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Please contact christophe.roux@unice.fr before submission.

BOOK REVIEWS

Books for review should be sent to the Jeffrey Hamill, *IPS* Book Review Editor (see cover page).

IN THIS ISSUE

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Greetings from the New President, by Amie Kreppel p. 4

Conference Announcements, p. 5

Publications, p. 6

ITALIAN AFFAIRS

The 2013 Italian General Election: the End of Bipolarism?, by Alessandro Chiaramonte and Nicola Maggini, p. 27

Territorial Disparities in Italy: The Case of Campania. Appraising the Successes and Failures of 25 years of Cohesion Policy Support, by Laura Polverari and Laura Tagle, p. 38

RESEARCH TRENDS

Left or Right? The Complex Nature and Uncertain Future of the 5 Stars Movement, by Piergiorgio Corbetta and Rinaldo Vignati, p. 53

Beyond Mario Monti: Austerity Policies and Path-Dependence. A Comparison of the Spanish and Italian Health Care Sectors, by Isabel M. Perera, p. 63

IERI E OGGI: THE STUDY OF ITALIAN POLITICS

Contemporary Italian Politics: A Journal for the Twenty-first Century, by James L. Newell, p. 72

BOOK REVIEWS

Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University) reviews Giovanna Procacci, *Warfare-Welfare. Intervento dello Stato e diritto dei cittadini (1914-18)* (Rome, Carocci, 2013), p. 79

Dwayne Woods (Purdue University) reviews Ilvo Diamanti (ed.), *Un Salto nel Voto. Ritratto Politico Dell'Italia di Oggi* (Rome, Laterza, 2013), p. 81.

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Greetings from the New President

It is my great pleasure to welcome new and old readers to this double issue of the Italian Politics and Society Newsletter. As 2014 arrives CONGRIPS is both celebrating past accomplishments and looking forward toward new initiatives. During our business meeting the 2013 APSA conference in Chicago we were finally able to celebrate the Lifetime Achievement Award to Professor Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University). CONGRIPS officially gave this award to Professor Tarrow in 2012, but the cancellation of the 2012 APSA meeting in New Orleans due to weather concerns delayed our celebration. This award formally recognized the tremendous contributions Professor Tarrow has made to the study of Italian politics and society during the course of a long and very productive career. For those who missed the celebration, the introductory comments made by CONGRIPS immediate past President, Simona Piattoni highlighted the long and impressive research achievements of Professor Tarrow, including the broader impact his work has had through the transformation of Italy into a significant comparative case across many important political and social topics including Communist mobilization, center-periphery relations, and clientelist relations among others.

While the Lifetime Achievement Award highlights the substantial past accomplishments of scholars like Professor Tarrow, CONGRIPS is especially interested in increasing the breadth and reach of new research on Italy by promoting the study of Italian politics and society among a wide spectrum of the academic community. In particular, we would like to facilitate the

development of Italy related expertise among younger scholars and encourage scholars at all stages to consider integrating Italy as a case within broader comparative and/or thematic research initiatives. These initiatives recognize the general decline in area studies across all regions, while recognizing the real value of in-depth country knowledge and the utility of comparative case analyses to test and further develop theoretical models of all types. We hope that the updates to the newsletter, website and our regular APSA panels will encourage the development of greater links between scholars interest in Italian politics and facilitate the sharing of information about events and opportunities related to Italian politics and society, both of which will help to achieve these goals.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Simona Piattoni (Università di Trento) for her energetic stewardship of CONGRIPS during her presidency and wish her the best of luck as she now turns her full attention to her post as President of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). I would also like to welcome Laura Polverari (University of Strathclyde) as our new program chair for APSA, and John Agnew (UCLA) as a new member of the Executive Committee. I am also extremely pleased to welcome Christophe Roux (University of Nice) as our new Vice President, while at the same time thanking him for his continued efforts on this newsletter.

