2010”.

17 (3) 2012

Andrea Hajek, "Francesco è vivo, e lotta insieme a noi! Rebuilding local identities in the aftermath of the 1977 student protests in Bologna".
Silvio Carta, "Visual anthropology and sensory ethnography in contemporary Sardinia: a film of a different kind".
Sebastiano Ferrari, "Pier Paolo Pasolini and the medium of song: Texts written for Laura Betti for the Giro a vuoto show".
Henry Partridge, "The determinants of and barriers to critical consumption: a study of Addiopizzo".
Rossella Merlino, " 'Con il volere di Dio': Bernardo Provenzano and religious symbolic ritual".
Joseph Francese, "Leonardo Sciascia's L'affaire Moro: Re-writing fact, which can be stranger than fiction".

17 (4) 2012 – Special Issue: The politics of sexuality in contemporary Italy

Isabel Crowhurst & Chiara Bertone, "Introduction: the politics of sexuality in contemporary Italy".
Irene Peano, "Excesses and double standards: migrant prostitutes, sovereignty and exceptions in contemporary Italy".
Raffaella Ferrero Camoletto & Chiara Bertone, "Italians (should) do it better? Medicalisation and the disempowering of intimacy".
Charlotte Ross, "Imagined communities: initiatives around LGBTQ ageing in Italy".
Eleonora Garosi, "The politics of gender transitioning in Italy".
Martin Dines & Sergio Rigoletto, "Country cousins: Europeanness, sexuality and locality in contemporary Italian television".
Isabel Crowhurst, "Caught in the victim/criminal paradigm: female migrant prostitution in contemporary Italy".

The Italianist **http://maney.co.uk/index.php/journals/ita/**

32 (1), February 2012

Theodore Ell, " 'Una vita della poesia': the early influence of Giacomo Leopardi on Piero Bigongiari".
Charles Leavitt, " 'Una seconda fase del realismo del dopoguerra': the innovative realism of Elsa Morante's L'isola di Arturo".
Meg Greenberg, "Educating Italy over the airwaves: 1946-1956".
Alessandra de Martino Cappuccio, "The relationship between dialect, theatre, and power in Antonio Gramsci".
Viktor Berberi, "Un'altra musica: synaesthetic metaphor and the poetry of the terza generazione".
Meliz Ergin, "Cartographic interventions: construction of identity through spatial reconfiguration in post/colonial Italy".
Gillian Ania, "Enrico Palandri e le 'condizioni atmosferiche' di uno scrittore: Interview (Milan, 2010)".

32 (2), June 2012

Danielle Hipkins, "Who wants to be a TV showgirl? Auditions, talent and taste in contemporary popular Italian cinema".
Pauline Small, "Industry, co-production and agency: Gina Lollobrigida in documents".
Marco Paoli, "Carlo Lizzani's *Il gobbo* (1960): A cinematic exploration of socially 'engaged' post-war criminality".
Gaoheng Zhang, "Italian male travellers at the borderline: Masculinities and liminal spaces in Lamerica and Il ladro di bambini by Gianni Amelio".
Monica Seger, "Unattainable horizons: On history, man and land in the films of Ciprì and Maresco".
Fabio Andreazza, "Tigre reale, uno e due: Aspetti dannunziani in un film degli anni Dieci".
Issa Clubb, "'And there is a commentary track'".
Millicent Marcus, "Paradise lost? *Cinema Paradiso* and the challenge of the DVD commentary".

Luciana D'Arcangeli, “Un nuovo cinema politico italiano? Indagine su un contenuto al di là di ogni sospetto”.

32 (3), October 2012

Marina Castiglione, “Dal plurilinguismo domestico al plurilinguismo letterario. Casi di studio in Sicilia”.
Margherita Di Salvo, “*Well, you know*, ed *anyway* in un corpus di migranti italiani”.
Brigid Maher, “Taboo or not taboo: swearing, satire, irony, and the grotesque in the English translation of Niccolò Ammaniti's *Ti prendo e ti porto via*”.
Daria Biagi, “Dimenticare e reinventare una lingua: l'uso delle paretimologie in Horcynus Orca di Stefano D'Arrigo”.
Paolo Bartoloni, “Zeno's thingness: on fetishism and bodies in Svevo's *La coscienza di Zeno*”.
Mauro Pasqualini, “A politics of emotions in the Italian Left: gender, consumption and intimacy in Lorenza Mazzetti's advice columns and novels, 1961-1969”.
Alex Standen, “Politicizing the puttana: changing representations of the prostitute in the works of Dacia Maraini”.
Marco Sonzogni, “Il critico tra il poeta e la musa: due lettere inedite di Contini a Clizia: in memoriam Giulio Abbiezzi (1927-2010)”.

Italian Political Science Journals: Contents

Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica
http://www.mulino.it/edizioni/riviste/scheda_rivista.php?issn=0048-8402

42 (1) aprile 2012

Piergiorgio Corbetta, “Genitori e figli 35 anni dopo: la politica non abita più qui”.
Aldo Di Virgilio, Daniela Giannetti, Luca Pinto, “Patterns of party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies 2008-2011”.
Nicoletta Di Sotto, Pietro Grilli di Cortona, ““No State, no democracy”. Fragilità statale e democratizzazioni nella terza ondata”.
Alessandro Pellegata, “L’alternanza dove non te l’aspetti. L’impatto dell’alternanza di governo sul controllo della corruzione nelle democrazie consensuali”.
Sergio Fabbrini, Luca Ozzano, Giuliano Amato, Robert D. Putnam, “Una discussione su “American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us””.

42 (2) agosto 2012

Claudio M. Radaelli, Anne C.M. Meuwese, “How the regulatory state differs. The constitutional dimensions of rulemaking in the European Union and the United States”.
Andrea Carati, “Intervento e promozione della democrazia. I paradossi della democratizzazione e la co-gestione delle funzioni di governo fra funzionari internazionali e attori politici locali”.
Andrea Pritoni, “La durata in carica dei governi italiani tra Prima e Seconda Repubblica”.
Alessandro Natalini, “Qualità della democrazia, «rule of law» e capacità amministrativa: l'Italia nella crisi economica globale”.
Luca Lanzalaco, “Scienza politica e caso italiano. Alla ricerca di una tradizione di ricerca”.

42 (3), dicembre 2012

Editoriale
Gianfranco Pasquino, Marco Valbruzzi, “Il Castello di Babele”.
Giovanni Sartori, “Come fare scienza politica”.
Mara Morini, “Il regime ibrido: un caso di «gerrymandering» concettuale?”.

Takis Pappas, “Il carisma politico”.
Marta Regalia, “La leadership: concetto, concezioni e rappresentazioni”.
Marco Valbruzzi, “Alternanza. Cosa è”.
Gianfranco Pasquino, “Deficit democratico”.
Alessandro Colombo, “Guerra e discontinuità nelle relazioni internazionali. Il dibattito sul declino della guerra e i suoi limiti”.
Fortunato Musella, “Governare senza il Parlamento? L'uso dei decreti legge nella lunga transizione italiana (1996-2012)”.
Enrico Borghetto, Luigi Curini, Marco Giuliani, Alessandro Pellegata, Francesco Zucchini, “Italian Law-Making Archive: A New Tool for the Analysis of the Italian Legislative Process”.
Maurizio Ferrera, “Rivisitare Max Weber: ontologia, conoscenza, politica e valori”.

Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche
http://www.mulino.it/edizioni/riviste/scheda_rivista.php?issn=1722-1137

(1) Aprile 2012
Gloria Regonini, “Scienze del pubblico e istituzioni”.
Gloria Regonini, “Parlamenti analitici”.
Martino Bianchi, “Il National Audit Office e il Public Accounts Committee: ancora lezioni da Westminster?”.
Daniele Capone, “Accountability e istituzionalizzazione della valutazione delle politiche negli Stati Uniti: il Government Accountability Office”.
Marco Zamboni, “L'utilizzazione della conoscenza nelle assemblee legislative regionali italiane”.

(2) Agosto 2012
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ITALIAN AFFAIRS

Technocrats and Technocratic Governments: the Italian Experience

Francesco Marangoni and Luca Verzichelli (University of Siena)

The establishment of the Monti government, after Silvio Berlusconi resigned as Prime Minister in November 2011, offers the opportunity for a more general reflection on (some of) the transformations the Italian government has undergone during the last two decades. On one hand, the Monti government has to be considered as an "ad hoc" solution, limited in time and space (i.e. policy agenda); as it was put in place to deal with a situation of obvious economic and financial emergency. A sort of 'interim government', staffed by people from outside the world of politics, to which political actors unable for various reasons to form a governing majority, delegated some of their power until such time as they could again assume their responsibilities directly. On the other hand, , we could say that the experience of the Monti government makes particularly evident (in a sense it brings to the extreme) a phenomenon that is anything but new and isolated in the more recent story of the Italian political system, as well as of other contemporary democracies (Dowding & Dumont 2009; Yong & Hazell 2011): the *penetration of technocracy* within the government. The number of substantial and analytical questions that this concept raises have been deeply discussed elsewhere (Verzichelli & Cotta, 2012). Here we limit ourselves to reviewing some crucial points. With the help of the recent comparative literature, in particular, we begin by distinguishing at least three different phenomena resulting from the penetration of technocratic figures and skills into democratic executives. The first concerns the *interruption of the delegation chain* (Strøm 2003) between the political identity of the parliamentary majority and the actor who is going to serve as the principal in the process of cabinet formation. Within the technocratic model of government the Prime Minister (PM) displays remarkably different characteristics in terms of career, reputation and autonomy vis-à-vis the main figures of the party organizations supporting the executive. A second phenomenon connected with the increase of technocracy of technical government concerns the interruption of the delegation chain within the cabinet: the PM (or chief executive, *lato sensu*), independently from their political identity, recruits ministers with enhanced characteristics of expertise and lacking a clear partisan identity. This kind of delegation is connected with specific goals: non partisan ministers can be called to cope with the implementation of priorities previously highlighted in the governmental platform, or to act as a sort of "guarantors" for a number of reforms, or finally as "sources of inspiration" in a given policy area.

A third situation deals with the interruption of that particular form of delegation involving parliamentary groups as ideal pools of aspirants for ministerial positions. The agents of the prime ministerial delegation are therefore not "*parliamentary-party representatives"* but people who may have some kind of political experience and representative capabilities, but are selected on the basis of other requisites, including policy expertise. Their policy skills are evident, as are their political commitments. Thus, it is possible that their governmental action could be somehow reconnected to the party (or one of the parties) supporting the government. However, they are selected (also) because of their own experience and their policy skills. Even a sketchy discussion of the complexity of the penetration of technocracy within the government, hence, shows at least three relevant dimensions which look independent from each other and which can take place with different degrees of intensity and in

different times. They can be provisionally defined as: a) *prime ministerial autonomy* from the dominant political views in parliament, b) *ministerial political independence* of cabinet members and c) *expertise capabilities* of cabinet ministers.

How to look at these different dimensions? One possibility is to place these three sub-dimensions of technocratic penetration in contrast (in theoretical terms) to an ideal model of ministerial delegations, such as the one inspired by the *party government* approach (Katz 1987). In other terms, we can assume that what we commonly define as a technical government is, in fact, a multifaceted phenomenon that incorporates a number of deviations from the *party government* ideal-type, in the direction of prime ministerial autonomy, ministerial political independence and policy expertise of cabinet ministers. The empirical dimensions we need to investigate to evaluate such a phenomenon, are straightforward. We must examine the personal characters of the PM and of the cabinet members; the process of ministerial selection and de-selection and finally, the nature of the governmental action.

The Italian case is a crucial one in this perspective for two reasons. First, because Italy resembled an example of pure *party government* during (at least) the "first republic." In addition, it has been characterized by an increasing weight of the technocratic component of the government in recent years. The question is, what kind of technocratic penetration has Italy experienced? And what have been its consequences in the traditional patterns of government formation and functioning? These are the basic questions we should try to answer, while also striving to understand to what extent these phenomena have also meant a departure from the traditional patterns of partisan government formation and functioning. Although we will focus mainly on the developments occurred during the so-called second republic, after the *big bang* of 1992, we need to have a brief look at what happened before.

Italian executives during the "first republic": limited use of technocracy under unwritten rules of party-government ministerial selection

As noted above, the Italian case during the period 1948-1992, has to be classified as an example of a full *party government* within a parliamentary democracy. The ministerial recruitment was a major concern for the partisan elites who ruled the country, with a high degree of continuity, despite a well-known low degree of governmental stability (Verzichelli & Cotta 2000). Data on the topic of ministerial partisanship have been extensively presented in other pieces of work (Dogan 1989; Cotta & Verzichelli 2003). Here, it is important to recall that the most comprehensive narratives of government formation agree on the existence of a set of *unwritten rules* which maximized the bargaining power of parties, the presence of partisan elites in government and the "post-electoral" nature of process of government formation. Indeed, both the policy guidelines and the structure of the cabinet team used to be shaped after the elections or after the formal termination of the previous government.

To argue that ministerial recruitment was dominated by partisan and parliamentary paths to power, however, does not mean that other experiences and experiments of technocratic presence in government were totally absent from the practices of the first republic. According to our data[1] 28 of the 260 ministers (11%) serving between the first and the tenth legislature (May 1948 to April 1992) had no previous parliamentary experience. The average duration of their ministerial career was substantially lower (2.2 years) than the duration of the entire population of ministers (3.7 years). Moreover, none of them held core offices such as those of *Presidente del Consiglio,* Minister for Interior, Foreign affairs, or Labor.[2] We can argue that this first (limited) number of technocrats in government during the golden age of the

[1] We use the archive on governments and ministerial elite hosted by the Center for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) at the University of Siena

[2] The most notable exception were the cases of Finance/Treasury ministers with a technical background recruited after the crisis of the seventies.

Italian *partytocracy* simply represented the answer to the occasional demands of expertise and/or, *non-partisan competences,* in crucial but rather narrow areas of ministerial action. The limits to the autonomy of these ministers were relatively predictable, as well as their political subordination to the (collective) decisions taken by the ministerial *selectorates* (the top elites from governmental parties).

Technocrats in Italian governments from the transitional years to 2012

Compared to these patterns, the governments of the "second republic" present evident discontinuities. The significantly increased number of ministers with a technocratic profile recruited between the difficult summer of 1992 and the beginning of the XIII legislature (1996), in particular, suggests a rather different scenario. This shift pertained both to the quantitative number of outsiders not belonging to the traditional partisan-parliamentary pathway to ministerial power, and to the qualitative profiles of the ministerial elite. During the four years of political turmoil (1992-1996) the percentage of minister with no previous parliamentary career went up to 38% (34 out of the 90 ministers serving during the XII and the XIII legislature). Of course, this was due mainly to the fact that two "technical governments" were formed during this short period of time (the Ciampi cabinet of 1993-94 and the Dini cabinet of 1995-96). However, the nomination of different types of technocrats and non-partisan ministers was not exclusively limited to these executive teams. For example, Giuliano Amato, who served as Prime minister between June 1992 and April 1993, appointed a few ministers who did not hold a parliamentary office. More importantly, the specific roles covered by several ministers during the period 1992-1996 clearly indicate that the process of government formation in Italy had changed during the transition to the second republic. During this period technocrats held ministerial positions tasked with overseeing much more relevant and autonomous tasks and, overall, depicting a new and compound picture of executive delegation. Three features in particular should be highlighted: 1) the drastic reduction of the number of ministers coming from the classical parliamentary-party pathway; 2) the demand of new policy competencies "cut" for specific portfolios and oriented toward the formulation of specific policy actions; 3) a more pronounced ministerial accountability, although limited to a few "strong ministers" of the core executive. Indeed, the ministers without portfolio were reduced in number and attributed more and more often to non-partisan or non-parliamentary figures, somehow directly connected to the figure of the chief executive. However, the evidence that clearly shows the necessity to pursue a more nuanced understanding of the landscape of ministerial personnel is the growing percentage of non-parliamentary actors among the junior ministers. This is a clear indicator of the reduction of the impact of the parliamentary path, even within the personnel of "political governments". Indeed, both Berlusconi (1994, 2001 and 2008) and Prodi (1996 and 2006) decided to incorporate into their governments some trustworthy figures from their own entourage or from the "civil society" as junior ministers in key positions (for instance, at the Presidency of the Council and at the Ministry of Economy and Finance). Among these figure, Gianni Letta (three times junior minister with Berlusconi) Enrico Micheli and Ricardo Levi (junior ministers with Prodi) and a number of experts and academics.

Selection and de-selection of ministers: Ambiguous indications of change

If this preliminary evidence signals some important changes in the profile of the Italian ministerial elite over the last two decades, we need to look more closely at a second (evidently connected) empirical dimension that is possibly influenced by the increase of technocratic penetration within the government. In particular, we need to consider the number of possible changes in the processes of selection and de-selection of ministers (Dowding & Dumont 2009) and, in the end, in the patterns of ministerial careers. Undoubtedly, the increase of ministers with non political profiles has been the cause of a

more complicated pattern of ministerial careers. *Insiders* and *outsiders* compete for some important posts even within purely political executives, where the PMs tend to promote a small group of *aides* in some key positions (see above). Interestingly, the duration of "non-aligned" ministers recruited between 1994 and 2011 (excluding the Monti government) is 2.4 years, while the group of ministers with no previous parliamentary experience (regardless of partisan identity) endured in office for an average of 2.6 years. The overall duration rate for this period is 3.0 years. Hence, as occurred during first republic, the average duration of "independent" ministers is lower than the duration in government of "pure politicians", but the much longer life expectancy of the governments reduces the difference between the two groups.

However, despite this opportunity for a broader typology of ministerial delegations (and of career patterns) there is not clear evidence of an increase in the capacity of the PM to *hire and fire* their own ministers. Certainly a powerful leader like Mr. Berlusconi had the opportunity to introduce some reshuffles during his long- lasting cabinets[3], but if we move to a more qualitative analysis we realize that the room for maneuver of the chief executive was not always so evident. It is true that in some cases where there was *policy shifting* caused by technocratic ministers Berlusconi could use the reshuffle tool to fire the disobedient delegates (ministers).[4] However, it is also evident that in other cases such demotions were delayed, and even sometimes not possible because of the specific political conditions, as occurred the peculiar relationship between Mr. Berlusconi and his long-term minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Tremonti, reveals[5].

In the end, the variable which played the most evident role in determining partial realignment in the processes of government formation and ministerial delegation has been the persistent instability of the party system. Surely, technocratic ministers could be more easily "managed" by their principals, but in a permanent transitional political scenario, even the role of technocrats was often confused and ambiguous. Some technical actors were oscillating between neutral and "partisan" attitudes and, in some cases; they transformed themselves into political actors.