Amie Kreppel (University of Florida)

Conference Announcement

CONGRIPS Panel

Retrenching States versus Expanding Societies: Civic Sense, Public Engagement and Citizens' Ability to Hold Power to Account in the Digital Era.
APSA Annual meeting, Washington, DC, August 28-31, 2014

Info provided by Laura Polverari

The recent economic crisis has generated unprecedented political challenges for Italy, other Western democracies, new or transition democracies outside Europe and for the European Union. In Europe, governments struggle to boost the economy and contain unemployment levels, and seem unable to meet citizens' demands for more inclusive and responsive policy-making. Political instability and fragmentation, the strengthening of populist and nationalist parties, the rise in social and territorial inequalities, increasing questioning of the goodness of the European construction, all appear to indicate an erosion of both representative democracy and State capacity.

Yet, as governments retrench from the economy and wane in popularity, grass-root civic engagement, often focused on local problems, appears to gain momentum. The new technologies and social media are a key development in supporting this process. At the same time, however, they are also breeding new tensions, for instance in relation to opportunities divide, manipulation of political messages, and the public's ability to discern and decipher digital information and use it to influence decision-making and hold governments to account.

The panel invites papers that: (i) explore issues related to State capacity and representative democracy crisis in Italy and in other countries in an age characterized by the widespread use of digital technologies; (ii) examine the causal inter-linkages between the high political flux and the role of the new digital media; (iii) consider the extent to which the challenges above described are acting as a catalyst for grass-root policy solutions outside traditional government and, more generally, for a redistribution of power within national and subnational polities (and, potentially, the role played by the new digital media in this); (iv) reflect upon how the digital technologies have revolutionized citizen mobilization; and (v) explore the likely future evolution and possible institutionalization of such recent developments.

Comparative papers – particularly those which compare and contrast Italy with other EU Member States, with the United States and with Latin American countries – will be favored, but work with a pure Italian focus, if couched in a comparative framework, will also be well received.

2013 Italian elections - Italian politics at the crossroads?

University of Birmingham (UK), 17 January 2014

Info provided by Ariana Giovannini and Jim Newell

The Political Studies Association and PSA's Italian Politics Specialist Group organized a one-day conference at the University of Birmingham on January 17, 2014. Here is the program, with further information available at <http://italianpolitics.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/1-day-conference-2013-italian-general.html>

9.30 – 9.40. Welcome address (Arianna Giovannini)

9.40 – 10.40. Key-note address: Gianfranco Pasquino (John Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy)

10.40 – 12.10. Session 1: Political Parties and the challenges ahead

A New Start? The Selection of the fifth Secretary of the Democratic Party, by Fulvio Venturino & Natascia Porcellato (University of Cagliari)

After the Elections: A Test for the Five Star Movement, by Fabio Bordignon & Luigi Ceccarini (University of Urbino)

The Window on the Secret Garden of Politics: MPs' Primary Elections in the Democratic Party, Five Star Movement and Left Ecology Freedom, by Marco Valbruzzi (EUI) & Natascia Porcellato (University of Cagliari)

12.15 – 13.15. Session 2: Campaigns & Media

Agenda's Dynamics in the Mainstream Media During the 2013 Electoral Campaign, by

Giuliano Bobba & Antonella Seddone (University of Turin)

New Forms of Media Partisanship? The 2013 Electoral Campaign from the Perspective of Entertainment Media, by Marco Mazzoni (University of Perugia) & Antonio Ciaglia (SUM, Florence)

14.30 – 16.30. Session 3: Key Themes & Open Questions

Do Younger Italians Prefer 'Technocratic' Politics? An Interpretation of Young People's Voting Behaviour, by Elisa Lello (University of Urbino)

The Paradox of the Rhetoric on Immigration in Italy. From 2013 Electoral Manifestos to Lampedusa, via Kyenge, by Eva Garau (University of Cagliari)

'Eye of the Storm': the Italian 2013 Elections and Institutional Reform, by Martin Bull (University of Salford)

Letta's Government and Constitutional Reforms, by Elisabetta Cassina Wolff (University of Oslo)

17.00 – 18.00. Round Table Discussion (Moderated by Daniele Albertazzi)

Gianfranco Pasquino (John Hopkins University, Bologna); Anna Cento Bull (University of Bath); Guglielmo Meardi (Warwick University); Martin Bull (University of Salford)

18.00 – 18.15. Concluding Reflections

James L. Newell (University of Salford).

Publications

By Alessandro Cagossi and Christophe Roux

Books

- Alfani, Guido. 2013. *Calamities and the Economy in Renaissance Italy: The Grand Tour of the Horsemen of the Apocalypse*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Aliano, David. 2012. *Mussolini's National Project in Argentina*, Madison NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Anile, Alberto. 2013. *Orson Welles in Italy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Arthurs, Joshua. 2012. *Excavating Modernity: The Roman Past in Fascist Italy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Baker, Nicholas Scott. 2013. *The Fruit of Liberty: Political Culture in the Florentine Renaissance, 1480-1550*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bartlett, Kenneth R. 2013. *A Short History of the Italian Renaissance*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Bellamy, Richard. 2013. *Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio and the Italian Political Tradition*, Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Black, Rachel E. 2012. *Porta Palazzo: The Anthropology of an Italian Market*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Bosco, Anna and Duncan McDonnell (eds.). 2013. *Italian Politics: from Berlusconi to Monti*, New York: Berghahn Books.
- Bosworth, R.J.B. 2013. *Italy and the Wider World, 1860-1960*, London: Routledge.
- Bouchard, Norma and Valerio Ferme. 2013. *Italy and the Mediterranean: Words, Sounds, and Images of the Post-Cold War Era*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brighi, Elisabetta. 2013. *Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and International Relations: the Case of Italy*, London: Routledge.
- Carvalho, Joao. 2013. *Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy: Comparing Britain, France and Italy*, London: Routledge.
- Cento Bull, Anna, and Philip Cooke. 2013. *Ending Terrorism in Italy*, London: Routledge.
- Champagne, John. 2012. *Aesthetic Modernism and Masculinity in Fascist Italy*, London: Routledge.
- Clapps Herman, Joanna. 2011. *The Anarchist Bastard: Growing Up Italian in America*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Copenhaver, Brian P. and Rebecca Copenhaver. 2012. *From Kant to Croce: Modern Philosophy in Italy, 1800-1950*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Corner, Paul. 2012. *The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini's Italy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Di Rosa, Luigi. 2012. "Economic change and the national question in twentieth-century Italy", in *Economic Change and the National Question in Twentieth-Century Europe*, Alice Teichova, Herbert Matis, and Jaroslav Pátek (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Donati, Sabina. 2013. *A Political History of National Citizenship and Identity in Italy, 1861–1950*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Edsel, Robert M. 2012. *Saving Italy: The Race to Rescue a Nation's Treasures from the Nazis*, New York: Norton.
- Emmott, Bill. 2012. *Good Italy, Bad Italy: Why Italy Must Conquer Its Demons to Face the Future*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Esposito, Roberto. 2012. *Living Thought: the Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Farrell, Henry. 2012. *The Political Economy of Trust: Institutions, Interests, and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferrari, Chiara. 2013. *The Rhetoric of Violence and Sacrifice in Fascist Italy: Mussolini, Gadda, Vittorini*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Gambetta, Diego. 2011. *Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate*, Princeton University Press.
- Garelli, Franco. 2012. *Catholicism in Italy in the Age of Pluralism*, Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Gesualdi, Louis J. 2012. *The Italian/American Experience: A Collection of Writings*, Lanham: University Press of America.
- Gilmour, David. 2011. *The Pursuit of Italy: a History of a Land, Its Regions, and Their Peoples*, New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux.
- Gordon, Robert S. C. 2012. *The Holocaust in Italian Culture, 1944–2010*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Graziano, Paolo R. 2012. *Europeanization and Domestic Policy Change: the Case of Italy*, London: Routledge.
- Gundle, Stephen. 2013. *Mussolini's Dream Factory: Film Stardom in Fascist Italy*, New York: Berghahn Books.
- Hametz, Maura. 2012. *In the Name of Italy: Nation, Family, and Patriotism in a Fascist Court*, New York: Fordham University Press.
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- Katharine, Mitchell and Sanson, Helena (eds.) 2013. *Women and Gender in Post-Unification Italy: Between Private and Public Spheres*, Bern: Peter Lang.
- Koon, Tracy H. 2012. *Believe, Obey, Fight: Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922-1943*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kranjc, Gregor Joseph. 2013. *To Walk with the Devil: Slovene Collaboration and Axis Occupation, 1941-1945*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Laurence, Jonathan. 2012. *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The State's Role in Minority Integration*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lombardi-Diop Cristina and Caterina Romeo (eds.) 2013. *Postcolonial Italy: Challenging National Homogeneity*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lomonaco, Fabrizio. 2013. *Tolerance: Stages in modernity from Holland to Italy*, Bern: Peter Lang.
- Longhi, Vittorio. 2012. *The Immigrant War: a Global Movement against Discrimination and Exploitation*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- MacMullen, Ramsay. 2013. *The Earliest Romans: A Character Sketch*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Marinelli Maurizio and Giovanni Andornino (eds.) 2013. *Italy's Encounters with Modern China: Imperial Dreams, Strategic Ambitions*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marquand, David. 2012. *The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Melissa, Coburn. 2013. *Race and Narrative in Italian Women's Writing Since Unification*, Madison NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Michelson, Emily. 2013. *The Pulpit and the Press in Reformation Italy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Minghelli, Giuliana. 2013. *Landscape and Memory in Post-Fascist Italian Film: Cinema Year Zero*, London: Routledge.