The first appointment of Mr. Tremonti (as minister of finance) in 1994 was an example of technocratic appointee who socialized with the political party of his principal (Silvio Berlusconi). Mr Dini, another former technocratic minister appointed by Berlusconi, become leader of a fully technical government in 1995 and then, after founding his own parties and entering the parliament in 1996, one of the allies of Prodi (in 1996) and later of the Berlusconi's coalition. To some extent, even the former prosecutor of *Mani Pulite,* Mr. Di Pietro, played a similar game. After serving as external minister in the Prodi Cabinet (following the attempt by Prodi to attract him within the first experimental "party of democrats", between 1998 and 1999), he founded a new party, thus becoming one of the leaders of the new coalition supporting the Prodi II government in 2006.

All in all, we can say that the wider competition for ministerial positions that occurred after the crisis of the early nineties, confirms and underscores the increasing need for policy expertise, but it does not really suggest dramatic changes in the degree of PM's autonomy and in the patterns of division of the labor within the Italian cabinet.

[3] The cabinet Berlusconi II (2001-2005) saw 6 substitutions out of 24 ministers (25%). The cabinet Berlusconi IV (2008-2011) had 6 substitutions out of 22 ministers (28%, plus 2 ministers appointed to a late stage). Overall, the rate of substitutions of these governments is extraordinarily high in comparison to the past, when the rate of substitution was always under 10%.

[4] The most evident case what perhaps that of Minister of Foreign affair Ruggero, fired a few months after his appointment in 2001.

[5] Tremonti resigned in 2004 at the end of a long debate with some coalition partners, to be recalled in the same position in 2005. Appointed again as minister of economy and finance in 2008, Tremonti had a long dispute, this time with the same Berlusconi, but he was not reshuffled until the collapse of the whole cabinet at the end of 2011.

Ministerial structure and policy action of technical governments: a comparison between the cabinets Dini and Monti

So far, we have concentrated on the personal characters of the ministerial personnel and on the evolution of the system of delegation within the cabinet. The return of a *technical government* in the autumn of 2011, however, suggests the need to pay particular attention to "fully" technical governments, such as the one guided by Monti (2011-2013). In doing so, we suggest a comparison between the experience of Dini (1995-1996) and the Monti government, which can be interpreted as paradigmatic cases of technical government[6], presenting many very similar features. Among those similarities, it should be noted that these two cabinets were born from the crisis of a centre-right government, with dramatic problems of financial stability (especially in the case of 2011) and the increasing priority given to the budgetary process[7].

If we turn to the question "*who are really the tecnici?,"* we find several elements of similarity. The two cabinets, in particular, confirm a more general trend that can be observed across the technocratic personalities within Italian governments over the past three decades. beginning in the mid-eighties occupational origins such as university professors, expert professionals, *grand commis d'état*, judges and entrepreneurs increased among the ministerial personnel (reflecting the need of *policy expertise* described above). Indeed, the Dini and the Monti governments present a very similar spectrum of technical ministers. In details, the Dini cabinet presents 2 entrepreneurs and/or large business owners (Agnelli, Lombardi); 6 university professors (Arcelli, Fantozzi, Gambino, Clò, Salvini, Treu) who had also a substantial previous career as governmental experts; 8 *grand commis* and high bureaucrats (Dini, Masera, Corcione, Paolucci, Luchetti, Caravale, Guzzanti, Baratta) with an experience in ministerial offices or public banks; 3 judges (Mancuso, Brancaccio, Caianiello). In the Monti cabinet we find: 2 private or semi-private managers (Gnudi, Passera); 8 university professors (Balduzzi, Fornero, Giarda, Monti, Profumo, Ornaghi, Riccardi, Severino); 9 grand commis (Barca, Catania, Moavero Milanesi, Patroni Griffi, Catricalà, Di Paola, Cancellieri, Terzi, Clini).

These descritptive data suggest the dominance of the high bureaucracy (public or semi-public) and of experts, typically with an academic background. In most of the cases the specific competencies correspond to the portfolios allocated (a general to the defense, an ambassador to foreign affairs, a doctor to health, etc.). The limited number of private entrepreneurs or managers may have to do with economic considerations (a ministerial position entails for them significant economic losses compared to private sector salaries), but also with a weak propensity of Italian businessmen to assume public office. Professors and *grands commis* have greater job security (meaning they can return after government service), to which should be added in general a previous experience in advisory positions to ministers or parliamentary offices. They have also more to gain in terms of future professional advantages from their ministerial job.

Social and political backgrounds of government members confirm a rather similar profile of the two cabinets. First, the almost complete extraneousness of the personnel to the political elite confirms that we are dealing here with an exceptional type of government formation (technocratic). One should also note that when the technocratic demand forces the PM to recruit personalities from different environments, the scarce presence of women in the Italian power elite comes out clearly, as well as the relatively advanced age of the top elite.

Another question we should try to answer, looking to the structure of these two governments, in comparison to the other cabinets with "expert ministers" and isolated

[6] See Cotta & Verzichelli (2012) for an in depth discussion of all the conditions that an executive need to satisfy in order to be considered a truly technical government.

[7] In 1995-6 the Dini technical government had to keep the line of convergence in order to respect the timing of entrance in the EMU. In 2011 Monti had to correct the austerity policies already started by the previous government, in order to avoid a risk of default for the Italian public finance

technicians, is "Why the *Tecnici* and the *Governi tecnici* ?" A parsimonious hypothesis is that both can be related to a crisis of the parties and more in general of the party system. However we must probably maintain some distinction between the simple expansion in the use of technical ministers in the cabinet ranks and the more serious choice of the delegation to a technical government. In some way they can be both related to a "deficit" of the party model of government, but obviously the second points to a more serious one. The first indicates that on one side parties face problems in attracting sufficiently qualified people in their ranks, and thus to produce partisan ministers that are able to deal with highly complex problems. On the other side, this need is increasingly felt at governmental level and the solution is thus to recruit non-partisan ministers.

As for the "governi tecnici" it is not just a problem of having "qualified ministers," but of facing a situation where the party system for a number of reasons is not able to provide a governing majority. In this sense they are "interim governments" perceived as a transitory situation to be put in place while waiting for the moment when the party system will be able to face its political responsibilities directly. In the past with no possibility of alternation in government and with a strong party such as the DC the solution was a Christian Democratic "monocolore" government. Today a partisan interim solution seems less acceptable and a fully technical government is required when the parties are not able to take the responsibility for difficult decisions. The question that remains to be answered is why grand coalitions of the main parties are not explicitly adopted in Italy in such situations? A tentative answer is that the current weakness of the main parties induces them to avoid taking a more open responsibility in difficult times. A technical government provides them with a "screen" and allows the parties to avoid political responsibility.

A more in-depth analysis of the effective delegation within the government is needed to add robustness to our conclusions. What seems to be clear enough, from a rough reading of parliamentary chronicles, is that technical PMs have a limited policy delegation. In this sense they appear to be a sort of care-taker governments, although with some relevant missions. At the same time, however, they show a significant power of persuasion and, at the very end, the power to de-select ministers who are responsible for agent shirking or policy shifting. The affair of the parliamentary motion of no confidence against minister of Justice Filippo Mancuso (October 1995) demonstrates a clear case of "indirect demotion", since the PM (Dini) was not defending his minister. This event (and more in general the position of Dini on the reform of Justice and the European policies) determined a shift in the governmental action, with a new personal and political commitment of Dini[8] who was supported, during the last months of the cabinet, by the centre-left and the Northern League, but not from the Berlusconi's coalition. Under this point of view, a difference should be noted with the experience of Monti who, at least until the days we are drafting this paper, seems to act more as the external agent of a parliamentary "grand coalition", thus recalling somehow the experience of Ciampi rather than the cabinet Dini. In fact, Monti has always appeared more reasoned and moderate than his "policy makers" within the cabinet, and he has often used his power of persuasion to preempt harsh conflicts between one of the ministers and one of the political actors of the majority supporting the government[9].

Final considerations

At the end of this brief excursus on the relevance and evolution of the "technocratic" phenomenon in Italy, let us just underscore some of the main points of discussions. First of all, starting from the very end of our analysis, the *technical governments* (or at least the two we have considered as truly technical governments) were born from

[8] Mr. Dini would have joined the centre-left coalition during the electoral campaign of 1996.

[9] Particularly, Monti has played the role of mediator after the proposals of the minister of welfare (Fornero) and the minister of economic development (Passera) who have repeatedly caused reaction both in the centre-left and in the centre-right parliamentary wings.

the same pre-conditions: 1) deep crisis in the party-parliamentary sub-system; 2) strong political and financial emergence suggesting a new form of *interim* government which, in this phase of the Italian system, has substituted other forms of care-taker cabinets (Christian democratic *monocolore* supported by other parties, or other *non organic* coalition cabinets).

Secondly, the delegation given to the chief executive has implied a certain room of maneuver: we can call it *relative autonomy* of the chief executive, which has been reinforced by the increase importance of specific policy issues and from other factors which, according to the recent literature, influence the nature of delegation within the parliamentary democracies in Europe, namely the EU policy making and *presidentalization* (Johnasson & Talberg 2010).

A further implication is about the existence and character of delegation *within* the executive. Here we have argued, although utilizing a still preliminary analysis, that expertise (and autonomy) of a few ministers (core executive ministers and expert ministers) are now much more evident in comparison to the generalist figure of the classic party government. This has a clear impact in terms of ministerial career and ministerial duration. In the technical government, the delegation in the hands of a member of the cabinet is probably predictable, but not rigidly delineated in the governmental pledges. This implies a number of possible "attempts for reform" from different ministerial actors who will try to push some of their ideas, but also the possibility of a rigid "stop" imposed from the parliament. Both Dini and Monti had, albeit with different styles, to calm some ministerial claims and sometimes to contradict their own agents.

This last consideration brings us to the questions these few pages cannot answer: how good are the *tecnici*? And what about the effective policy impact of the *governi tecnici* ? What kind of problems they face …. and what problems they create ? These questions are clearly open to discussion. They are, most importantly; open to systematic research efforts needed to come.

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RESEARCH TRENDS

The Production of Quality: Comparative Wine Politics in France and Italy

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In 1976, virtually unknown Californian wine producers shocked the culinary world by beating top French Bordeaux houses at the blind tasting event known as "The Judgment of Paris." The challenge was repeated in 1986 and 2006, with Californian vintners emerging victorious each time. Yet as producers in other countries increasingly meet or surpass French producers in terms of quality, the price differential between French wines and other wines continues to increase (Wine Australia, 2010). France's closest competitor—both in terms of export wine prices and volumes—are quality Italian wine producers. While the Italian and French wine markets are at parity in terms of annual production volumes and average per unit price exported of table wines, the difference in the value conferred by exported regulated quality wines is significant. France's exported *appellation d'origine contrôlée* (AOC) wines average €5.59 per liter, whereas Italian *denominazione di origine controllata* (DOC) and *denominazione di origine controllata e garantita* (DOCG) export price averages €3.34. [1] What has enabled French producers to maintain this price dominance over high quality competitors, specifically Italian producers? As demonstrated in this essay, the consistent price and assigned value differences between these two groups rest less in the mysteries of market-logic and more in divergent politics. I characterize the structure of the French and Italian wine markets as supply dominant and demand dominant, respectively. I argue that these market structures are explained by patterns of producer organization and by the role of the state in legitimizing standards. The distinction between supply-dominant and demand-dominant markets has important implications for the construction and protection of market value: producers who create market demand operate in a more protected market space than producers who follow demand. As a result, the former have the potential to launch themselves into a higher-value tier than producers in the latter category.

Markets and politics: supply-dominant versus demand-dominant production chains

According to Gary Gereffi's analysis of global industrial supply chains, there are two types of commodity chains: producer-driven and buyer-driven. Producer-driven systems are characterized by high barriers to entry for the inputs of production. In contrast, buyer-driven commodity chains are highly competitive and controlled further down the production chain by branded manufacturers and retailers (Gereffi 1999). These commodity chains resemble French and Italian quality wine markets, where the French quality wine industry can be described as producer-driven (what I call supply-driven) and the Italian wine industry can be described as buyer-driven (or demand-driven). French regulatory institutions limit supply and put value in the hands of the few economic actors with legal access to the shared geographic *terroir* brand (i.e., growers within a protected appellation). Through the notion of *terroir*, French

[1] Regulated sparkling wines are omitted here, but if included, this difference would be even more pronounced: Champagne exports sell for €21.34/liter, whereas Italian sparkling wine exports average €2.30/liter (2010 EC-Eurostat export data).

producers create high barriers to entry for production inputs by equating quality with "intrinsic" geographic traits and generations of refined grape production know-how. On the other hand, Italian wine brands tend to rely more on the winemaker's brand and on wine guide scores than on the notion of government- regulated *terroir*. Italian quality is associated more with style and winemaking processes than on distinctive production inputs. Thus Italian producers must swim in more competitive waters where value is based not on a production input of scarce quantity, but on reproducible production processes.

I contend this is due to differences in the patterns of producer organization, the role of the state in legitimizing standards, and the types of market structures subsequently produced.

Table 1.1 A Comparison of Wine Market Structures

	France Quality Market (AOC)	Italian Quality Market (DOC)
Nature of competition	Quality.	Hybrid: Price/quality intersection.
Who sets standards	Wine industry	Market
Who owns the brand	Growers	Large wine producers, wine distributors, retail stores
Patterns of producer organization	Corporatist-associational	Autarchic-associational
Supply or demand dominant	Supply-dominant	Demand-dominant
State-society relations	Embedded, autonomous	Embedded, non-autonomous

Patterns of producer organization

Patterns of producer organization vary greatly between the French and Italian quality wine markets, and these patterns shape the subsequent distribution of power within the supply chain, leading to different definitions of quality and subsequently different levels of market protection. Specifically, the French quality wine sector follows a corporatist organizational structure, where power is equally shared between "upstream" grape growers and "downstream" wine merchants. In Italian wine production, the sector's organizational structure is associative: it relies on cooperation without any formal redistribution of power between one set of supply chain actors to another. The seeds of these differences are found in the early politicization and institutionalization of power structures in the two cases.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth century found French grape growers in frequent economic crisis, and growers framed this problem as the result of fraudulent mislabeling by French wine merchants. Harrison White argues that established producers try to fend off lower-priced market entrants by strengthening supply chain linkages to exclude lower-priced, lower quality producers from the market. This is the dynamic we observe in the French wine market, where producers organized to protect themselves from increased market competition: wine merchants were purchasing grapes from other, cheaper, new sources (Simpson 2011, Loubère 1990). To respond to these new market threats, growers organized to constrain the sourcing options of wine merchants: if a wine merchant wanted to use a geographic name on the label, the grapes had to be purchased from a grower within the specified geographic area. To construct these market barriers, the highly politicized French growers organized first into local grower *syndicats*, then into grower-merchant councils. In 1935, a national institution (the INAO) and national regulation (AOC) emerged to support and reinforce these local institutional innovations (Loubère 1990; Colman 2008).

Whereas French producers developed the AOC to protect their market space from new competitors, Italian wine regulation was constructed in an attempt to fortify the emerging Italian quality market. The regulation was not borne out of political struggle, and moreover, the regulation was

used as a means to improve quality (by specifying best practice procedures). Additionally, the production practices the early DOC protected were not best production practices and sometimes these practices actually damaged the wine; producers could make better quality wines by leaving the appellation (personal interviews, Vincenzo Zampi 2010; Aldo Vacca 2011). Thus consumers often found higher-priced, higher quality wines outside of the DOC regulation. These developments weakened the legitimacy of the DOC mark. One quality winemaker and political leader in Emilia-Romagna, summarizing the market influence of the DOC, said: "*Regulation is less important than wine experts. People don't trust the government mark*."

While Italian quality wine regulatory institutions were modeled after the French institutional structure, only the French model functions in a manner that parallels industrial corporatism. One reason for this difference is found in the different division of power within the local French regulatory body, the interprofessional council, versus their Italian counterpart, the *consorzio*. In both cases, the local institution governs the interests of a protected geographic brand, for example, Champagne or Montalcino.

In the French case, the interprofessional council splits power evenly between growers and merchants, and each producer is given one vote, regardless of output. The French institutional structure tends to equalize power between two previously unequal players: traditionally weak, numerous and interchangeable grape growers and the larger, more powerful (downstream) wine merchants. In this way, the French interprofessional structure resembles the corporative-associative order described by Streeck and Schmitter:

In a corporative –associative order, actors are *contingently* or *strategically interdependent* in the sense that actions of organized collectivities can have a predictable and determinant effect (positive or negative) on the satisfaction of other collectivities' interests, and this induces them to search for relatively stable pacts. To reach this stage, the contracting interest associations have to have attained some degree of symmetry in their respective resources, especially in their capability for representing the interests and controlling the behavior of their members, and an effective monopoly in their status as intermediaries for a given class, sector or profession (1985: 126).

Corporatism, as Wyn Grant suggested, has the potential to change the balance of political power in favor of the weaker groups in a capitalist market society (p. 25). In the French case, wine merchants agreed to give organized grape growers a geographically determined monopoly over a limited grape supply for two reasons: first, to secure some form of protection from the politically powerful grower groups, and second, to preempt the state from intervening and writing the market rules. As growers began cooperating with wine merchants (*négociants),* they ensured that high grape quality and adherence to traditional production became profitable for actors throughout the production chain. For example, Champagne grape growers have a monopoly over Champagne grape production, enabling them to earn as much as €5.50 per kilo. Champagne *négociants* pay more for their wine grapes than any other *négociant.* But instead of making Champagne uncompetitive, the quantity of Champagne is severely constricted, leading buyers to bid up prices in the luxury market: Champagne sells for €21.34 per liter, four times the amount of other regulated French wines (EC-EUROSTAT, 2007 prices). The protects farmers, but wine merchants are better off as well, as both parties benefit from the restricted supply, the perceived qualitative difference, and the notion of Champagne as a status product.

While French quality production is characterized by corporatist organization, fragmented cooperation across Italy's wine producers and the country's initial regulatory failures prevented protective regulation from altering power relationships between actors in the wine production process. As a result, Italian wine regulation such as the DOC never moved value upstream from merchants and distributors to grape growers, and indeed the

institutional structure was amended from the initial French style (with an even division of power between growers and merchants) to a new model where voting power is determined by output, regardless of supply chain position. The Italian structure frequently divides small producers—who try to compete on a differentiated product—from large producers, who produce on economies of scale. Grower power remains weak, and brand and value is located with large firms or with actors who have the ability to transform the grape, instead of placing value with a limited number of supply inputs. This places some quality producers in a favorable market space, but prevents them from attaining product attributes associated with singularity, uniqueness, and higher prices. As a result, they compete in a more crowded market space. Specifically, the differences in the location of supply-chain power shape French and Italian wine styles. The wine blog *The Zinquisition* summarized these differences between French (*terroir*-driven) wines and Italian (style-driven) wines: "*Terroir*-driven wines are often associated with wines of a "natural" style… with limited human intervention. Style-driven wines are wines where a winemaker strives to create a wine of a certain style…. These wines are also thought by critics to reveal less of their *terroir* as those subtleties are masked by the (human) intervention *(The Zinquisition*, December 2005, as cited in Corrado and Odorici 2009, p. 115).

The difference in supply chain value and in definitions of quality, then, is perceived to affect the extent to which a product can distinguish itself from similar competitors. French quality is perceived to be above concerns of market demand. The Italian wine strategy of wine guides and wine experts, on the other hand, orients production to changing consumer tastes. Elite Italian wine producers define quality, but they define it by anticipating market demand. As a result, Italian wines have competed in a more crowded, less protected market space.[1] As Aldo Vacca, wine historian and president of the Barbaresco wine cooperative, described in July 2011:

The traditional market is more unique. It has more of a market. It is more intriguing, more complex, you don't have all of this fruit but eventually you have layers of complexity… (Some producers have) started to realize what I always thought—if we want to sell our wines, we need to give a unique product. So maybe not wines that are fashionable at the moment, maybe not the most popular, but different. Otherwise, everyone is in the same market space.

The role of the state in legitimizing producer-determined standards

The structure of the wine market is further shaped by the ability of regulatory agencies to create an effective feedback mechanism with producers. Peter Evans' notion of "embedded autonomy" helps us understand this dynamic. Evans argues that embedded autonomy can actually enhance the ability of the state to develop a "constructed comparative advantage" (p. 82). According to Evans, an embedded-autonomy relationship can strengthen the state's capacity to acquire the information needed to effectively regulate the sector, while keeping the state sufficiently isolated to maintain some autonomy, securing better, more effective policy: "a coherent, cohesive state apparatus with close, institutionalized links to an economic elite would be more effective at

[1] While the Italian market structure may remain less protected than the French one, this provides one distinct advantage to Italian producers. In the French market structure, producers who operate outside of the AOC (42% of the market is outside of AOC regulation) are perceived to be without *terroir*, without history, and, despite great gains in wine quality, these producers are shut out of the quality market. However, Italian producers have been much more successful in establishing themselves as quality producers in the absence of the DOC mark, especially when they have access to capital and can hire a well-known enologist. So the Italian market structure is more upwardly mobile—if you have access to capital. The French market is more like a rigid nobility structure—wine quality, like noble titles, are granted at birth and are generally immutable. So while the French market may protect the insiders, the outsiders are disadvantaged; the Italian model provides more options for unregulated producers, but less protection for regulated ones.

producing industrial transformation than other kinds of state-society relations" (p. 225).

Evans' typology enables us not only to make sense of the successful French regulatory case, but it also sheds light on the limited success of Italian quality wine regulation. The Italian state bureaucracy is "embedded"—there are strong ties between the state and some groups within civil society, especially elite groups. However, the Italian bureaucracy is perceived to lack the autonomy associated with the Weberian state; specifically many view the state bureaucratic structure to be vulnerable to manipulation by the elite.[2] A lack of bureaucratic autonomy undermines the producer-state feedback loop, weakening the "fit" of the policy, the level of consumer trust in the mark, and the producers' ability to create a "constructed comparative advantage."

According to Professor Vincenzo Zampi, this political nature of the DOC inhibited the regulation from delivering effective results. "*When you want to create a new area, you need to allow people to experiment, learn, and find the best quality. Instead, politicians are in a rush to give a value-added to their constituents*" (personal interview 2010) Instead, the DOC protected, institutionalized, and gave a quality guarantee to many wines which had not yet found their highest quality production practices as a means to secure political patronage (personal interviews: Franco Ziliani 2009, wine industry expert, 2009, Italian enologist 2010, Vincenzo Zampi, 2010). Low levels of DOC bureaucratic autonomy harm the evolution of the sector in three ways. First, it may slow down the process of innovation (at least among some producers). Second, it may stigmatize the shared local geographic brand, if the region is associated with a low-quality wine. Third, the protection of lower-quality wines weakens the value of other DOCs, as the government mark no longer signifies an effective quality guarantee.

Additionally, French and Italian states have historically played different roles in regards to the construction of a centralized, hierarchical, elite-defined idea of quality. The French state has played a significant role in regulating the quality production dating from the seventeenth century (Shonfield, 1965, p. 79), providing a social origin for centralized definitions of quality (such as the AOC). During this time, quality was determined by the Sun King (Louis XIV), regulated by his finance minister Colbert, and the king's taste would be replicated by his court and through the social hierarchy. Consumers demonstrated their sophistication by converging on the king's definition of quality (Elias 1978). Conversely, the young Italian state (Italy was united only in 1861) had no history of regulating quality. Quality was hierarchical and defined by the local courts; a centralized, national quality hierarchy never emerged. Quality knowledge is deep in Italy, but it is not centralized. It is taught at the local level.

Relatedly, domestic consumption patterns vary in regards to regulated quality wines. DOC and DOCG wines accounted for only 25 percent of Italy's total domestic wine consumption in 2001; the parallel figure for French consumption during the same year was over 50 percent (Odorici and Corrado 2004, 115). According to a survey of French wine consumers, place of origin is the most important factor driving their purchasing decisions (d'Hauteville 2007). Italian consumption patterns, however, follow a different social cue. According to the Italian government's national wine report (2008), the best-selling wine in each Italian wine region is a local wine: "the best-selling geographic wine in each region are wines from that region, for example, Barolo in Piedmont, Valpolicella in Veneto, Lambrusco in Emilia Romagna, Chianti in Tuscany, Primitivo di Manduria in Puglia, Nero d'Avola in Sicily, and so on. Italian stores tend to carry major wines from all Italian wine regions, but consumers still exhibit a strong preference for regional wines" (ISMEA, 2008a). When Italian consumers venture beyond familiar local wines, wine guide scores play a significant role in comparison to the government's DOC mark—to the extent that a number of protected DOCs have annual production volumes of zero (based on

[2] For specific accusations of political corruption in quality wine regulation, see Franco Ziliani's blog http://www.vinoalvino.org

research conducted by Corrado and Odorici, personal interview Corrado and Odorici 2010).

Implications: politics, economics and value creation

Contrary to conventional wisdom, patterns of market competition are not necessarily determined by national regulations. France and Italy have similar regulatory regimes: both the *appellation d'origine contrôlée* (AOC, created in 1935) in France, and *denominazione di origine controllata* (DOC, created in 1963) in Italy—claim to protect *terroir*, or a delimited area with a distinct cultural heritage and geographic characteristics. The regulations link geographic areas with specific rules of production, including allowable grape varieties, maximum yields, and grape growing methods. These production standards are determined by the producers themselves, and they theoretically act as a *de facto* quality indicator, where the protected place names serve as a shared brand.

Despite the parallel regulatory apparatus, French producers operate in a more protected market space than their Italian counterparts. The difference in these market structures derives from the construction and protection of power in the supply chain. In the French wine supply chain, grape growers organized around the notion of *terroir*, and were successful in convincing wine merchants, the Ministry of Agriculture, and consumers that grape growing origin and technique determined wine quality. In the Italian market, grape growers were atomized and remain less politically coherent, and the guarantee of wine quality rests not with grape growers but with individually-owned brands and wine guides. French grape growers exert a tremendous amount of institutionalized political and economic power, whereas Italian growers remain in a relatively weak market position. This puts all Italian wine producers in a more competitive market space: know-how can be replicated and it is less inherently protected than a *terroir*-based brand, which is argued to have unique quality characteristics. Additionally, large branded firms and retailers dominate grape growers and small producers within the supply chain (ISMEA 2008b). As the market objectives of these large firms are price-based competition and consistent wines (ISMEA 2008b), this supply chain structure pushes small firms away from unique high quality experimentation.

French AOC commands high average prices because of a supply-dominant market approach. Central to the supply-dominant approach is the idea that the producer resists or creates demand rather than following it, and industry experts are better equipped to lead the market than the mass consumer base.[3] In other words, supply should not follow demand, but demand should follow supply. In wine, consumers have a notoriously difficult time in distinguishing between wines of variable qualities. The regulated supply-side approach attempts to solve this problem by aligning the consumer idea of quality with the producer definition; in other words, consumers align their preferences with what producers and the state deem as quality (Teil, 2004).[4]

On the other hand, Italian quality wines are "demand dominant", meaning they tend to respond to market signals. This is true both of large quality producers, who dominate their suppliers and tend to blend both mass market and quality-value production, and of small quality producers, who build their reputations via one of the five main Italian wine guides. Wine guides emerged in the 1980s, following the inability of Italian wine regulation to provide salient quality guarantees, and their rankings are inevitably influenced by the evolving tastes of their reader base (Odorici and Corrado, 2004). As demonstrated, Italian growers have historically remained less politicized and more fragmented than their French counterparts (Loubère, 1978); weakening their ability to tightly link wine quality to a geographically-

[3] A classic example of "supply-dominant" production is Apple. Steve Jobs aptly demonstrated the notion of supply-driven production when he said: "Consumers do not know what they want; you need to show them" (Isaacson, 2011).

[4] Even within the French case, more regions are more "supply-dominant" than others. For example, Burgundy is more "supply-dominant" than Bordeaux; see Colman 2008 or Laferté 2006.

based (and limited quantity) grape. Instead, wine quality has been defined principally by individual brands. The tendency toward individualist market orientation—as opposed to associative political logic—leads Italian wine production in the direction of demand-dominance, guided by the principle that the "consumer knows best".

There is an assumption in liberal economics that free markets—with atomized producers offering different products and buyers pursing different market preferences—will lead to efficient, utility-maximizing outcomes. Such a market model is appealing in theory. But as this paper suggests, certain forms of market cooperation can construct a perception of qualitatively different products.

High value-added wine markets provide an example of how producers politically construct the rules for value. Like other luxury markets, these markets are distinguished by limited supply, hierarchical and elite-defined notions of quality, and prices that vastly exceed production costs. They rely heavily on politically constructed market signals to indicate quality. French producers were the first to compete in the luxury wine market, and they responded to an increase in market competition by constructing a new definition of quality. This conception of quality valorised their product and kept potential competitors out of their market space. French grape growers were able to define this authenticity regime in terms of *terroir*—or the traditional best expression of a delimited geographic area—due to their political organization and the regulatory legitimacy of the state. Italian wine producers, conversely, developed their market with the intention to increase their market share. This reality, combined with the ways Italy's patterns of political organization differed from those in France, led an alternative authenticity to emerge in the Italian market.

One reason the French quality model operates at a higher price point could be explained by the argument that too much competition may actually be *detrimental* to the creation of value-added markets. Some authors have already described the potential tension between the notion of market efficiency (competition) and of "market slack" (Hirschman 1970) or market "monopolists" (Brooks 2012; Schumpeter 1942; Kim 2005). In *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, Albert Hirschman argues that a degree of "market slack"—or market inefficiency—allows firms to invest in the development of new products, improve production, take risks, anticipate market demand, and look to protect long-term market interests. Schumpeter takes this argument a step further, arguing that monopolies are better for the economy than competitive firms: "there are superior methods available to the monopolist which either are not available to a crowd of competitors or not available to them so readily" (1942, p 101).

Behind the idea of "monopolistic value creation" is the notion that firms should aim for unoccupied market space, where they can secure long-run market stability and a degree of market slack. This idea parallels the notion of protected supply dominant or producer dominant markets. Successful French AOC regions provide examples of how producers can create demand instead of responding to it and how "inefficient production" can benefit upstream producers, consumers, and even wine merchants. For other successful, high value-added sectors a degree of protection of upstream supply-chain power (i.e., power with suppliers, as opposed to distributors) is key to constructing a degree of market protection (Carter 2011). Critical to this upstream supply-chain power is creating the perception of unrivaled quality and restricting market supply.

A firm or a cluster of firms which has both a degree of market protection yet competes in the broader marketplace can enable firms to achieve a stable market niche. Competition can lead to efficient production and low prices, but too much competition can lead to commodification, a transferring of market risk to the most vulnerable production actors, and a collapse of market options for consumers. On the other hand, vertical and horizontal supply chain cooperation can decrease transaction costs, increase trust between actors, and contribute to the long-run health of a company or sector. It can help develop a sufficient economic cushion to fund research and development, enable creative

risks, and facilitate innovation. At its worst, cooperation can produce monopolies or oligopolies and protect inefficient producers. Ideally, producers strike the balance described by Schumpeter: enough market protection to provide a buffer from intense price-based competition, but enough exposure to product substitutes that encourages innovation and quality production. The idea of protecting upstream suppliers is central to building and maintaining value in competitive, integrated markets.

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Islam e modernizzazione: il caso iraniano nella storiografia italiana

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La rivoluzione iraniana del 1979 e la conseguente istituzione della Repubblica islamica d'Iran rappresentarono la spinta decisiva per l'affermazione sulla scena mondiale dei movimenti islamici integralisti, il cui obiettivo era quello di rifondare la società su basi religiose, trovando un qualche punto di contatto tra legge di Dio e legge dello Stato, in opposizione ai modelli di modernizzazione filoccidentali. Dopotutto, come ricordato da M. Campanini, quella del rapporto tra Islam e modernizzazione, era una questione che già dal secolo precedente animava il dibattito tra intellettuali, religiosi e leader islamici, che più volte avevano tentato di proporre una possibile conciliazione e che alla fine aveva creato due diverse correnti di pensiero, interne allo stesso mondo islamico. Da un lato c'era chi riteneva necessario adeguarsi al modello occidentale, avviando così un processo di modernizzazione dell'Islam, così come sostenevano gli intellettuali protagonisti della *nahda*, seppur ognuno con metodi ed obiettivi diversi; dall'altro c'era invece chi considerava l'Islam come un'ideologia capace di interpretare la modernità, senza il bisogno di doverla adattare ai modelli occidentali e proprio per questo proponeva l'islamizzazione della modernità, così come suggeriva il movimento *salafita*[1].

Tuttavia, se nel sunnismo radicale intellettuali come l'indiano Abu'l-Ala al-Mawdudi e l'egiziano Sayyid Qutb, predicavano il recupero di un Islam autentico, esplicitamente proposto come alternativa ai valori occidentali, per combattere lo stato di miscredenza in cui si trovava il mondo islamico [2], nel mondo sciita la teoria khomeinista del *velayat-e faqih* era riuscita ad avviare concretamente un processo di islamizzazione della modernità, prima caratterizzando in chiave islamica una rivoluzione e successivamente affidando al clero sciita un ruolo politico di assoluto rilievo nell'istituzione di uno stato islamico. Una "rivoluzione", nel senso proprio della parola, che da subito l'opinione pubblica occidentale tentò di circoscrivere alla sua dimensione religiosa, islamica, demonizzandola come se fosse un ritorno ai secoli bui del Medioevo sebbene l'Iran non fosse certo il paese in cui sembrava essere più probabile una rivoluzione all'insegna dell'Islam visto il suo carattere plurietnico, la mancanza di una precisa definizione territoriale e senza una comunanza di lingua e costumi. Nonostante ciò l'Islam diventò, nel corso delle rivolte degli anni Settanta, unico comune denominatore, così da portare molti ad abusare della facile equazione tra Iran e sciismo, e tra sciismo e identità iraniana[3]. Eppure, come ricorda M. Emiliani la rivoluzione iraniana solo in un secondo momento diventò "islamica", per il semplice fatto che l'islam era stato uno dei bersagli principali del percorso di modernizzazione imposto da Muhammad Reza, ma anche facilitato dalla rete capillare di cui poteva usufruire nel territorio, tra moschee, associazioni, fondazioni e scuole[4].

Di islamico c'era certamente il linguaggio, per cui Islam diventò sinonimo di "né Oriente né Occidente", dando un carattere spiccatamente internazionalista, o quanto meno che in una prima fase chiamava in causa l'intero mondo musulmano. Solo in un secondo momento, quando l'obiettivo di esportare la rivoluzione venne meno, ci si riferì in modo diretto allo sciismo, strumentalizzandolo per precise dinamiche di potere e rivisitandone la stessa tradizione, per rispondere alla sfida lanciata dalla modernità[5].

[1] Campanini M., *Storia del Medio Oriente. 1978-2006*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2006, p. 57; Lewis B., *La costruzione del Medio Oriente,* Laterza, Roma-Bari 2006, pp.150-151.

[2] Schulze R., *Il mondo islamico nel XX secolo. Politica e società civile*, Feltrinelli, Milano 2004, p. 13.

[3] Scarcia Amoretti B., *Il mondo musulmano*. *Quindici secoli di storia*, Carocci editore, Roma 1998, p. 234.

[4] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar. Rivoluzione, clero e potere in Iran*, Odoya, Bologna 2008, pp. 115-145.

[5] Scarcia Amoretti B., *Il mondo musulmano*. *Quindici secoli di storia*, Carocci editore, Roma 1998, pp. 230-231.

Perciò, per analizzare la storia della Repubblica islamica, è necessario interpretare nel modo più corretto la rivoluzione del 1979 da cui ebbe origine. In particolare, bisogna sfatare due luoghi comuni: la rivoluzione iraniana non fu una rivoluzione "clericale", né fu una rivoluzione "contro la modernità".

Per quanto riguarda il primo punto, M. Emiliani ha sottolineato come la capacità del clero iraniano fu proprio quella di essere l'unica classe in grado di reagire alle conseguenze della modernizzazione forzata imposta dallo scià, colmando i vuoti che man mano si crearono all'interno della società iraniana e sfruttandone le contraddizioni[6]; la religione, quindi, non si limitò a svolgere un ruolo dottrinale, ma contribuì anche ad inquadrare e stabilizzare la società, fino a trasformarsi, in forza trainante delle manifestazioni di piazza, capace di assemblare classi sociali diverse, addirittura antagoniste, tutte accomunate dal pensiero islamista[7]. Dopo aver appurato l'indiscusso ruolo da protagonista svolto dal clero sciita, la stessa M. Emiliani ha riportato il dibattito sviluppatosi circa la duplice interpretazione che diversi studiosi danno del ruolo da esso svolto come "promotore" della rivoluzione: se da un lato la corrente orientalista attribuisce l'avvio della rivoluzione all'iniziativa del clero sciita, c'è chi invece sostiene, l'ipotesi che il clero abbia solo canalizzato a proprio favore il movimento rivoluzionario, senza esserne il reale promotore[8]. Secondo quest'ultima ipotesi, ormai più accreditata, la rivoluzione iraniana solo in seguito diventò una "rivoluzione islamica", quando cioè le altre componenti che vi avevano partecipato attivamente furono oscurate e prevaricate dall'establishment religioso e soprattutto solo dopo che quest'ultimo riuscì a compattarsi intorno alla figura di Khomeini[9]. Fu solo alla fine degli anni Settanta che il clero sciita riuscì ad egemonizzare la rivolta, trasformando l'Islam in una bandiera e in uno slogan che accomunò giovani seguaci di Shariati o delle ideologie marxiste e guerrigliere, la borghesia medio alta erede di Mossadeq, insieme con mullah, ayatollah e studenti delle scuole coraniche, commercianti dei bazari e soprattutto donne, che trasformarono il velo, da cui lo scià le aveva svincolate, in un simbolo di libertà. Fu con l'acutizzarsi della crisi iraniana e della violenta repressione esercitata dal regime che il clero decise di fare fronte comune attorno a Khomeini, facendolo diventare un simbolo della battaglia e facendo prevalere definitivamente l'Islam "nero" sull'islam "rosso". Per quanto riguarda il secondo punto, ovvero la questione dello scontro con la modernità, è sempre M. Emiliani a ricordare che, per poter capire la rivoluzione iraniana e in particolare la successiva fase di istituzionalizzazione, è necessario esaminare proprio il rapporto tra clero e modernità. Anche se nata dallo scontro con essa, la rivoluzione iraniana non l'ha mai negata, ma ne ha proposto una nuova interpretazione, cercando in qualche modo di attualizzare un ideale islamico che non riusciva a rimanere al passo coi tempi[10]. Modernizzazione, come ricorda Focault, non intesa come processo evolutivo, ma percepita come un progetto arcaico e totalizzante, imposto per decenni dalle dinastie che avevano governato il paese[11].