- Mole, Noelle J. 2011. *Labor Disorders in Neoliberal Italy: Mobbing, Well-Being, and the Workplace*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Montanari, Massimo. 2013. *Italian Identity in the Kitchen, or Food and the Nation*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Muehlebach, Andrea. 2012. *The Moral Neoliberal: Welfare and Citizenship in Italy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nelson Jonathan K. and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 2013. *The Patron's Payoff: Conspicuous Commissions in Italian Renaissance Art*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nicaso, Antonio and Marcel Danesi. 2013. *Made Men: Mafia Culture and the Power of Symbols, Rituals, and Myth*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Picot, Georg. 2012. *Politics of Segmentation: Party Competition and Social Protection in Europe*, London: Routledge.
- Piredda, Patrizia (ed.) 2013. *The Great War in Italy: Representation and Interpretation*, Leicester: Troubador Publishing.
- Pojmann, Wendy. 2013. *Italian Women and International Cold War Politics, 1944-1968*, New York: Fordham University Press.
- Pridham, Geoffrey. 2013. *Political Parties and Coalitional Behaviour in Italy*, London: Routledge.
- Renga, Dana. 2013. *Unfinished Business: Screening the Italian Mafia in the New Millennium*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Ricciardi, Alessia. 2012. *After La Dolce Vita: a Cultural Prehistory of Berlusconi's Italy*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Roberts, Sean. 2013. *Printing a Mediterranean World: Florence, Constantinople, and the Renaissance of Geography*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rogers, Mary and Paola Tinagli (rds.). 2012. *Women and the Visual Arts in Italy c. 1400-1650: Luxury and Leisure, Duty and Devotion*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Romani, Gabriella. 2013. *Postal Culture: Reading and Writing Letters in Post-Unification Italy*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Rosengarten, Frank. 2012. *Giacomo Leopardi's Search for a Common Life through Poetry: a Different Nobility, a Different Love*, Madison NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Ross Taylor, Lily. 2013. *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic: the Thirty-five Urban and Rural Tribes*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Schmitz, David F. 2011. *The United States and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
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- Soper, Steven C. 2013. *Building a Civil Society: Associations, Public Life, and the Origins of Modern Italy*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2012. *Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Terpstra, Nicholas. 2013. *Cultures of Charity: Women, Politics, and the Reform of Poor Relief in Renaissance Italy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tilles, Daniel. 2011. *Fascism and the Jews: Italy and Britain*, Portland: Vallentine Mitchell.
- Varese, Federico. 2013. *Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Territories*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Viroli, Maurizio. 2012. *As If God Existed: Religion and Liberty in the History of Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Viroli, Maurizio. 2012. *Machiavelli's God*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Viroli, Maurizio. 2013. *Redeeming the Prince: the Meaning of Machiavelli's Masterpiece*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Journal Articles with a focus on Italy

- Albertini, Marco. 2013. "The relation between social class and economic inequality: A strengthening or weakening nexus? Evidence from the last three decades of inequality in Italy", *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, Vol. 33.
- Allievi, Stefano. 2013. "Immigration, religious diversity and recognition of differences: the Italian way to multiculturalism", *Identities*.
- Altavilla, Carlo, Floro Ernesto Caroleo. 2013. "Asymmetric Effects of National-based Active Labour Market Policies", *Regional Studies*, Vol. 47, Iss. 9.
- Ancilli, Stefano. 2013. "Equivocal Subjects: Between Italy and Africa—constructions of racial and national identity in the Italian cinema", *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*.
- Andreotti, Alberta, Enzo Mingione, Jonathan Pratschke. 2013. "Female employment and the economic crisis", *European Societies*, Vol. 15, Iss. 4.
- Angiola, Nunzio, Piervito Bianchi. 2013. "Public Managers' Skills Development for Effective Performance Management: Empirical evidence from Italian local governments", *Public Management Review*.
- Annicchino, Pasquale. 2013. "Recent developments concerning the promotion of freedom of religion or belief in Italian foreign policy", *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, Vol. 11, Iss. 3.
- Attinà, Fulvio. 2013. "Mediterranean Security Revisited", *Democracy and Security*, Vol. 9, Iss. 1-2.
- Azzolini, Davide, Carlo Barone. 2013. "Do they progress or do they lag behind? Educational attainment of immigrants' children in Italy: The role played by generational status, country of origin and social class", *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, Vol. 31.
- Baldini, Gianfranco. 2013. "Don't Count Your Chickens before They're Hatched: The 2013 Italian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections", *South European Society and Politics*.
- Baldini, Gianfranco and Brunetta Baldi. 2013. "Decentralization in Italy and the Troubles of Federalization", *Regional & Federal Studies*.
- Bale, Tim, André Krouwel. 2013. "Down but Not Out: A Comparison of Germany's CDU/CSU with Christian Democratic Parties in Austria, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands", *German Politics*, Vol. 22, Iss. 1-2.
- Baudner, Joerg, Martin J. Bull. 2013. "The Europeanisation of national institutions reassessed: A comparison of regional policies in Germany and Italy", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 11.
- Bellucci, Paolo, Andrea De Angelis. 2013. "Government approval in Italy: Political cycle, economic expectations and TV coverage", *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 32, Iss. 3.
- Bellucci, Paolo, Diego Garzia, Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 2013. "Issues and leaders as vote determinants: The case of Italy", *Party Politics*.
- Bellucci, Paolo. 2012. "Government accountability and voting choice in Italy, 1990–2008, Electoral Studies", Vol. 31, Iss. 3.
- Beltrame, Lorenzo. 2013. "Disputing the boundary of pluripotency. The Italian public debate on amniotic fluid-derived stem cells", *New Genetics and Society*, Vol. 32, Iss. 4.
- Bernhard, Patrick. 2013. "Borrowing from Mussolini: Nazi Germany's Colonial Aspirations in the Shadow of Italian Expansionism", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 41, Iss. 4.