Senza approfondire l'analisi sulla filosofia khomeinista, è tuttavia necessario ricordarne i punti cardine: proponeva di superare il carattere quietistico che vincolava gli sciiti a subire anche i governi miscredenti, consentire ai giurisperiti di sostituire l'*imam* nascosto nelle funzioni politiche, promuovere una rivoluzione islamica come strumento di

[6] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar,* cit, pp. 122-123.

[7] Kepel G., *Jhiad. Ascesa e declino. Storia del fondamentalismo islamico*, Carocci,Roma 2001,p. 119-120, citato in Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar,* cit., p. 123.

[8] Si veda, ad esempio: Keddie N., *Religion and politics in Iran. Shi'ism from quietism to revolution*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1983; Arjomand S. A., *The turban for the crown. The Islamic revolution in Iran*, Oxfors University Press, New York and Oxford 1988 citati in Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar,* cit., p.122

[9] Foucault M., *Taccuino persiano*, Guolo R. e Panza P.L. (a cura di), Guerini e Associati, Milano 1998, pp. 84-85.

[10] Ibidem.

[11] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar,* cit., p.122; Focault M., *Lo scià ha cento anni di ritardo*, "Corriere della sera", 1 ottobre 1978, sta in Focault M. *Taccuino persiano*, cit.

liberazione per gli oppressi e teorizzare la realizzazione di un *repubblicanesimo islamico*[12]. Tutti elementi innovativi che fecero dell'Islam lo strumento principale per cambiare lo *status quo* politico e del khomeinismo la base per la nascita di un nuovo Iran islamico.

Come messo in evidenza da B. Scarcia Amoretti, la teoria del *velayat-e faqih* khomeinista incontrò opposizioni e resistenze anche all'interno dello stesso clero sciita proprio perché ne contraddiceva alcuni dei principi fondamentali[13]. Resistenze che non solo si mantennero vive all'interno della Repubblica islamica post-rivoluzionaria ma che andarono a costituire quello che molti autori, come M. Ranuzzi de'Bianchi e R. Guolo definiscono come uno dei problemi politici interni principali, ovvero quello del fazionalismo, definito anche "multipartitismo estremo"[14]. Ad ogni modo, la parte del clero, attivista e combattente, intuì che il solo modo per continuare a svolgere un ruolo influente nel paese era quello di porsi all'altezza della sfida posta dalla modernità, così che alla "modernizzazione dell'Islam", tanto auspicata dai Pahlavi, contrappose questo nuovo progetto di "islamizzazione della modernità", che ebbe la sua base proprio nella filosofia khomeinista[15], e nella stessa campagna di reislamizzazione attuata nel periodo post-rivoluzionario. Inoltre, come osservato acutamente da M. Campanini, anche l'ideologia khomeinista non deve assolutamente essere considerata come qualcosa di "medievale", anzi deve essere letta come frutto dell'incontro con la modernità: sono moderni gli strumenti di propaganda utilizzati da Khomeini, è innovativo il messaggio che il radicalismo si propone di trasmettere perché contestualizzato sulla base delle condizioni politiche e sociali contemporanee e lo stesso concetto di stato islamico è qualcosa di completamente nuovo, nato in opposizione (almeno di principio) alle idee Occidentali, ma che propone un progetto che fino ad allora nessuno aveva mai preso in considerazione[16].

Non è eccessivo, a questo punto, affermare che l'istituzione della Repubblica islamica d'Iran, come la filosofia khomeinista che ne sta alla base, possano essere interpretate come il tentativo concreto, l'unico, di trovare un punto di contatto tra Islam e modernizzazione.

Con questi presupposti, si può analizzare la storia della Repubblica islamica riducendo il rischio di cadere in facili distorsioni eurocentriche o viziate da schemi mentali, tipicamente occidentali, che hanno portato in passato a leggere la storia dell'Iran alla luce della falsa dicotomia tradizione/modernità.

Un contributo importante, in tal senso è stato fornito, per quel che riguarda la storiografia italiana, da autori come F. Sabahi, R. Guolo, e, il più recente, R. Redaelli, che con i loro lavori monografici sono riusciti a proporre un completo quadro d'insieme, ricostruendo le vicende storiche iraniane dal punto di vista politico, economico e sociale. Per quanto riguarda, invece, il ruolo svolto nello specifico dal clero sciita nella storia dell'Iran, e in particolare nella storia della Repubblica islamica, un contributo fondamentale è stato dato da M. Emiliani, M. Ranuzzi de' Bianchi e E. Atzori, che ripercorrendo le tappe storiche dell'Iran dalla fine dell'Ottocento ad oggi, hanno tracciato con precisione la "lunga marcia verso il potere del clero sciita", fino ad arrivare all'intricato sistema istituzionale iraniano, tutt'ora esistente.

Così come proposto da R. Guolo, la storia della Repubblica islamica può essere divisa in quattro fasi. La prima, quella "rivoluzionaria" (1979-1989), caratterizzata dall'egemonia politica dei radicali e dalla

[12] Per approfondire: Khomeini R, *Il governo islamico. O l'autorità spirituale del giureconsulto*, Il Cerchio, Rimini 2006; Abrahamian E., *Khomeinism: essays on the Islamic republic*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1993; Keddie N., *Religion and politics in Iran. Shi'ism from quietism to revolution*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1983.

[13] Scarcia Amoretti B., *Il mondo musulmano*, cit., p.231.

[14] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar*, cit., pp. 204-206 e Guolo R., *La via dell'imam. L'Iran da Khomeini ad Ahmadinejad*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari 2007, pp. 64-65.

[15] Guolo R., *Avanguardie della fede. L'islamismo tra ideologia e politica*, Guerini e Associati, Milano 1999, pp. 46-47.

[16] Campanini M., *Storia del Medio Oriente,* cit., p. 169.

guerra imposta con l'Iraq; la seconda, della "ricostruzione" (1989-1997), contraddistinta dall'alleanza del clero khomeinista con i pragmatici, il cui leader, Rafsanjani, tentò una modernizzazione del paese tramite un'apertura, soprattutto economica, all'Occidente, ed una politica estera fondata sulla Realpolitik; la terza fase, del "pluralismo" (1997-2005), inaugurata dalla presidenza Khatami, segnata da vari tentativi di apertura e nuove proposte, prima fra tutte quella della democratizzazione della società, che però si rivelarono del tutto illusori soprattutto a causa del continuo e lacerante scontro con l'opposizione conservatrice; infine, l'ultima fase, quella della "restaurazione rivoluzionaria" iniziata con l'elezione dell'utlraconservatore Ahmadinejad (2005), da molti interpretata come conseguenza inevitabile della delusione riformista ma soprattutto delle minacce provenienti dall'arena internazionale, e, in particolare, dall'avventura dei *neocon* statunitensi prima in Afghanistan e dopo in Iraq[17].

Il 1° febbraio 1979 Khomeini tornò in patria, pronto a raccogliere i frutti dell'unica vera rivoluzione popolare avvenuta nel panorama islamico e medio-orientale ed il 1 aprile 1979 venne ribattezzato dallo stesso Khomeini "il primo giorno del governo di Dio" dopo che un referendum nazionale aveva sancito la nascita della Repubblica islamica. Per la prima volta nella storia iraniana il clero si dotò di un partito, il Partito repubblicano islamico (Pri), basato sull'ideologia fondamentalista e sul principio khomeinista del *velayat-e faqih*, che sfruttando la rete delle moschee ebbe lo scopo rimpiazzare tutti gli altri partiti e porre fine a quella fase spontaneista e populista della rivolta, eliminando anche le sinistre e i liberal-moderati dallo scenario politico e raggiungendo così il pieno controllo del territorio nazionale. Il Partito repubblicano islamico (Pri) si dichiarò anti-capitalista e anti-imperialista, prese le distanza tanto dagli Stati Uniti quanto dall'Unione Sovietica, fissò il suo obiettivo nella reislamizzazione della società e si dotò di una propria milizia, *basiji*, formata per lo più da volontari, che come per i *pasdaran* provenivano dalle fasce più povere della popolazione e nutrivano una devozione estrema per Khomeini. Fu anche grazie a loro che il Pri riuscì ad esercitare il controllo sui comitati rivoluzionari, sui mass media e sulle nuove istituzioni statali, anche se inizialmente dovette confrontarsi con la maggioranza del clero sciita, che rifiutava di accettare pienamente i principi khomeinisti.

Tuttavia, come ricorda B. Scarcia Amoretti, ad influenzare più di ogni altra cosa la prima fase della Repubblica islamica furono gli avvenimenti esterni[18]. Primo fra tutti la guerra con l'Iraq, quella che V. Strika definisce "guerra dimenticata", in riferimento sia alla durata decennale che al poco interesse mostrato dalle grandi potenze e dall'ONU[19]; la stessa guerra che R. Guolo descrive come "poco moderna" fatta di campi trincerati e minati, di scontri di fanterie e, soprattutto, che costituì il terreno fertile per il divulgarsi di una nuova ideologia, quella del martirio e del sacrificio in nome della rivoluzione, onnipresente nella storia della Repubblica islamica e che da questo momento diventò la base per la nascita del futuro "partito dei militari" [20]. L'altro grande avvenimento esterno fu la presa dell'ambasciata americana e la crisi degli ostaggi, determinante per il futuro dell'Iran sia per la totale rottura dei rapporti diplomatici con Washington che per le sanzioni. Ma anche perché a partire da questo episodio la fazione di Khomeini riuscì a far riemergere e strumentalizzare un altro aspetto ideologico, quello del nazionalismo[21]. F. Sabahi sottolinea come l'episodio contribuì all'ulteriore isolamento dell'Iran nel contesto internazionale, anche rispetto allo stesso mondo islamico, mentre gli storici continuano ad interrogarsi sulla natura dell'azione, cioè se considerarla una mossa spontanea, ancora una volta strumentalizzata da Khomeini con

[17] Guolo R., *La via dell'imam,* cit., pp. V-VI

[18] Scarcia Amoretti B., *Il mondo musulmano*, cit., p. 232.

[19] Strika V., *La guerra Iran-Iraq e la guerra del golfo*, Liguori editore, Napoli 2003, p. 11.

[20] Guolo R., *La via dell'imam*, cit., pp. 43-45.

[21] Coville T., *Iran. La devolution invisible*, La Découverte, Paris 2007, citato in Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar*, cit., pp. 143-144.

estrema abilità, oppure una mossa strategica realizzata dallo stesso[22].

Altro elemento condizionante il futuro della Repubblica islamica, emerso sempre in questa prima fase, fu quello dello "stato duale" o "stato parallelo", reso esplicito nella stessa Costituzione del 1979 che R. Guolo definisce "Costituzione a modello carismatico", scaturita dal braccio di ferro tra il Pri e gli altri attori rivoluzionari e che vedeva, e vede, convivere al suo interno elementi islamici, democratici e secolarizzanti[23]. Così come illustrato da P.L. Petrillo, è proprio il coincidere degli elementi religiosi con quelli politici che porta a definire lo Stato iraniano "teocratico", in quanto l'ordinamento religioso è costituzionalizzato e ai religiosi è attribuito un ruolo politico attivo. Convivono, dunque, esigenze politiche ed economiche con esigenze spirituali. Per le prime furono previsti organismi a legittimazione popolare diretta, come l'elezione del Presidente della Repubblica, dei rappresentanti del parlamento, dei membri del Consiglio dei guardiani, anche se la tradizione del pensiero islamico sciita, impone che la partecipazione attiva del popolo sia concepita come un derivato della volontà divina, cui spetta la sovranità assoluta del mondo e dell'umanità. Per le esigenze spirituali, invece, furono preposti organismi di derivazione religiosa, introducendo una novità anche nel panorama sciita: mentre prima al clero era riconosciuto il ruolo di interprete della tradizione e della legge coranica, con il khomeinismo la costituzione gli attribuì il potere di vagliare la legislazione parlamentare in modo che risulti conforme al Corano e alla *sunna* [24].

Questa volontà di conciliare elementi laici con elementi religiosi diede luogo a delle forzature: il teorema del *velayat-e faqih* in commistione con la cultura occidentale fece in modo che esistesse un presidente eletto sopraffatto dalla Guida della rivoluzione (*faqih*), un parlamento i cui poteri furono privati dal Consiglio dei guardiani, ed una sovranità popolare negata dai *mojtahed* (giuristi islamici). Alla luce di ciò, M. Emiliani nota come, così come la modernizzazione dei Pahlavi, anche il *velayat-e faqih* diventò un sistema totalizzante, imposto dall'alto e pieno di contraddizioni, sorte proprio dall'incontro con l'Occidente che Khomeini si propose di interpretare ed adattare alla tradizione sciita[25].

Il tentativo di armonizzare principi religiosi e politici fece in modo che l'Iran diventasse un modello singolare anche nello stesso mondo islamico, perché se da un lato adottò un governo basato sul suffragio universale e sulla garanzia dei diritti fondamentali, dall'altro diede vita ad una "teocrazia costituzionale", in cui la legge islamica coincise con la legge dello Stato. Da qui la nascita del dibattito sulla natura "teocratica" della Repubblica islamica, anche se c'è chi sostiene che comunque il modello iraniano deve essere considerato un modello secolare, proprio perché è lo Stato a definire il ruolo del clero, e non viceversa. Rimane comunque il fatto che Khomeini riuscì a trasformare il clero da "interprete" del volere divino in un "monarca secolare" per volere divino[26].

La prima fase della Repubblica islamica può considerarsi conclusa con la morte di Khomeini, il quale poco prima aveva avvertito la necessità di procedere ad una revisione costituzionale in modo da colmare le lacune manifestate dallo stato islamico di sua creazione fin dai primi anni della sua nascita; revisione costituzionale che permise l'elezione di 'Ali Khamenei a nuovo *rahbar*, nonostante fosse carente dei requisiti religiosi tipici dei grandi *ayatollah* [27]. Questo ovviamente costituì un ulteriore pretesto per l'affermazione del fazionalismo interno

[22] Sabahi F., *Storia dell'Iran*, Mondadori, Milano 2006, pp.169-171.
[23] Guolo R., *La via dell'imam,* cit., pp. 158-168.
[24] Petrillo P. L., *Iran*, cit., pp. 89-90; Buchta W., *Who rules Iran? The structure of power in the Islamic Republic*, Institute for Near Est policy, Washington DC 2000.
[25] Schirazi A., *The constitution of Iran. Politics and state in the Islamic republic*, I.B. Tauris, London – New York 1997, citato in Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar*, cit., pp. 137-138.
[26] Guolo R., *Avanguardie della fede*, cit., p. 46; Roy O., *The failure of political Islam,* Harvard University Press, Boston 1994; Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar,* cit., p. 141.
[27] Petrillo P. L., *Iran*, cit., pp. 63-66.

all'establishment clericale[28], in quanto molti si rifiutarono di riconoscere l'autorità del successore di Khomeini, tuttavia, come sottolineato da R. Redaelli, a differenza degli altri possibili candidati, Khamenei rappresentò una garanzia per il gruppo di potere affermatosi nel periodo post-rivoluzionario, soprattutto per il settore giudiziario, burocratico e militare [29].

Questi i presupposti che inaugurarono la seconda fase della Repubblica islamica, durante la quale Khamenei, come osservato attentamente da M. Ranuzzi de'Bianchi, decise di rafforzare la sua immagine non più cercando la legittimazione religiosa, ma aggrappandosi a quella politica, così come dimostrato dalle continue interferenze nei lavori dell'esecutivo o del parlamento, dai rapporti intrattenuti con i grandi agenti economici, della finanza e dello stato sociale islamico, quegli stessi soggetti che sicuramente contribuirono anche a fargli raggiungere la carica di Guida della rivoluzione, nonostante gli evidenti limiti nella gerarchia religiosa [30]. Diversamente l'allora presidente Rafsanjani si concentrò molto di più sulle questioni economiche, legate soprattutto alle difficoltà derivanti dal lungo conflitto con l'Iraq e per il quale era necessario avviare il processo di ricostruzione del paese.

Rafsanjani si distinse soprattutto per le scelte di politica estera, in particolare per il tentativo di riavvicinamento con gli Stati Uniti e con l'Europa, con la quale era in corso il progetto del "dialogo critico", interpretata dai conservatori e dai radicali come una prova del "complotto del nemico" per minare i fondamenti della Repubblica islamica[31]. Infatti, a partire dalla sua seconda rielezione, i segnali intimidatori da parte della fazione di Khamenei, quella comunemente definita "conservatrice", diventarono sempre più espliciti, tanto da portare il presidente Rafsanjani ad allinearsi ad essi definitivamente, sacrificando totalmente la sua politica per tenere salda la poltrona e non compromettere i suoi interessi economici.

È sempre R. Redaelli a contestualizzare i problemi della Repubblica islamica alla luce dei nuovi equilibri internazionali che si erano delineati: la mancanza di un antagonista globale portò Washington a ritenere che fosse possibile controllare il Golfo avendo come unico punto di riferimento l'Arabia saudita, mentre verso le altre due potenze regionali, cioè Iran e Iraq, venne adottata una politica di pressione definita "Dual containment". Questa nuova politica consisteva nel far crollare il regime al potere in Iraq, tramite le sanzioni e le continue pressioni internazionali, e nel mantenere nell'isolamento internazionale, politico ed economico, l'Iran. L'ostilità degli Stai Uniti per la Repubblica islamica si basava soprattutto su tre motivi: il sostegno dell'Iran al terrorismo internazionale (quale era considerato il sostegno agli *Hezbollah* libanesi che combattevano contro le forze di occupazione israeliane in quella regione), l'opposizione iraniana al processo di pace di Oslo e il presunto tentativo iraniano di dotarsi di armi di distruzione di massa[32].

Ma la crisi della Repubblica islamica, emersa esplicitamente dalla morte del suo fondatore, non riguardò soltanto la sfera dei rapporti internazionali, o quella dello sviluppo economico, bensì l'intera società, intesa come società civile ma anche come comunità religiosa.

Così gli anni Novanta furono caratterizzati da questa crisi di identità, che portò alcuni intellettuali a definirsi "post-islamisti", ovvero coloro che, come spiegato da Campanini, avendo preso parte alla

[28] Per quel che riguarda le correnti interne ai gruppi politici iraniani si veda Moslem M, *Factional politics in post-Khomeini Islam*, Syracuse University Press-Eurospan, Syracuse (NY)-London 2002, citato in Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar,* cit. pp. 207-210.

[29] Redaelli R., *L'Iran contemporaneo*, Carocci Editore, Roma 2009, p. 67

[30] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar,* cit., pp. 188-190.

[31] Redaelli R*., Iran: l'incerto cammino delle riforme*, sta in Borsa G., Molteni C., Montessoro F., *Trasformazioni politico-istituzionali dell'Asia nell'era di Bush,* Il Mulino, Bologna 2001, p.14.

[32] Id., *La posizione occidentale verso l'Iran: containment e dialogo critico*, sta in Colombo A. (a cura di), *L'Occidente diviso. La politica e le armi*, Università Bocconi Editore, Milano 2004, p. 228.

rivoluzione, iniziarono a volerla superare, rompendo il legame tra stato e religione, senza però perdere di vista i principi islamici[33]. Si diffuse la concezione che la religione si sarebbe potuta salvare proprio attraverso la secolarizzazione dello stato, intesa come graduale ritiro del clero dalla politica, il quale a sua volta avrebbe così potuto riacquistare la propria autonomia. Iniziò a farsi strada l'idea di "democrazia islamica", dove la religione sarebbe stata difesa sulla base della volontà popolare[34].

In questo clima emerse il discorso teologico di Khatami che, idealizzando una "società civile islamica", optò per una "terza via" tra il neotradizionalismo dei conservatori e il dogmatismo ideologico dei radicali, insistendo soprattutto sul rapporto tra democrazia e religione[35]. In questo modo cominciò la terza fase della Repubblica islamica, il cosiddetto periodo del pluralismo, analizzato in modo contraddittorio, come fa notare R. Redaelli sintetizzando le diverse interpretazioni storiografiche sul tema, vuoi perché ancora abbastanza recente per trarne reali conclusioni, vuoi per delle forzature interpretative utilizzate nel tentativo di dare una lettura il più comprensibile e lineare al mondo occidentale. Perciò alcuni presentano gli otto anni di illusione riformista come una lotta tra i buoni e i cattivi, rappresentati rispettivamente dalla società civile, che diede vita ad un movimento spontaneo di liberazione, contro gli oppressori delle elitè di potere, arroccate ai privilegi e alla corruzione. Modello interpretativo usato ancora oggi per raccontare gli scontri politici tra riformisti e conservatori che animano il paese. Secondo questa visione ci sarebbe stata una netta contrapposizione tra potere effettivo, costituito da *rahbar*, Consiglio dei guardiani, clero khomeinista e *pasdaran*, e il paese reale, ovvero la società civile che aveva finalmente trovato una forma di espressione istituzionale nei riformisti. Altri invece hanno descritto la parentesi riformista sottolineandone gli elementi di continuità con le fasi precedenti, soprattutto in considerazione del fatto che lo stesso presidente Khatami, così come tutti coloro che teorizzarono dei mutamenti degli equilibri politici, lo fecero in quanto membri del clero iraniano[36].

Allo stesso modo è stato interpretato il modernismo di Khatami: non come antagonista della rivoluzione islamica, ma come un processo che si è sviluppato all'interno di essa, tanto che il riformismo islamico, nato dalla presa di coscienza dei problemi del paese, non è mai arrivato a proporre alcun sistema alternativo, e fa bene M. Ranuzzi de'Bianchi a ricordare che anche quando si parlava di concetti come "società civile" o "stato di diritto" si faceva sempre nel contesto della società civile islamica e sotto il primato del *velayat-e faqih*[37]. E, come suggerito da P. L. Petrillo, quando si parlava di "sovranità popolare", ci si riferiva ad una "democrazia religiosa" che non presupponeva né il secolarismo né il liberalismo[38], ma che piuttosto sembrava esprimere la necessità di dover controllare "eticamente" la modernizzazione.

L'altro grande argomento affrontato da Khatami fu quello del rapporto con l'Occidente. Pur affermando l'alterità della Repubblica islamica rispetto al mondo occidentale, egli distinse tra Occidente-sistema e Occidente-civiltà, ritenendo possibile avviare un discorso di apertura politica con quest'ultimo, escludendo uno scontro militare e promuovendo un confronto razionale[39]. Propositi messi totalmente in discussione dopo gli attentati dell'11 settembre 2001, in seguito ai quali fu stravolta la posizione internazionale dell'Iran. Dopo un timido dialogo iniziale tra Washington e Teheran, dovuto sia all'atteggiamento accomodante tenuto dal presidente, sia dal

[33] Campanini M., *Il pensiero islamico contemporaneo*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2005, pp. 103-111; Brumberg D., *Reinventing Khomeini. The struggle for reform in Iran*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001.

[34] M. Ranuzzi de'Bianchi ricorda che se Shariati era stato il teologo dell'islamismo, Soroush lo è stato del post-islamismo, per approfondire: Soroush A., *Reason, Freedom and democracy in Islam*, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2000.

[35] Khatami M., *Religione, libertà e democrazia*, Laterza, Roma – Bari, 1999, pp. 65-90.

[36] Redaelli R., *L'Iran contemporaneo*, cit., pp. 81-83

[37] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar*, cit., pp. 259-260.

[38] Petrillo P. L., *Iran*, cit., pp. 89-92.

[39] Khatami M., *Religione, libertà e democrazia*, cit., p. 24-25.

fatto che l'Iran era un avversario storico dei *taliban* e che in Afghanistan sosteneva da tempo l'Alleanza del Nord (decisiva per l'intervento statunitense in quel paese), la situazione cambiò, sia da parte iraniana, dove i riformisti furono accusati di tradire i valori della costituzione islamica, ma soprattutto da parte statunitense, quando G. W. Bush decise di inserire l'Iran nell'"Asse del Male".

Perciò, il progetto di "democrazia religiosa" di Khatami si scontrò definitivamente con quello di "esportazione della democrazia e della libertà" dei *neocon* statunitensi, dando ragione a quanti avevano accolto con diffidenza le aperture del presidente riformista.

Ad ogni modo, il vero punto debole che ha portato a definire fallimentare la stagione riformista iraniana, può, ancora una volta, essere ricondotto al consolidato dualismo presente nello stato iraniano e alle infinite contraddizioni che di volta in volta emersero: la legittimità politica si trovava là dove il potere era assente, mentre mancava totalmente dove questo era massicciamente presente, così mentre i riformisti si richiamavano all'opinione pubblica e alla legittimazione popolare, i conservatori si facevano forti dei principi costituzionali e della natura teocratica del *velayat-e faqih*[40].

Interrogandosi su ciò che rimase degli otto anni di riformismo, M. Ranuzzi de'Bianchi evidenzia i cambiamenti, le rotture e l'ulteriore frammentazione che colpirono la società iraniana: il movimento studentesco, radicale all'epoca dei Pahlavi e islamo-radicale negli anni della rivoluzione, si trasformò in un fenomeno dalla forte connotazione democratica, rinunciando alla violenza e promuovendo la partecipazione popolare, gli intellettuali abbandonarono le loro visioni islamiste o marxiste per sviluppare l'idea di una democrazia religiosa in conflitto col modello teocratico. Sempre M. Ranuzzi de' Bianchi individua, a ragione, ben tre movimenti principali che da lì in poi caratterizzarono lo scenario politico-sociale iraniano: la volontà estremista, espressione dei pasdaran, la volontà dei conservatori, espressione di una teocrazia dura e pura, e, infine, la volontà di una parte riformista, espressione dei movimenti sociali [41].

Ebbe inizio così l'ultima fase storica, ancora non conclusa, quando alle elezioni del 2005 venne eletto presidente Ahmadinejad. Dopo un'intensa campagna elettorale e le successive polemiche sui brogli, la vittoria del presidente neo-conservatore rappresentò in qualche modo una novità nella storia della Repubblica islamica. L'elezione di Ahmadinejad fu considerata da alcuni come il culmine di quel processo di avvicinamento tra ambienti militari e parte del clero, che durante gli anni di presidenza Khatami avevano ogni giorno dovuto combattere per conservare il sistema rivoluzionario dalla minaccia riformista, dando vita a quel fenomeno che fu in seguito definito "militarizzazione della politica" [42]. C'è chi, invece, sostenne che l'elezione di Ahmadinejad, erroneamente definito "l'uomo di Khamenei", rappresentasse proprio la sconfitta del clero, soprattutto per il fatto che il leader ultraconservatore fu il primo presidente, tranne la breve parentesi di Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr (25 gennaio-22 giugno 1980), a non appartenere al clero sciita [43]. Sebbene strettamente legato all'ayatollah ultraconservatore Mesbah-Yazdi, egli sosteneva che spettasse al partito, e non al clero, comandare sulla rivoluzione; un partito composto, soprattutto, da *basiji* e *pasdaran*. Rivendicò dunque un maggior coinvolgimento, se non un ruolo da protagonista, di tutti coloro che, come lui, da giovani "martiri" avevano difeso con il sangue la rivoluzione (riferendosi in particolare agli anni di guerra combattuti contro l'Iraq), al contrario dei chierici rimasti "imboscati" nelle retrovie.

In realtà, come specificato da R. Guolo, sebbene alcuni considerassero Ahmadinejad una pura appendice di Khamenei, egli non era perfettamente allineato con il clero khomeinista che faceva capo alla Guida. Nello specifico, il "presidente con l'elmetto" non condivideva

[40] Petrillo P. L., *Iran*, cit.; Buchta W., *Who rules Iran?,* cit.

[41] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar*, cit., pp. 259-260.

[42] Id., pp. 294-296.

[43] Guolo R., *La via dell'imam*, cit, pp. 114-115.

l'interpretazione *velayat-e faqih* khomeinista riguardo al rapporto tra politica e religione, secondo il quale il potere politico spettava al clero in sostituzione dell'Imam Nascosto; Ahmadinejad sosteneva, piuttosto, che il suo compito era quello di preparare attivamente il ritorno del Dodicesimo Imam. Come fatto notare da F. Sabahi, questa visione mistica ovviamente metteva in discussione sia il concetto di teocrazia che quello di democrazia, considerate obsolete, così come veniva messa in discussione non solo il ruolo di Khamenei ma di tutto il clero sciita, che tornavano ad essere considerati semplici strumenti dell'Imam, in attesa del suo ritorno[44]. Perciò, ad essere contestata era l'intera filosofia khomeinista, vista come un compromesso per riunire i tanti gruppi che allora si opponevano alla monarchia, in alternativa alla quale si proponeva un ritorno allo sciismo pre-rivoluzionario. L'obiettivo era quello di intraprendere un vero e proprio progetto di "dekhomeinizzazione" per risolvere il dilemma dello "stato duale" e la conflittualità tra organi a legittimazione religiosa e organi a legittimazione popolare eliminando questi ultimi e riaffermando il potere assoluto dei primi, diminuendo così il carattere repubblicano della Repubblica islamica, ritenuto frutto di una particolare contingenza storica, quella appunto del 1979, che aveva portato Khomeini ad introdurre elementi estranei alla tradizione islamica[45].

Così concepita la politica ultra-conservatrice era destinata a scontrarsi con l'establishment clericale al potere, quella stessa struttura di potere teocratica che precedentemente si era schierata contro il liberalismo di Khatami, contribuendo a segnarne la sconfitta. Così avvenne, e proprio alla luce di quanto successo in precedenza, Ahmadinejad dovette strategicamente scegliere se continuare con la sua linea intransigente, scontrandosi con il clero moderato, oppure allinearsi a quest'ultimo.

Ovviamente, perdendo legittimità, seppur non palesemente, a livello istituzionale, e per colpa di quelle stesse forze politico/religiose che lo avevano sostenuto in precedenza, Ahmadinejad dovette sforzarsi di risollevare la propria popolarità tra la società civile: il sentimento antiamericano e antisionista, assieme al diritto al nucleare, furono sicuramente gli argomenti che più facilmente gli permisero di attirare consensi e di compattare, per quanto possibile, il fronte politico interno. Comunque temi talmente sensibili, su cui difficilmente pragmatici, riformisti o lo stesso clero avrebbe potuto sollevare qualche opposizione. Il tutto fu ovviamente facilitato dalle esperienze fallimentari di esportazione della democrazia tentati in Afghanistan e in Iraq dai *neocon* statunitensi, che legittimarono lo spostamento del dibattito politico interno dal tema della democrazia, visto come ennesimo tentativo di ingerenza da parte di una potenza straniera nella politica interna, a quello della sicurezza nazionale e alla riesumazione dei principi rivoluzionari.

A tal proposito emerse un altro elemento di grande importanza, rilevato da F. Sabahi, cioè il grande pragmatismo politico con cui il clero sciita governò la Repubblica islamica. Per quanto continui ed eclatanti, gli slogan del presidente Ahmadinejad contro il Grande Satana e contro Israele, così come l'atteggiamento negazionista assunto di fronte al tema dell'Olocausto, pur influenzando il clima internazionale nel quale la Repubblica islamica dovette confrontarsi, non condizionarono minimamente l'azione politica concreta. F. Sabahi elenca una serie di scelte e circostanze in cui il pragmatismo politico degli ayatollah emerse esplicitamente, mettendo da parte qualsiasi precetto religioso e gli stessi valori islamici, in nome degli interessi della Repubblica islamica[46]. O, forse, in nome di interessi personalistici o come strumento per mantenere il potere. Dopotutto, come osservato da E. Atzori, anche l'appoggio dato al "laico" Ahmadinejad può essere letto come il tentativo da parte del clero, ormai impopolare, di camuffare un allontanamento dalla scena politica, almeno in prima persona, pur continuando a monopolizzare il tutto dai

[44] Sabahi F., *Storia dell'Iran,* cit.
[45] Guolo R., *La via dell'imam*, cit., pp. 116-117 e 172-173.
[46] Sabahi F., *Storia dell'Iran*, cit, pp. 238-239

retroscena [47] . Tentativo comunque mal riuscito, se si considerano i poteri sempre più forti della Guida, e quelli che poco contano del Presidente. Dunque, se il vero problema della Repubblica islamica è quello dello stato duale, del conflitto, forse irrisolvibile, tra "sovranità di Dio" e "sovranità del popolo" che vincola ed ingabbia qualsiasi processo decisionale, bisogna comunque riconoscere che questo conflitto poco ha a che fare, almeno oggi, con la sfera religiosa, quanto piuttosto dalla volontà della classe dirigente di mantenere lo *status quo* tramite la conservazione del contorto sistema istituzionale; tanto che la storia della Repubblica islamica diventa un succedersi di eventi che non hanno fatto altro che riprodurre le posizioni di potere acquisite (e spesso anche con le stesse persone).

Certamente si può affermare che le aspettative di maggiore giustizia e benessere sociale del periodo rivoluzionario siano state deluse, ma a distanza di quasi trent'anni dalla sua fondazione, R. Redaelli sottolinea come non si possa fare a meno di riconoscere alcuni progressi fatti dalla Repubblica islamica. Progressi che riguardano prima di tutto la società civile: miglioramenti sociali, nel campo dell'istruzione, della sanità ma anche progressi tecnologici, senza comunque ignorare questioni ancora irrisolte, come esempio la legge di famiglia o i grandi limiti alla libertà di espressione[48]. Come si è già visto, la società civile è cresciuta, oltre che demograficamente, dal punto di vista della consapevolezza politica, così come dimostra la partecipazione attiva nella sfera pubblica. Cambiamenti (o percorsi di modernizzazione) importanti, soprattutto se si considera la variabile "relazioni internazionali", che certamente ha ostacolato lo sviluppo del paese, come dimostrano le continue sanzioni, embarghi e minacce, appena accennate. Non a caso il principale problema ancora oggi rimane la povertà diffusa nel paese e le prospettive tutt'altro che positive dei "diseredati" moderni, come li definisce M Emiliani, costituiti dai giovani che non hanno vissuto né la modernizzazione forzata dei Pahlavi e la repressione della SAVAK, né l'entusiasmo della rivoluzione e del suo leader Khomeini, e che oggi fanno fatica a capire e giustificare l'intricato sistema politico che dovrebbe rappresentarli[49].

Pur riflettendo al suo interno le diverse posizioni presenti nella società civile iraniana, il clero sembra sempre più lontano dalla base popolare, e sempre più impegnato a scontrarsi al suo interno su quanti vogliono continuare a conservare il potere politico di cui godono e quanti vorrebbero invece far tornare la religione nella sfera individuale, riacquistando l'autonomia di cui godeva, prima di essere totalmente schiacciata sullo Stato, senza peraltro riuscire veramente a controllarlo.

Rimane aperto e di estrema attualità il dibattito sulla natura più o meno democratica o islamica della Repubblica iraniana, che alla fine sembra non riuscire ad essere né l'una né l'altra. È importante, in tal senso, tener presente che nessuno, neanche coloro che erano favorevoli ad una maggiore democratizzazione della società, coloro che si battevano per la difesa dei diritti umani, coloro che contestavano il ruolo politico assunto illegittimamente dal clero, misero mai in discussione l'essenza "islamica" dello Stato. Il fondamento stesso della sovranità popolare aveva, come già detto, la sua base nel matrimonio tra la forma democratica e la sostanza della verità religiosa[50]. Ma, fattore ancor più destabilizzante, era che questo matrimonio non apparteneva né al modello delle democrazie occidentali, né alla tradizione sciita. Dopotutto nel costituire lo Stato islamico furono utilizzate anche delle istituzioni tipiche dello Stato moderno, senza modificarle minimamente, ma semplicemente affiancandole ad altre di tipo religioso. Alla luce di ciò, le ricette proposte dall'Occidente,

[47] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar*, cit., p. 13.

[48] Redaelli R., *L'Iran contemporaneo*, cit., p. 132; si veda anche: Ganji A., *Islamamad. Iran, Islam e democrazia. Saggi scelti e dialoghi con Charles Taylor e Martha Nussbaum*, Transeuropa, Massa 2009; Gheisari A., Nasr V., *Democracy in Iran. History and the quest for liberty*, Oxford University Press 2006; Guolo R., *L'Islam è compatibile con la democrazia?,* Laterza Roma-Bari 2007; Vannuccini V., *Rosa è il colore della Persia*, Feltrinelli, Milano 2006.