- Bertolani, Barbara, Matteo Rinaldini, Mara Tognetti Bordogna. 2013. "Combining Civic Stratification and Transnational Approaches for Reunited Families: The Case of Moroccans, Indians and Pakistanis in Reggio Emilia", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.
- Bertone, Chiara. 2013. "Citizenship across generations: struggles around heteronormativities", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 17, Iss. 8.
- Bettin, Cristina M. 2013. "Italian Jews: From Social Integration to the Construction of a New European Identity", *The European Legacy*, Vol. 18, Iss. 3.
- Blangiardo, Gian Carlo, Stefania Rimoldi. 2013. "The role of families in the population crisis", *International Review of Sociology*, Vol. 23, Iss. 3.
- Boccagni, Paolo. 2013. "'I'm not like all these Ecuadorians'. Promises and dilemmas of immigrants' selective ethnicity appropriation", *Social Identities*.
- Bordandini, Paola. 2013. "Renewal and Tradition: Comparing Italian Radical Left Parties through their Middle-Level Elites", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 18, Iss. 1.
- Bordignon, Fabio, Luigi Ceccarini. 2013. "Five Stars and a Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes Italian Politics", *South European Society and Politics*.
- Caiani, Manuela, Rossella Borri. 2013. "The Extreme Right, Violence and Other Action Repertoires: An Empirical Study on Two European Countries", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 14, Iss. 4.
- Campomori, Francesca, Tiziana Caponio. 2013. "Competing frames of immigrant integration in the EU: geographies of social inclusion in Italian regions", *Policy Studies*, Vol. 34, Iss. 2.
- Campopiano, Michele. 2013. "Rural communities, land clearance and water management in the Po Valley in the central and late Middle Ages", *Journal of Medieval History*, Vol. 39, Iss. 4.
- Carnino, Cecilia. 2014. "From Luxury to Consumption in Eighteenth-Century Europe: The Importance of Italian Thought in History and Historiography", *History of European Ideas*.
- Carrosio, Giovanni. 2013. "Energy production from biogas in the Italian countryside: Policies and organizational models", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 63.
- Cavalli, Alessandro. 2013. "The Memory of Fascism and of the Anti-Fascist Resistance among Italian Youth", *European Review*, Vol. 21, Iss. 4.
- Cayli, Baris. 2014. "Italian civil society against the Mafia: From perceptions to expectations", *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, Vol. 41, Iss. 1.
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- Ceron, Andrea. 2013. "The Politics of Fission: An Analysis of Faction Breakaways among Italian Parties (1946-2011)", *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Ciccarelli, Carlo, Tommaso Proietti. 2013. "Patterns of industrial specialisation in post-Unification Italy", *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, Vol. 61, Iss. 3.
- Cipolletta, Sabrina, Elena Faccio. 2013. "Time experience during the assisted reproductive journey: a phenomenological analysis of Italian couples' narratives", *Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology*, Vol. 31, Iss. 3.
- Cirilli, Andrea, Paolo Vener. 2013. "Spatial Structure and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) Emissions Due to Commuting: An Analysis of Italian Urban Areas", *Regional Studies*.
- Colombo, Asher. 2013. "Foreigners and immigrants in Italy's penal and administrative detention systems", *European Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 10, Iss. 6.
- Coltorti, Fulvio. 2013. "Italian Industry, Decline or Transformation? A Framework", *European Planning Studies*, Vol. 21, Iss. 12.

- Contini, Dalit. 2013. "Immigrant background peer effects in Italian schools", *Social Science Research*, Vol. 42, Iss. 4.
- Corbetta, Piergiorgio, Pasquale Colloca. 2013. "Job Precariousness and Political Orientations: The Case of Italy", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 18, Iss. 3.
- Corbetta, Piergiorgio, Rinaldo Vignati. 2013. "Beppe Grillo's First Defeat? The May 2013 Municipal Elections in Italy", *South European Society and Politics*.
- Croce, Giuseppe, Emanuela Ghignoni. 2013. "Educational mismatch and spatial flexibility in Italian local labour markets", *Education Economics*.
- Cucciniello, Maria, Greta Nasi. 2013. "Evaluation of the Impacts of Innovation in the Health Care Sector", *Public Management Review*.
- Curini, Luigi, Andrea Ceron. 2013. "Parties' Influence during Government Policy Negotiations: Parliamentary Dynamics and Spatial Advantages in the First Italian Republic", *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, Vol. 19, Iss. 4.
- Curini, Luigi, Luca Pinto. 2013. "Government formation under the shadow of a core party: The case of the First Italian Republic", *Party Politics*, Vol. 19, Iss. 3.
- Da Roit, Barbara, Amparo González Ferrer, Francisco Javier Moreno-Fuentes. 2013. "The Southern European migrant-based care model", *European Societies*, Vol. 15, Iss. 4.
- D'Agostino, Giorgio, Margherita Scarlato. 2013. "Innovation, Socio-institutional Conditions and Economic Growth in the Italian Regions", *Regional Studies*.
- Damonte, Alessia. 2013. "Policy tools for green growth in the EU15: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis", *Environmental Politics*.
- Dansero, Egidio, Matteo Puttilli. 2013. "Multiple territorialities of alternative food networks: six cases from Piedmont, Italy", *Local Environment*.
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- Dotti, Nicola Francesco, Ugo Fratesi, Camilla Lenzi, Marco Percoco. 2013. "Local Labour Markets and the Interregional Mobility of Italian University Students", *Spatial Economic Analysis*, Vol. 8, Iss. 4.
- Faccio, Elena, Elena Bordin, Sabrina Cipolletta. 2013. "Transsexual parenthood and new role assumptions", *Culture, Health & Sexuality*, Vol. 15, Iss. 9.
- Falcinelli, Daniela, Sveva Magaraggia. 2013. "'Double Yes' for Whom? Gender Innovation in Italian Families", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 21, Iss. 2.
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- Fratesi, Ugo, Marco Percoco. 2013. "Selective Migration, Regional Growth and Convergence: Evidence from Italy", *Regional Studies*.
- Gabrielli, Giuseppe, Anna Paterno, Gianpiero Dalla-Zuanna. 2013. "Just a Matter of Time? The Ways in Which the Children of Immigrants become Similar (or not) to Italians", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 39, Iss. 9.
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- Guerrini, Andrea, Giulia Romano. 2013. "The process of tariff setting in an unstable legal framework: An Italian case study", *Utilities Policy*, Vol. 24.
- Hanafin, Patrick. 2013. "Rights, bioconstitutionalism and the politics of reproductive citizenship in Italy", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 17, Iss. 8.
- Ignazi, Piero, E. Spencer Wellhofer. 2013. "Religion, Rurality and Voting: Secularisation, Landownership and Italian Electoral Behaviour, 1953–2008", *West European Politics*, Vol. 36, Iss. 5.
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- Kaag, Mayke. 2013. "Transnational Elite Formation: The Senegalese Murid Community in Italy", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 39, Iss. 9.
- Labbate, Silvio. 2013. "Italy and the development of European energy policy: from the dawn of the integration process to the 1973 oil crisis", *European Review of History*, Vol. 20, Iss. 1.
- Landi, Massimiliano, Riccardo Pelizzo. 2013. "A Spatial Analysis of the Italian Second Republic", *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, Vol. 19, Iss. 3.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Richard Nadeau. 2012. "PIGS or not? Economic voting in Southern Europe", *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 31, Iss. 3.
- Longo, Francesca. 2013. "The Relevance of Security Sector Reform in Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the European Union in the Mediterranean", *Democracy and Security*, Vol. 9, Iss. 1-2.