[49] Emiliani M., Ranuzzi de'Bianchi M., Atzori E., *Nel nome di Omar*, cit., p. 15.

[50] Petrillo P. L., *Iran*, cit., pp. 89-92.

di “democratizzazione” dell’Iran, come di altri paesi del Medio Oriente, di cui ancora si continua a discutere, risultarono ancor più paradossali, e contribuirono a diffondere il concetto (se non altro strumentalizzato nei proclami politici) di democrazia come sinonimo di Occidente, quindi di ingiustizia ed individualismo che minacciavano la *umma* musulmana, perciò in costante opposizione all’Islam.

IERI E OGGI. THE STUDY OF ITALIAN POLITICS

Sidney Tarrow's Contribution to the Study of Italian Politics: An Appreciation

Stephen Hellman (York University)

Among the disruptions and inconveniences that resulted from the cancellation of the 2012 Annual Meeting of the APSA was the inability of CONGRIPS to celebrate the contribution of Professor Sidney Tarrow to the study of Italian politics and society by conferring on him our Lifetime Achievement Award. This was, to be sure, a minor inconvenience indeed compared with the impact of Hurricane Isaac, but the fact remains that public recognition of one of our most distinguished, and deserving, colleagues had to be postponed.

I offer what follows [1] in partial compensation for the postponement, and I use "partial" in a dual sense. In the first place, I am but one observer, and the breadth and depth of Sid Tarrow's scholarship is immense, and something I would hardly be qualified to comment on in its entirety (though here I am in pretty good company). Secondly, my observations – as befits the official publication of CONGRIPS – will be limited to his early work on Italian politics, i.e., to the very significant contribution he made before he shifted his focus to social movements and contentious politics. His writing on these latter themes, which continues, has earned him (justified) world-wide recognition that more qualified colleagues can discuss with far greater expertise than I possess. But his early work should not be relegated to the memory hole, for it was immensely important as well.

The Broader Context

Sidney Tarrow's contribution to the study of Italian communism was significant, and in some respects path-breaking, and not only in the English-speaking world. The key points that stand out in this contribution are, first, that he approached the Italian Communist Party (PCI) party on its own terms, as opposed to the Kremlinological lens through which it – along with other non-ruling communist parties – tended to be viewed at the time. Second, more than anyone else writing at the time, his analysis of the party was informed by both a clear-eyed view of the PCI as a communist party but, above all, by understanding it as a political party operating in a specific system, and hence a phenomenon that could best be understood by bringing to bear (and refining) the tools of comparative political analysis. In short, Sid Tarrow was among the pioneers in treating the PCI as a party in a western democracy first, which not only enriched our understanding of the phenomenon, but set a laudable example of studying Italian communism "on the ground," rather than being guided by abstract theoretical constructs. Finally, and most important of all, his approach meant that the environment in which the party operated also needed to be understood – which produced profound insights not only into the PCI, but also the Italian political system.

Members of CONGRIPS probably know that Tarrow's scholarly work began with the PCI, in the form of *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*,[2] although most are probably unaware of how substantial a body of work this is. Using a restrictive measure of what "fits" as a study of Italian communism, I count a single-authored book and a jointly-edited volume, both of which can be considered as genuinely path-breaking, as well as two other jointly-edited collections (one in two volumes) that were extremely timely and included a number of significant contributions.

1. This is a modified version of a paper presented at a conference honoring Sidney Tarrow, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, June, 2011.

2. Yale University Press, 1967.

Moreover, his second book, *Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France*,[3] while not primarily concerned with the PCI, or comparing Italian and French Communism, nonetheless brings an added dimension to our understanding of the PCI and western communism in general. Tarrow's writings on the PCI in the Italian political system will be deeply influenced by *Between Center and Periphery*.

To these books should be added, again using a conservative metric, at least fifteen important articles or chapters in edited volumes. Several contributions are not only synthetic, with important general insights, but include data compiled or collected by the author himself, or acquired elsewhere but then subjected to secondary analysis, with interesting and occasionally fascinating results. In sum, while the qualitative contribution is certainly most important, the sheer quantity of work produced by Sidney Tarrow is impressive in its own right.

The Italian Communist Party – the largest, most interesting, and, at a certain point probably the most studied non-ruling communist party in the western world – dissolved itself twenty years ago, after more than a year of agonizing and occasionally traumatic internal debate. Its dissolution overlapped with the collapse of the Soviet-dominated bloc of East Europe, and with the end of the Soviet Union itself. None of this was a bolt out of the blue: eight years earlier, Enrico Berlinguer had publicly proclaimed the end of the "propulsive force" of the October Revolution (when the USSR supported a military takeover of Poland to thwart a worker-led challenge to Soviet-style state socialism).[4] Although the Italians and Soviets patched things up, after a fashion, in the 1980s, their relations were never the same, to put it mildly.

This quick backward glance is meant to remind us that throughout its existence, because it was a *communist* party, the PCI could never completely dissociate itself from the USSR. For most of its 70-year existence, the steps it did take in that direction were initially quite halting. At the same time, this was a party that, especially from the late 1960s on, increasingly did take its distance from Moscow. Assertions of autonomy were taking place among other communist parties, with greater and lesser degrees of enthusiasm. But, with the possible exception of the French Communist Party, at least until its dramatic decline in the 1980s, no other Western communist party received anything like the attention given to the PCI.

Until the 1960s, academic studies of communism, while often making valuable contributions, reflected the prejudices as well as the realities of the Cold War. Particularly for those trained in Soviet studies, it was axiomatic that any study of Western communism had to begin in Moscow.[5] Others assumed that anything worth knowing about the PCI could only be obtained from national headquarters, since "everyone knew" that communist parties were centralized and ultra-disciplined. As late as the end of the 1960s, the idea that one might learn something of value by studying the PCI at or near the grass roots was often greeted with stares of incredulity, pity, or both – as those of us in the field at the time can attest.

Nor were these assumptions entirely irrational. Times were changing, but even the PCI's much-vaunted openness had its limits: studies based on the opening of the party's early archives in the 1960s only began appearing later in that decade, and the material that was initially made available stopped at the Second World War. Party archives from the Resistance and the end of World War II were not opened until the 1970s, while scrutiny of internal records from the depths of the Cold War had to wait for the 1990s – when the PCI no longer existed.[6] It is,

3. Yale University Press, 1977.

4 . *l'Unità*, December 30, 1981, p. 1 for the pronouncement; for a discussion, see Joan Barth Urban, *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer* (London: I.B. Tauris 1986), pp. 315f.

5. This is one of the things that makes Donald Blackmer's work on the PCI and the international communist movement all the more significant, for he broke from this framework. See Donald L.M. Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).

6. The fifth volume of Paolo Spriano's monumental history appeared in 1975: *Storia del partito comunista italiano. V. La Resistenza. Togliatti e il partito nuovo*. Turin: Einaudi. The next volumes in the series appeared

finally, worth noting that while extensive excerpts from Antonio Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* began to appear almost immediately following World War II, these were organized and edited by the top party leadership, with the aim of presenting Gramsci as a cultural figure as much as a communist revolutionary. The complete, critical edition of the *Notebooks* was only published in 1975, though they did not contain any new political revelations.[7]

Tarrow's earliest work on the PCI, which includes two of the most significant contributions of all, can thus be located at the point where studies were emerging that began to examine the contemporary party in greater depth and in more empirically-grounded fashion than had previously been the case. For a number of reasons, empirical social scientific research *all'americana* came even later to Italy than elsewhere in western Europe.[8] The earliest systematic study of electoral behavior appeared in 1963; in 1967 and 1968, a massive, groundbreaking multi-year, multi-volume project on all aspects of political participation in Italy was published by the Carlo Cattaneo Institute in Bologna. These volumes focused on all aspects of the DC and PCI: their structures, electoral support, activists' backgrounds and profiles, flanking organizations, and presence in Parliament as well as local governments.[9]

This, then, is the broad historical backdrop against which Tarrow's work on Italian communism must be viewed.

Tarrow as a Student of (Southern) Italian Communism, Antonio Gramsci, and the DC

If *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* did not appear in a scholarly vacuum, it was nonetheless part of the earliest wave of modern political science research in Italy, irrespective of subject matter. The field research on which it was based was primarily carried out 1963-64 (with a post-dissertation supplementary trip in 1966). It was published in 1967, and its revised Italian version came out in 1972.

Looking back on this book from the vantage point of 2011, Tarrow finds it both static and overly "structuralist" in the way it is conceived. (*Strangers at the Gates*, Ch. 2) But looking back on a study is obviously different than trying to go back to that study and appreciate its original contributions. And a sensitive structuralist framing of a communist party's interaction with its environment 45 years ago was in fact a signal contribution. I would also argue that Tarrow's latter-day self-criticism modestly underestimates the important insights that were gained by using that structural framework as a critical backdrop against which the party's strategy could be analyzed on its own terms.

It was always relatively easy to demonstrate that communist parties were not as monolithic as they (and their adversaries) claimed. But *Peasant Communism* employed a broad range of evidence to demonstrate the specific ways in which a uniquely structured party (combining classical socialist mass-party characteristics and a Leninist vanguard-party model) fell victim to both the contradictions of its environment *and* to a strategy that was meant to provide it with the means to dominate that environment. That Italy was a fragmented country, with the most dramatic differences revealed in the contrasts between

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two decades later: Renzo Martinelli, *Storia del partito comunista italiano. VI. Il "Partito nuovo" dalla Liberazione al 18 aprile.* Turin: Einaudi, 1995; and Giovanni Gozzini and Renzo Martinelli, *Storia del partito comunista italiano. VII.* Dall'attentato a Togliatti all'VIII congresso. Turin: Einaudi, 1998.

7. Valentino Gerratana, ed., *Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. Edizione critica dell'Istituto Gramsci*. 4 Volumes. Turin, Einaudi, 1975.

8. Including the intellectual and academic legacy of Fascism, but also a strong pre-existing anti-empirical, idealism-inflected intellectual culture. For an overview, see Luigi Graziano, "The Development and Institutionalization of Political Science in Italy," *International Political Science Review* Vol. 8 (Jan., 1987): 41-57. Graziano draws on Joseph LaPalombara, "Dipendenze e interdipendenze nello sviluppo della scienza politica italiana," in Graziano, ed., *La scienza politica in Italia: bilancio e prospettive* . Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 61-89.

9. The 1963 electoral study is Alberto Spreafico and Joseph LaPalombara, eds., *Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia*. Milan: Comunità. A synthesis of the major findings of the Cattaneo project can be found in Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*. New Haven: Yale, 1970.

North and South, was well-known, and much studied.

But that this political dualism produced a communist party that approximated the mass party it was supposed to be in the North, even as its southern structure was a fluid congeries of social groups and movements whose interests were often in conflict with one another was only spelled out clearly in *Peasant Communism*. This dualism is demonstrated utilizing a vast array of empirical evidence collected from historical archives, social statistics, election studies, party statistics, and fieldwork that involved traveling all over the country to visit provincial federations – the party's most important sub-national structures, where directives had to be implemented "on the ground." One of the most revealing findings in the entire book is that northern leaders overwhelmingly defined their primary roles in organizational terms, while very few of their southern comrades did so (66% vs. 15%). Conversely, while few northern party secretaries envisioned their principal tasks in more strictly political terms, four times as many southerners (61% vs. 16%) saw this as their main role. (Table 9.9, p. 242) So much for the monolithic structure, marching in lock-step to implement orders delivered from on high!

Perhaps even more important, in my view, is how *Peasant Communism* demonstrates – *pace* Sid's self-criticism – that the PCI's dualism did not simply reflect the underlying structural realities of the two Italies. Instead, the party's dualism, and the most powerful determinant of its dilemma, arose from a conscious effort to apply a strategy unsuited to southern conditions and, more seriously still, that rested on an often erroneous understanding of Italian political and social dynamics. In short, while the PCI faced a challenging – perhaps intractable – reality, Tarrow suggests that its guiding assumptions effectively doomed its efforts to build and sustain an alliance that might radically challenge the status quo – particularly when the status quo was ever-changing, even as the party's analysis was not.

Demonstrating Tarrow's interest in Marxist theory, this book also contains a succinct introduction to and exposition of PCI theory and strategy. Clearly and synthetically, Tarrow frames the 'Italian Road to Socialism' (*via italiana al socialismo*) within the classical Marxist and Leninist arguments, above all those concerning the presumed role of peasants in a socialist revolution. Most importantly, he goes on to analyze how these arguments were interpreted in a specifically Italian context. In short, he tries to understand the PCI on its own terms, rather than departing from some abstract notion of how a communist party ought to look. Before the explosion of interest in Antonio Gramsci that began at the end of the decade and produced numerous, often contradictory, strands of "Gramsciology" from the 1970s onward, *Peasant Communism* provides one of the earliest and most clear expositions in English of the revolutionary theory of the martyred leader who died in 1937.

Tarrow certainly gives Gramsci's originality the attention it deserves, above all with respect to his analysis of Italian social classes, to the conditions that distinguish the question of revolution in the West from the classical Leninist doctrine that had become communist orthodoxy after 1917, and to the kind of political party that would be necessary to meet these challenges. Much of this exposition is embedded in a comparison of Gramsci with the *real* father of the *via italiana*, Palmiro Togliatti, the party's head from the end of the war until his death in 1964. Togliatti had been a collaborator of Gramsci's in Turin during and after World War I, was a co-founder of the PCI, and also knew his way around the international communist movement. He shared with Gramsci an aversion to sectarian leftism and a commitment to rooting the party deeply in Italian society: for both, these beliefs grew out of the left's traumatic defeat by Fascism in the 1920s.

They truly did share important philosophical and strategic assumptions. Yet there were also important differences, which matters enormously since it was Togliatti who left an indelible imprint on the party and led it for more than two decades. Tarrow's analysis lays out the striking differences between the two leaders' conception of revolutionary

alliances. Gramsci thought very much in classical terms, whereby the working class would ally only with those groups and strata with an "objective interest" in eliminating capitalist social relations, although he also assigned much more of an independent role to the peasantry – at least the landless peasantry – than did either Marx or Lenin. In contrast to Gramsci's incisive delineation of allies, Togliatti's conception was more additive and inclusive, concerned more with isolating the masses' most intractable enemies, and hence always marked by a defensive, preventative tone – quite understandable, given the trauma that Fascism's triumph represented.

Such a broad conception of alliances was a constant for the PCI, and Tarrow argues that it was especially ill-suited to southern Italian conditions, for it reinforced an already-marked tendency to avoid analyzing a rapidly-changing reality. For instance, a land reform is enacted that transforms some landless peasants into (quite conservative) smallholders, or marginally increases the fragmented, unproductive holdings of those who had a tiny parcel? No big deal – we can try to enroll them alongside the other toiling masses, including those without land. Of course, we had better tone down the militancy of the landless to ensure that our alliances are as broad as possible. Or, to take another example, the land reform all but eliminated the largely absentee *latifondisti* who used to be the clear class enemy. Again, this seemingly posed no problem for the PCI, which shifted its attention to the "monopolies" who control agricultural production – even though monopoly capitalism was hard to find in the countryside of the Mezzogiorno. But it provided a convenient, if largely fictitious, enemy against which a very broad alliance could be rallied. These broad, indiscriminate, alliances were justified in the South because, in the party's view, the bourgeois revolution had not yet been completed there, so it was less important to worry about a sharply delineated alliance strategy. At the end of the day, despite the PCI's claims that Gramsci's analysis guided the *via italiana*, it is hard to argue with Tarrow's point that the two were basically incompatible. (p. 251)

Lest this summary sound as if the Sid Tarrow of *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* was simply channeling Gramsci to find the *via italiana* lacking, it should be emphasized that while he considered Gramsci's analysis of revolution in the West to be original, he concluded that it was also unrealistic. We see this most clearly in the discussion of Gramsci's famous argument to the effect that a revolutionary party in the West would need to carry out, simultaneously, a "war of movement" consisting of class struggle and mobilization "from below" at the same time that it conducted a " war of position" inside the institutions of a liberal democracy. Only when both types of "war" were carried out together could this strategy be successful – since, as Tarrow notes, "the dialectical tension he establishes in theory is virtually impossible in practice except over the very short run." Hence it was "almost inevitable" that the Togliattian version of the party, with more emphasis on "war of position," would prevail. (p. 129) And it did.

There is a certain fatalism in *Peasant Communism*, which seems to conclude that the PCI's dilemma was truly insoluble. The structures of southern Italian society conspired against a meaningful translation of the Togliattian strategy into a coherent guide for action. But Tarrow goes even further, arguing that the strategy itself was fatally flawed, given existing conditions: "What emerges as a sound strategy of structural reform and mass organization in the North becomes a vague strategy of populist rebirth and mass solidarity in the South." (366) In the South, we encounter an "amorphous populist movement which casts its net through diverse strata of a fragmented society and seeks issues that can unite disparate groups." (262)

My own research on the PCI was stimulated and inspired by many of the insights in *Peasant Communism*, which eventually led me to an even more fundamental criticism of the *via italiana*. That is, was this really such a "sound strategy" for the North? Could the party leadership be so oblivious to changes that were taking place everywhere – South as well as North – if this

strategy did not contain a formidable set of blinkers? These blinkers differed from those that normally obstructed the view of more orthodox communist parties, but they were still blinkers. It seemed to me that along with Tarrow's "suitable for the North, disastrous for the South" analysis of the *via italiana*, one could also find arguments that suggest more basic flaws in the strategy as a whole, irrespective of geographical considerations. And these arguments have less to do with whether the strategy demonstrated fealty to Antonio Gramsci's ideas, and more to how successfully it seemed to understand Italian reality, and provide responses to it.

We have seen this already in the party's reflexive tendency to always seek the broadest alliances under all circumstances. But nowhere is the spotlight more focused on the PCI's problems in understanding a changing reality than in the discussion of the Christian Democratic Party (DC). What Tarrow calls the "new structure of power" that the DC put in place in the postwar period shaped the political and social, environment in which the PCI had to operate. (Chapter 12) So the Communists truly ignored this reality at their peril. Like the PCI, the DC's efforts to construct a mass party that could sink deep roots in the South ran into the same refractory social conditions that stymied the Communists. But the DC enjoyed crucial advantages denied to the PCI. Smallholding peasants posed no theoretical dilemma to a Catholic party whose strongest support came from small landholders. Nor was a fragmentary class structure a problem for a party whose social doctrine eschewed class conflict.

Like any party attempting to hold together a disparate social coalition, the DC would have to mediate among competing interests, but – in contrast to the PCI – it had political power to facilitate this mediation. And in postwar Italy, political power brought with it access to an immensely large public sector of the economy in addition to a very large bureaucracy that the ruling party did not hesitate to use for its own ends. Displacing the old personalistic system of patronage that existed in the South in the pre-mass party era, the DC used the power of the modern state to create a bureaucratic form of clientelism. An already-inefficient bureaucracy was thus set on the road to even greater dysfunctionality. As a mass party that could now deliver mass patronage, the longer the DC remained as the irreplaceable center of every governing coalition, the more self-perpetuating it became. This "occupation of power," in the revealing phrase of a later observer, [10] increasingly characterized the relationship between the country's bureaucratic structures and the ruling party's organizational structure. It explains the tenacity with which the Christian Democrats held onto the major administrative and economic levers of control, even after they expanded their coalition to include the Socialists in the early 1960s. And control of these very real levers of power explains the ferocity of the struggles that were constant within the governing coalition, often among members of rival DC factions, bringing down governments at the rate of one every eight or nine months.

Yet to this image of bureaucratic clientelism and mass patronage must be added the DC's special relationship with both the Vatican and the United States, as well as its legitimate claim to be the principal bulwark against "the communist menace." Moreover, it also was, in its own fashion, a Catholic-populist mass party. Put all these factors together, and the nature of the challenge faced by the PCI becomes all the more clear. The DC was an extraordinarily complex political party, so effective precisely because of its multiple identities. Yet, as Tarrow shows, the PCI continued to view the DC through a simplistic framework that, above all, missed the ways in which it was increasingly penetrating southern society, stabilizing its social and political presence, and tightening its hold on some of the same social groups that the PCI hoped to woo.

Peasant Communism provides an excellent window into the phenomenon of this new structure of DC power in the South, informed by follow-up field work that included extensive interviews with leading Christian Democratic politicians as well as administrators. To go back to earlier remarks

10 . Ruggero Orfei, *L'Occupazione del potere. I democristiani '45-'75*. Milan: Longanesi, 1976.

about the ways Sid Tarrow's work on the PCI opened new vistas: here we have someone "rounding out" a study of a communist party by supplementing it with original work on the country's ruling party. The point clearly is that to make sense of the Italian Communist Party, you had better show that you understand something – make that a great deal – about Italy.

After *Peasant Communism*

The preceding review hardly does justice to *Peasant Communism*, which is, after all, 367 pages long. But it does spell out some of the most important contributions of that volume, while introducing a number of the recurring themes in Tarrow's work on the PCI throughout the 1970s and beyond. Looking forward, we find less Gramsci and more Togliatti, as he digs more deeply into the party's overall strategy, particularly during the period dominated by the *via italiana*'s metamorphosis into the *compromesso storico*. This is also the period in which, however briefly, Eurocommunism captured the world's attention, in large part because the largest communist party in the western world captured 34% of the vote and appeared to be on the verge of assuming a governing role. Tarrow's work takes a more explicitly comparative turn after *Peasant Communism:* to his North-South comparisons within Italy, he now adds Italian-French comparisons to impressive effect.

Still, the Mezzogiorno, and the PCI's problems there, were hardly ignored in the 1970s. A powerful theme in *Peasant Communism* was the way in which the PCI was locked into comfortable old categories that understood the South as a backward and pathological example of capitalist development. This view conveniently dovetailed with the party's broad and indiscriminate alliance strategy which, as we have seen, rested, among other things, on the notion that the bourgeois revolution still remained to be completed in the Mezzogiorno. As we move into the 1970s, Tarrow finds the South to be experiencing rapid changes, but because these changes do not conform to the PCI's preconceptions, it ignores or misreads them.[11] The "ideology of backwardness" that provided a title to one of *Peasant Communism*'s chapters persists, even though the region has in fact been developing, albeit not according to classical Marxist (or, for that matter, mainstream) precepts.

In fact, the DC's control of various ministries, agencies, and consortia was creating ever-tighter links between the ruling party and numerous traditional social figures, above all smallholding farmers and traditional middle strata. But a growing stratum of state employees – many of whom were recipients of the bureaucratic clientelism analyzed in *Peasant Communism* – further reinforced the DC's hold on its electorate. Reviewing southern election returns through the early 1970s, Tarrow found a consolidation of Christian Democratic electoral support that appeared to signal an end to that region's notoriously fluctuating electorate. (1972, 118-119) The South had, in fact, become a DC electoral bastion, and, with the Catholic North-East, it remained that way until the end of the so-called "First Republic" in the early 1990s.

In addition, the South increasingly provided the ruling party with an ever-growing proportion of its membership from the 1960s on, thanks to what Tarrow dubbed "bureaucratic clientelism." Observers of the Italian political scene would coin the phrase "southernization" (*meridionalizzazione*) to describe this phenomenon which, it should be noted, also increasingly characterized the Italian Socialist Party when it reinserted itself into governing coalitions at the end of the 1970s. The occupation of power and distribution of mass patronage to an archipelago of constituents would eventually prove problematic, indeed disastrous. These practices blocked any possibility of articulating and carrying out coherent governmental policies. The longer they went on, the more fiscally irresponsible things became, as governing parties showered benefits on constituents and looked the other way at tax

11. This discussion draws primarily on "The Political Economy of Stagnation: Communism in Southern Italy, 1960-1970," *The Journal of Politics* 34 (Feb., 1972): 93-123.

time. But, however irrational it might have been in a policy sense, mass patronage efficaciously consolidated the ruling parties' political support.

As we move into the 1970s, Tarrow's attention to the fundamental tensions in the PCI's strategy focuses increasingly on the fact that the political dimension of the strategy was always systematically favored over the social dimension. This well-established tendency was consolidated and formalized in the early 1970s. In 1972 – more than a year before the strategy of "historic compromise" was spelled out – PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer was mooting the possibility of the party assuming a direct governing role.[12] The historic tension in PCI strategy between the social-mobilizational and the political-institutional moments was moving definitively toward the latter. Despite some initial qualifications that put a more radical and optimistic spin on the *compromesso*, by the middle of the decade a narrow, limited institutional approach came to characterize the party's strategy.

Reflecting this shift, Tarrow's discussions of the strategy increasingly focus on its Togliattian (and Berlinguerian) aspects as the *via italiana* as it morphed into the *compromesso storico*. The analysis is not elaborated in "gotcha!" or denunciatory fashion: *anzi!* Tarrow emphasizes the radical implications of the *compromesso* when it first appeared – which many critics missed. And he recalled the social, as well as political-institutional, components of the strategy, though he did say that should the party's focus become exclusively institutional, it then would be fair to label it as not even social-democratic, but reformist.[13] He argues that while it was undeniable that the PCI had increasingly emphasized institutional solutions from the 1960s on, this was a response to the opportunities provided by the realities of Italian politics, and not a willful abandonment of the more social, "bottom-up" aspects of the original strategy.[14]

The Mid-Seventies: Eurocommunism and the *compromesso storico*

Tarrow's writings on the PCI in the mid-seventies are set against the backdrop of the brief, but intensely followed, season of Eurocommunism. Because of international detente between the US and USSR, but especially because of domestic political dynamics, western communist parties appeared to be shedding a lot of baggage. In a period in which postwar "economic miracles" were grinding to a halt, but where labor remained well-organized and often quite militant, the suggestion that the permanent exclusion from government of the strongest communist parties might come to an end made Eurocommunism far more than an ideological curiosity. And this meant that extra attention was suddenly focused on France and Italy.[15]

Well before this explosion of attention in the mid-seventies, students of Italian and French communism had noticed these parties' evolution, and their research was contributing to our understanding of both. In 1972, Sidney Tarrow and Donald Blackmer, the two most astute observers of the PCI in the U.S., organized a conference on the two parties, bringing together experts on the French and Italian parties and labor movements, including numerous young researchers, many of whom had just completed their dissertations – or who were still writing them. Most contributions to this conference were published, in 1975, as chapters in *Communism in Italy and France*, sandwiched between Blackmer's introduction and Tarrow's

12. "Le Parti communiste et la société italienne," *Sociologie du communisme en Italie*. Cahiers de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques Nº 194 (1975), p. 51. This lengthy article makes many of the same points as Chapter XV of *Communism in Italy and France*, published in the same year. But since Chapter XV is comparative, while this was written for a French audience and therefore focuses on the PCI, there are even more details, as well as a more extended discussion, of the Italian party here.

13. "Le Parti communiste," pp. 15-17.

14. "Le Parti communiste," p. 37.

15. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) was also a serious attention-getter at this time, particularly because its leadership was the most flamboyant (and anti-Soviet) of all. But the post-Franco transition was just getting underway in the mid-seventies, and events eventually demonstrated that the PCE was a relatively marginal force.

conclusions. [16] Tarrow also contributed a separate chapter comparing French and Italian communist mayors, summarizing part of the research that eventually resulted in *Between Center and Periphery.*

Communism in Italy and France is a watershed in the study of western communism. The timing of its publication helped, for the Eurocommunist wave was cresting by the time the paperback edition appeared at the very end of 1976. But what made it truly exceptional was the content of its 15 chapters, which covered everything from sweeping overviews to empirically-grounded analyses of the key social and political dimensions of these parties. Nothing on the subject, before or since, comes close to matching this volume's depth and breadth. Even so, Tarrow's concluding chapter stands apart. My own opinion is that it represents the most comprehensive and intelligent synthetic comparison of the two parties ever written. It is, quite simply, a masterful demonstration of comparative analysis (and one I still recommend to graduate students for this reason). It demonstrates the kind of synthetic brilliance, ability to incorporate wide-ranging historical and political-sociological material, and sheer power of intellect that has characterized so much of Sid's work. It also demonstrates quite conclusively the huge distances that separated two "fraternal parties," often automatically lumped together because of their size, importance, and geographical proximity.

This is an exemplary concluding chapter in the mundane but still admirable sense that in constructing his argument about the way the two parties have both adapted and changed over the course of their existence, Tarrow manages to bring every one of the book's 13 other contributors' work into the discussion in a constructive and insightful way. It is a *tour d'horizon* that begins with the two countries' formation as nation states and their subsequent histories; their industrial revolutions and respective class structures; the timing of crucial developmental stages or critical junctures in each party; the way these stages produced different patterns of leadership recruitment as well as organizational practices; the relative importance of each country in the international system, with the consequences of this phenomenon on each party; the impact of differently-weighted democratic traditions; and, finally, how all these factors combined over time to shape these differences into self-perpetuating traditions that proved remarkably durable.

16. Princeton University Press, 1975.

The Historic Compromise

The historic compromise, as noted above, was adumbrated by Berlinguer even before it was officially articulated in 1973, in the wake of the coup that overthrew the leftist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. But the *compromesso* took on increasing importance almost immediately, as the political tide shifted dramatically in the PCI's favor. The party began to rack up impressive electoral gains in the middle of the decade, sweeping into power at the local level in 1975, and then achieving its all-time peak of over 34% in the general elections of 1976. Moreover, the 1975 and 1976 elections came on the heels of the 1974 divorce referendum, a crushing defeat for conservative Catholics, who had insisted on forcing this issue. So it truly did seem as if a profound realignment was underway. Since these monumental shifts came right after enunciation of the *compromesso storico*, it is not surprising that the party leadership read these events as evidence that the strategy was not only correct, but had helped produce these advances.

The numerical standoff in Parliament lasted until the Socialist Party rejoined the DC at the end of the decade. But before that occurred, the standoff produced a pair of very broad coalitions between 1976 and 1979 that included PCI participation in the governing majority, although the DC never allowed it to become a full coalition partner. Because of the emphasis the party had put on assuming a governing role, the popular press, but even many knowledgeable observers, tended to conflate this participation with the achievement of the goals of the *compromesso*, which was in fact a far more ambitious

strategy than the simple insertion of the PCI into the majority (see below). The Communists were able to wring some concessions out of the DC, and their participation in the majority represented a breakthrough in their legitimation. But at the end of the day, their achievements were rather meager. Yet from the time they entered the majority, despite the clear limits on what they were able to accomplish, party leaders treated every limited step as an enormous leap on the road to the realization of the strategy. Looking back on this period a few years later, Tarrow notes how this triumphalism aggravated even further the disappointment of supporters by inflating expectations.[17] Thus, while the *compromesso storico* was never really put into practice, by the time the PCI returned to the opposition in 1979 after losing votes in a general election for the first time in the postwar period, the strategy was written off as a failure.

If the institutional approach revealed its shortcomings in the course of the 1970s, the corresponding neglect of the more social dimensions of the party's strategy also cost it dearly. For the 'seventies was a period when profound social changes were undermining old certainties, eroding identities, political structures and loyalties that had once appeared to be rigidly fixed. It is profoundly ironic that, in the midst of these dramatic changes, the PCI's strategic response had been to propose a "great historic compromise" that assumed a fixed, indeed static, social reality. The justification for cooperation between the PCI and DC (with a subsidiary role assigned to the Socialists) rested on the assumption that the country's democratic institutions faced a crisis so serious that only a massive "supermajority" could confront and subdue it. The supermajority's greatest strength was assumed to reside in the social leverage that the two parties could exert, thanks to their profoundly rooted mass party and subcultural characteristics.

These assumptions gave the original formulation of the *compromesso* its optimistic character, as well as whatever capacity it had for enacting truly profound reforms. And they go a long way toward explaining why the strategy's most convinced proponents could sincerely argue that the PCI had not abandoned the social dimension of the *via italiana al socialismo*. But this assumed that the party controlled a social bloc that would follow its directives or, at the very least, give it undying loyalty no matter what it accomplished in the short term. That proved emphatically not to be the case. To return to the Gramscian formulation, this rather cautious reading of the strategy assumed that the war of position had not been won by the left, for the DC was viewed as in control of *its* bloc of social forces. But this more cautious reading of the strategy sought to avoid a war of position altogether, if by that we mean constant struggles for control of civil society. Instead, it was aimed at obtaining a stable truce that would consolidate Italian democracy and thereby establish the preconditions for the *compromesso* to go forward.

There was always a more aggressive, "leftist" interpretation of the *compromesso*, which was an extension of the more social-mobilizational reading of the *via italiana* – just as the dominant interpretation reflected the more institutional interpretation. For the leftists, the *compromesso* should be aggressively pursued, accompanied by considerable social mobilization to exert pressure "from below" on the system. Far from aiming to make common cause with the entire DC, the aim of the leftist strategy was to *split* the DC. This rupture, it was assumed, would then produce a progressive coalition consisting of the Communists, the Catholic left, and the Socialists, which would finally give the country a governing coalition that could actually carry out serious, even radical, reforms.

Tarrow discusses this alternative reading, and obviously draws upon it to illustrate some of the more interesting aspects of the party's strategy. But he stresses that

17 . "Transforming Enemies into Allies: Non-Ruling Communist Parties in Multiparty Coalitions," *The Journal of Politics* 44 (November, 1982): 949-950. This article argues that party leaders were compelled by the requirements of organizational maintenance and the mobilization of consent to present these paltry tactical gains as great strategic advances.

the idea of splitting the DC was always unrealistic given how entrenched it was in Italian society, as well as within the economic and political structures of the state. Only an extremely rapid secularization of Italian society, profound enough to de-link (former) Catholics from the DC, would make this scenario plausible – and there were no signs of that taking place.[18]

While he took seriously and often discussed at length the more optimistic and ambitious interpretations of the *compromesso*, Tarrow's assessment of the strategy's coherence, as well as its likelihood of success, was skeptical from the start and grew increasingly dubious as the decade progressed. But it would be a mistake to think that his skeptical reading simply tracked the PCI's declining fortunes. On the contrary: he had sketched in the outlines and likely scenarios of the PCI's overemphasis on the political-institutional dimensions of its strategy in his 1975 conclusions to *Communism in Italy and France*, and his assessment proved to be prescient.[19]

Italian-French Comparisons: Original Research

I mentioned earlier that Tarrow's contribution to the Blackmer-Tarrow volume included, in addition to his superb conclusions, a chapter that drew on his comparative study of mayors in France and Italy. Of the 250 mayors studied in *Between Center and Periphery*, 50 were Communists, and they comprised the subjects of Chapter IV of Blackmer and Tarrow. [20] PCI-PCF comparisons are found here, analyzed in head-to-head fashion as well as within the context of the broader study.

Conforming to general observations about the two Communist Parties, parties, Italian Communist mayors are revealed as more "open" in every sense, with far more exposure to non-communist politicians at both the national and local levels – even with respect to such seemingly banal measures as reading the non-Communist press. Perhaps most striking of all is the finding that only one in 20 French Communist mayors claimed to have contacts with the leaders of all local parties, while four-fifths of their Italian comrades did so. (154) At the same time, the Italian Communists took little pleasure in their administrative duties and contacts with the bureaucracy. In France, reflecting the PCF's more closed and isolated organization, but also the realities of a far more competent state bureaucracy, Communist mayors tended not to be very enthusiastic politicians, and seemed comfortable with playing by the rules of a centralized administrative structure, so long as it enabled them to deliver the goods to their constituents.

As interesting, and often entertaining, as these findings are, their significance is more fully appreciated when situated within the broader arguments of *Between Center and Periphery*. This study is worth discussing, if only to stress that its most important contribution does not concern communist politics at the local level, but the functioning of the Italian and French states – and thus the general political context in which the two largest nonruling communist parties had to operate. What Tarrow uncovers, via a powerful comparative historical-institutional analysis combined with extensive empirical research, is, in the first instance, how different are the superficially similar Italian and French state structures and the ways the center of the system (bureaucratic and political) relates to the periphery. This finding in itself is interesting, but not surprising, although it does shed light onto a dimension of political-bureaucratic interaction that is often understudied. The second, truly key, finding of *Between Center and Periphery* is that, despite these differences, both countries rather successfully worked out a way to integrate the periphery – including the communist-governed periphery – into the center, avoiding the sort of ideological paralysis that was always viewed as a lurking danger.

18. "Communism in Italy and France: Adaptation and Change," Chapter XV of Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *Communism in Italy and France*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 636.

19. "Communism in Italy and France: Adaptation and Change," pp. 637-640.

20. "Party Activists in Public Office: Comparisons at the Local Level in Italy and France," Chapter IV of *Communism in Italy and France*, pp. 143-172.

First, the contrasts: French mayors are able to obtain much more than their Italian counterparts, because they are dealing with a far more efficient administrative apparatus – no surprises here! But French efficiency comes with a high *political* price, for those who most successfully learn to play by the rules of the game end up absorbing the top-down, supposedly apolitical, technocratic values of France's policy elites. And this goes for French Communist mayors as much as for the others. In contrast, Italian mayors have to learn how to navigate a more clientelistic system with far more fluid rules, thereby putting a premium on mayors' skills as political entrepreneurs. The most striking finding is that, in such a highly polarized general political setting, even mayors from the opposition – the PCI above all – were able to gain considerable benefits for their own party once the most tense Cold War tensions ebbed. And they did so by playing a system that rewarded local politicians' ability to establish links with decision-makers in Rome who were hardly Communists. PCI mayors' proclivity for broad political contacts may have reflected the greater ideological and strategic openness of their party, but it was also a systemic imperative.

Now, the similarities: Political systems that appear to be seriously polarized, even ideologically paralyzed, nonetheless manage to function, often in surprising ways. Here is an argument that recurs in many of Tarrow's later writings, and that clearly had a big impact on his analysis of the Italian political system: lacking a mechanism of coordination "at the summit" of the political system – horizontal links between elites in the capital – enjoyed by the consociational democracies of Northern and Central Europe, the Italian linkage is *vertical*, and exists between center and periphery. Moreover, this does not only apply to Italy; this linkage has unexpected stabilizing effects in countries where political fragmentation and ideological polarization would otherwise make such integration appear to be impossible. Put succinctly, "In these systems, political exchange migrates from horizontal integration at the top to vertical integration between center and periphery and to integration at the base of the political system." Even as ferocious ideological disputes rage in the very public, national political sphere, "elites in each system have developed a consensus on procedural rules of the game that contrasts with the ideological conflicts that mark their public debates." (253)

This is good news indeed for those who fear the potentially disastrous effects of what appears to be incurable ideological polarization. But it has problematic implications for anyone, PCI included, whose goals include the transformation – or even simple reforms – of society. A consensus on the rules of the political game need not imply abject capitulation to the status quo. But when the game involves jockeying for a share of the action in a patronage-riddled system by working out a *modus vivendi* with your supposed political adversaries, the likelihood of meaningful change becomes vanishingly small. In addition to its numerous other virtues and contributions to comparative politics, *Between Center and Periphery* contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms by which parties with radical goals end up co-opted by the systems they set out to change. The war of position – by the mid-1970s Tarrow usually employs the more subtle and useful "strategy of presence"[21] – has become a fetter constraining the action of the party, rather than a lever it can exercise in the interest of challenging the status quo.

The End of the Seventies and Beyond

By 1977-78, it was evident that even the least ambitious variants of the *compromesso storico* were never going to be realized. Most importantly, the DC spurned the PCI's overtures, conceding only what it had to: the looming catastrophe that the PCI had invoked to justify its support of successive National Unity governments never materialized. Whether the threat was ever as serious as the PCI claimed is debatable, but the PCI's participation certainly helped

21. The term was apparently coined by Alessandro Pizzorno in "Le Parti communiste italien dans le système politique italien," *Colloque sur le communisme en France et en Italie*, Paris: Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1968, ronéo, p. 6. Cited in Tarrow, "Le Parti communiste," p. 3.

stabilize the Italian political situation. And the PCI's fortunes took a sharp turn for the worse after it effectively admitted defeat and returned to the opposition in 1979.

The party's errors of commission as well as omission between 1976 and 1979 underscored some of its deepest unresolved problems, and left a lasting, problematic, legacy. The lingering problems were nowhere more evident than in the PCI's misreading of some of the most fundamental structures of Italian society and politics, not to mention the sweeping changes that were altering these structures, rendering them increasingly complicated. Tarrow understood both the structures and the dynamics earlier and more thoroughly than most, producing telling analyses, as well as prognostications, of the party's problems. Hence it is not surprising to discover that a number of his writings, produced as the PCI's ill-fated efforts were still playing out, assume a retrospective and, at times, a post-mortem tone.

In this concluding section, I will focus on three interrelated topics that occupy a prominent place in many of those writings. All draw on earlier work, developing a number of earlier insights while furnishing some new ones. These phenomena concern, respectively, Tarrow's focus on the dynamics of the Italian political system; the party system itself; and the social and political dynamics of the movements that arose outside the party system proper, but nonetheless must be understood in terms of their interaction with it and with the political system. For present purposes, I will limit my comments, as much as possible, to the way his work on the PCI intersects with these themes.

Political Dynamics: Retarded Modernization

A theme going back to *Peasant Communism* is the DC's ability to hold onto power, stabilizing a political system many observers were ready to write off as doomed. Of course, the DC's bureaucratic clientelism and an ever-expanding coalition for patronage ultimately did generate an unsustainable fiscal and financial crisis. But if the ruling party's lavish distributional practices ultimately proved unsustainable, it reaped huge political dividends for over forty years. Yet, as Tarrow constantly reminds us, the DC was not simply a patronage machine. Nor was it merely a megaphone for the more retrograde views of the Church, an anti-communist shield, a protectionist patron of vulnerable strata or a puppet of business. The fact that it was *all* of these things at once was what enabled it to maintain an extremely variegated social coalition and to flex and bend in response to changing circumstances; in an argument that cannot be done full justice here, Tarrow (returning to Gramsci) called this the exercise of "soft hegemony."[22]

Soft hegemony cost Italy dearly in terms of the pace and extent of its social and civic modernization. The occupation of power that permitted the DC to stitch together so many disparate interests meant that many social groups that otherwise could have been part of a progressive coalition were enmeshed in, and thus demobilized by, the coalition for patronage. That the DC could not construct what Tarrow calls a coalition for modernization, or for universality, is hardly surprising since it had no real interest in doing so. More intriguing is why the PCI, back in the opposition, did not pose itself as the – necessary – center of a coalition to reform both state and society in the face of rising demands emanating from within the ever-expanding new middle classes.[23]

This question represents a leitmotif in Tarrow's analyses of the Italian political system from the late 1970s onward. His answer is that the party's ideological assumptions, its strategic orientation, and its entrenched practices did not so much rule this out as prevent the idea of a progressive, reform coalition for modernization from

22. "Maintaining Hegemony in Italy: The Softer They Rise, the Slower They Fall," Chapter 10 of T.J. Pempel, ed., *Uncommon Democracies* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

23. "The Italian Party System Between Crisis and Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* XXI (May, 1977): 207-208 and 218-219. The argument is framed comparatively in "The Crisis of the Late 1960's in Italy and France: The Transition to Mature Capitalism." in Giovanni Arrighi, ed., *Semiperipheral Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1985, p. 229.

appearing on its agenda.[24] Pushing forward a modernizing project is hardly a radical goal: it is reformism, pure and simple. Less than a decade earlier, this was forbidden terrain; now it was something for which one lamented the Communists' lack of vocation. Not the least of the ironies in this regard is that the *via italiana* was originally framed in terms of completing the bourgeois revolution along the path to a specifically Italian version of socialism. Here we see that socialism has faded from the PCI's horizon but so, apparently, has the bourgeois revolution, for would that not be the real aim of a modernizing coalition?

These considerations bring us to Tarrow's critical engagement with debates concerning the dynamics of the Italian party system that were much in vogue at the time. The most interesting by far involved the concept of *consociationalism*. My purpose here is not to revisit the multiple dimensions of the discussion, but to draw upon Tarrow's interventions by way of providing a window onto how his work informed both his scholarly insights as well as his underlying political beliefs.

For those unfamiliar with the concept, consociationalism provides an account of how deeply divided societies, in which no community or group constitutes a clear majority, can work out a democratic *modus vivendi* by establishing a power-sharing consensus. The concept is considered especially applicable to societies riven by structured subcultural divisions that are organized into discrete, non-communicating "pillars": power-sharing has to be worked out among leaders, and the more tightly-organized these pillars are, the easier it is to obtain, and stick to, elite-level bargains. The behavior existed long before it was named and explored conceptually, and it is not surprising that the political scientist most identified with the concept, Arend Lijphart, is from the Netherlands. The study in which he first analyzed the phenomenon in depth was, in fact, a 1968 monograph on the Netherlands; the study in which he developed an explicitly comparative framework was published in 1977.[25]

Italian academics sometimes appear to jump rather indiscriminately onto the bandwagon of new intellectual trends, but the timing of Lijphart's comparative analysis – 1977 was smack in the middle of the National Unity government – renders Italian academic attention to consociationalism at the time totally understandable. Aspects of the *compromesso storico* bore striking similarities to some of Lijphart's formulations. The PCI was explicitly appealing to the DC as the representative of a presumed "Catholic world," and there could be no doubt that this appeal foresaw an agreement "at the summit" to overcome the perils that might otherwise threaten the very foundations of the democratic system.

That consociationalism was already well-known and discussed among students of comparative politics and party systems can be seen in the fact that Tarrow addressed the parallels in a 1977 publication – based on a conference that had taken place two years earlier.[26] He might have simply pointed out that Italy was not the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, or Switzerland (where consociational arrangements had been most successful). Instead, he succinctly synthesized the literature on consociationalism, isolated the prerequisites necessary to produce an elite-level consensus that could manage subcultural fragmentation, and argued that *none* of those (five) prerequisites existed in Italy. The most important conditions are: diffuse prosperity, necessary to fund a distribution of resources that would, by definition, require duplication; skilled and responsible national elites inclined to compromise; and highly structured and

24. To be sure, numerous elements within the PCI were insistently demanding, and would have welcomed, a reformist agenda, but they represented a distinct minority within the party from the end of the 1970s through the 1980s.

25. Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968; and *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

26. "From Cold War to Historic Compromise: Approaches to French and Italian Radicalism," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age* Vol. I. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977, esp. pp. 240-242.

disciplined subcultures that could be counted on to follow the lead of their national leaders once a bargain was struck.

We have seen, in *Between Center and Periphery*, how a political system that was blocked at the summit nonetheless found ways to do an end-run around the apparent ideological rigidities and blockages. This involved a sort of "grass-roots consociationalism," insofar as Tarrow's research uncovered extensive contacts among local-level politicians of all political stripes. And it also involved the integration of the periphery via vertical contacts between local leaders and national elites – including PCI mayors and parliamentarians from governing coalitions. But these local horizontal and vertical linkages integrated the PCI into the existing system of distribution, and as a very junior partner at that. In short, they helped stabilize the political system, but only by perpetuating many of its most dysfunctional characteristics. Writing in 1977, Tarrow concludes that it is just as well that consociationalism could not be put into practice in Italy for, given existing conditions, "convergence at the center without a change in the current distributive policy bias of the government will only further erode the legitimacy and solvency of the system." (242)

Consociationalism, even if it could have been realized under Italian conditions, would have simply produced elites making incremental adjustments within a system of power that required fundamental changes. This would freeze existing alignments, when what was required was the disruption of the coalition for patronage that perpetuated the system's worst irrationalities. Instead, the situation required the construction of an alliance with the goal of seeking collective solutions to fundamental structural problems. Only such a "majority for universalism" could, potentially, challenge the DC's system of power. Although Tarrow is writing before the *compromesso* came to an inglorious end, and appears on the surface to be suggesting how the PCI's strategy needed to be tightened up a bit, the modernizing alternative he proposes runs radically counter to the PCI's strategy and actions. And, one can add, without the participation of the PCI at the center of such a coalition, no such alternative was plausible.

Conclusions: Sidney Tarrow in Transition

Had the PCI been inclined to construct a modernizing alliance for universalism – a far-fetched assumption, considering the entire arc of its postwar evolution – where should it have looked? Sid Tarrow's reflections on the PCI and the Italian political system, as well as the directions his research took from the 1980s on, provide an obvious starting point, as well as a logical concluding point for an examination of this period of his scholarly production.

From the late 1960s on, the social ferment that was shaking many of Italy's foundations almost always took the PCI by surprise. Its support was ultimately critical in passing divorce and abortion laws, the reform of family law, and other significant pieces of legislation that finally put Italy closer to its more secular neighbors. But its extreme caution with respect to offending Catholic sensibilities delayed its adherence to, and moderated the content of, even those initiatives it ended up supporting. The party often had to be prodded into action by social movements, although as time wore on, increasing pressure came to be exerted from within the PCI itself. It is worth recalling that, for all its flaws, in the mid-1970s the PCI was still a mass party, with 1.8 million members; it recruited hundreds of thousands of new members in the wake of what Tarrow would later call the declining phase of the mobilizational cycle.[27] An organization like this could hardly be oblivious to events that were shaking society's foundations.[28] And, precisely because it remained a mass party, it recruited activists from the various social movements into its ranks, many of whom quickly rose through those ranks.[29] But, just as clearly, it

27. *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

28. For empirical evidence and a more extended argument, see Stephen Hellman, "Il Pci e l'ambigua eredità dell'autunno caldo a Torino," *Il Mulino*, No. 268 (March-April, 1980): 246-295.

29. Peter Lange, Cynthia Irvin and Sidney Tarrow, "Mobilization, Social Movements and Party Recruitment:

was not a protagonist in these events, which included working-class militancy as well as the many extended examples of the mobilization of students, youth more generally, women, neighborhood activism of various stripes, and even various professional categories.

While he never stopped discussing and writing about Italy, his attention would increasingly be drawn to these new movements, and to contentious politics more broadly, in their national, transnational, and global manifestations.[30] His methodological approach, always eclectic in the best possible sense, became even more so – and even more interdisciplinary. It would take an extended discussion to chart and analyze his work on these subjects from the 1980s onward – and such a discussion would require knowledge that far exceeds my own. But while I am unable to guide us through the later stages of Sid Tarrow's career, I hope I have provided some sense, and appreciation, of just how impressively it started.

The Italian Communist Party since the 1960s," *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 20 (1990): 10-42.

30. *Democracy and Disorder*, cited in note 27, was written in 1989 and focuses exclusively on Italy, but it very much reflects Tarrow's evolving interests (and writing style).

BOOK REVIEWS

Federiga Bindi, *Italy and the European Union*, Washington, DC/Rome, Brookings Institution Press/Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione, 2011 (ISBN 9780815704966, ix + 346 pp., £ 19.99, pb.

With this book Federiga Bindi fills a certain void in both European Union and Italian studies by offering a description of the institutions and procedures through which Italy makes itself present at EU level, the aims and strategies that are thus pursued and the impact that Italy manages to exert on EU policymaking. Other contributions in the past have analyzed some of these aspects *across a number of policy areas*, but only few have dwelled on the institutional set-up and legislative instruments that allow the Italian voice to be heard in Brussels *in general*. Bindi illustrates in this book the background reasons for the particular ways in which Italy acts at EU level: the oft-observed fragmentation of its action, the ad-hocness of certain maneuvers and the belatedness of its initiative. The author attributes these worrying traits to the domestic institutional and political arrangements designed to cope with the demands of EU policymaking and with the low visibility of EU issues on the domestic political agenda.

The book begins by exploring systematically Italy's relationship with "Europe", recalling the historical milestones of integration (Chapter 3) and recording partisan orientations and public opinion's attitude towards the EU (Chapter 4). Together, these chapters tell us a well-known story, oftentimes recounted in the literature, which however constitutes the necessary background for the more detailed analysis that follows. The overview of the historical milestones reads as a fairly standard account of the Treaties that moved European integration along and of the negotiations and international context against which they were set. Occasionally, the spotlight is directed at specific Italian political figures (De Gasperi, Sforza and Colombo in the 1950s and 1960s, Malfatti and Cossiga in the 1970s, Andreotti, Craxi, De Mita and Goria in the 1980s, Amato, Ruggiero and Frattini in the 1990s and Prodi, Berlusconi and Frattini again in the 2000s).

The emphasis given to the latter stands out in this overview of Italian statesmen who contributed, one way or another, to European integration as well as in following chapters. The gratitude of the author towards this minister, who clearly supported her effort at writing the book (dutifully acknowledged in the preface) appears to have translated into a magnified assessment of this Minister's role in the development of the Union. The following chapter, dedicated to how Italian parties and public opinion have seen European integration, contains cursory reference to how the electoral system changed in Italy and how this influenced political participation and party alignments (and a rather speculative passage on what might happen to parties once Berlusconi will end his political career). This, and other, more evaluative excerpts that intersperse the analysis make the reader wonder whether the book merely wants to serve a scholarly purpose or has also has a more political agenda (this chapter unfortunately contains also a series of typos and small errors that make the reader wonder whether it was not written in some haste).

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are then devoted to a rather detailed description of how various governmental branches and state apparatuses have been involved in EU affairs: from parliament to the executive, from the public administration to organized interests. The aim is to give the reader a sense of how the Italian state machinery, and even its politics, work when applied to EU matters. This is clearly no easy task, but it is performed in a narratively pleasant and informative manner. The wealth of (sometimes excessively detailed) information is probably meant to allow us to appreciate how and why Italian governments have managed (or have failed) to distill the

national interest and to promote it at EU level. What emerges from this account is how all ministers have been jealous of their personal remits and have failed to cooperate across ministerial lines to present more articulated positions when negotiating at EU level. The internal fragmentation of Italian executives, in turn due to the "Cencelli rulebook" that presided over the distribution of ministerial and under-secretarial positions during the First Republic, have prevented Italian ministers from playing effectively the "EU game" which entails the confection of appealing "package deals" across policy issues. The chapter also points to lack of uniform practices across governmental and state branches which penalizes particularly the negotiating phase, in which the most important deals are normally sealed. The impression is that, due to an outdated ministerial culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the permanent representatives in Brussels (also drawn from within the diplomatic ranks) had to pick up the slack left behind by professional politicians too busy playing the domestic game. Even more disheartening appears to be the incapacity of the Italian public administration to deal with and even comprehend the importance of EU-level of policy-making. The picture does not improve when Bindi describes the involvement of Italian interest groups and lobbies in EU affairs – an assessment confirmed also by the most serious comparative studies of interest group activism at EU level (see, e.g., Rainer Eising's *The Political Economy of State-Business Relations in Europe*, Routledge 2009, or Justin Greenwood's *Interest Representation in the European Union*, Palgrave 2011).

This analysis finally comes to fruition in Chapters 8 and 9 in which "high politics" issues – Treaty negotiations, the European Arrest Warrant and the Albanian crisis – and "low politics" ones – EMU and the 20-20 Climate-Energy package – are analyzed. The choice of cases is somewhat imbalanced, as the reader may legitimately wonder whether EMU is really a "low politics" issue just because it does not deal with "foreign relations" traditionally understood. Currency management and monetary policy are amongst the highest political issues one could imagine, over which Member States can "make or break" the Union, as it has become alarmingly clear recently. There are some valuable insights in these two empirical chapters that one would wish were developed further. For example, the oscillating difficulty of forging coalitions across member states on the occasion of important Council meetings. The disappointing conclusion of the Constitutional Treaty ratification process is blamed onto the failure of France, Germany and Italy to express that firm leadership that had served the Union so well in the past and mention of a specific Italian lack of stewardship on the occasion of its presidency during the second semester of 2004 is done only in passing without offering an analysis of why that was so.

Where the book appears weaker is in its pursuit of the theoretical ambitions announced in the introductory and theoretical (the first, second and last) chapters. The book claims to fill a descriptive void which, in the case of Italy, might indeed be there (but see Maurizio Ferrera's and Marco Giuliani's 2008 *Governance e politiche nell'Unione Europea*). What it does not do, however, is to place the Italian case in a theoretical perspective that helps us explain why that should be so. The literature review contained in Chapter 2 thus appears a trifle conventional, aimed more at establishing a niche for the book than at engaging existing theories of Europeanization (in its broadest, both top-down and bottom-up, meaning). The book however is a pleasant and informative, written by a "European" believer who clearly suffers at seeing her country make an insufficient contribution to the process of integration and who is moved by an authentic desire to boost with her own work the engagement of Italian politicians and functionaries in the European project.

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