- Mantovan, Claudia. 2013. "Cohesion without participation: immigration and migrants' associations in Italy", *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 47, Iss. 3.
- Marabello, Selenia. 2013. "Translating and Acting Diaspora: Looking Through the Lens of a Co-development Project Between Italy and Ghana", *African Studies*, Vol. 72, Iss. 2.
- Marchetti, Raffaele. 2013. "Civil Society–Government Synergy and Normative Power Italy", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 48, Iss. 4.
- Marchetti, Sabrina. 2013. "Dreaming Circularity? Eastern European Women and Job Sharing in Paid Home Care", *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, Vol. 11, Iss. 4.
- Marinelli, Elisabetta. 2013. "Sub-national Graduate Mobility and Knowledge Flows: An Exploratory Analysis of Onward- and Return-Migrants in Italy", *Regional Studies*, Vol. 47, Iss. 10.
- Marini, Francesco. 2013. "Immigrants and transnational engagement in the diaspora: Ghanaian associations in Italy and the UK", *African and Black Diaspora*, Vol. 6, Iss. 2.
- Masseti, Emanuele, Simon Toubeau. 2013. "Sailing with Northern Winds: Party Politics and Federal Reforms in Italy", *West European Politics*, Vol. 36, Iss. 2.
- Mazzoleni, Martino. 2013. "Transition in Continuity: The Lombardy Regional Election of 2013", *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol. 23, Iss. 5.
- Mazzoni, Marco and Antonio Ciaglia. 2013. "An incomplete transition? How Italian politicians manage the celebritisation of politics", *Celebrity Studies*.
- McCann, Dermot. 2013. "Transforming European Capitalism? The European Union and the Governance of Companies", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*.
- Mescoli, Elsa. 2013. "Towards the elsewhere: discourses on migration and mobility practices between Morocco and Italy", *Identities*.
- Mezran, Karim. 2013. "Muslims in Italy: The Need for an 'Intesa' with the Italian State", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 48, Iss. 1.
- Milio, Simona. 2013. "The conflicting effects of multi-level governance and the partnership principle: Evidence from the Italian experience", *European Urban and Regional Studies*.
- Millan, Matteo. 2013. "The Institutionalisation of "Squadrismo": Disciplining Paramilitary Violence in the Italian Fascist Dictatorship", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 22, Iss. 4.
- Morlino, Leonardo. 2013. "The impossible transition and the unstable new mix: Italy 1992–2012", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 11.
- Nifo, Annamaria, Gaetano Vecchione. 2013. "Do Institutions Play a Role in Skilled Migration? The Case of Italy", *Regional Studies*.
- Nomikos, John M. 2013. "Combating Illegal Immigration, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in Greece and Italy", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 26, Iss. 2.
- Nucciarelli, Alberto, Angelo Castaldo, Elisabetta Conte, Bert Sadowski. 2013. "Unlocking the potential of Italian broadband: Case studies and policy lessons", *Telecommunications Policy*, Vol. 37, Iss. 10.
- Ozzano, Luca, Alberta Giorgi. 2013. "The Debate on the Crucifix in Public Spaces in Twenty-First Century Italy", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 18, Iss. 2.
- Pargeter, Alison. "The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities: The Case of Italy and Libya", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 18, Iss. 1.
- Parigi, Paolo, Laura Sartori. 2013. "The political party as a network of cleavages: Disclosing the inner structure of Italian political parties in the seventies", *Social Networks*, Vol. 36.
- Passarelli, Gianluca. 2013. "Crossing the Rubicon ... and Back: Twenty Years of the Italian Northern League", *South European Society and Politics*.
- Picker, Giovanni, Gabriele Roccheggiani. 2013. "Abnormalising minorities. The state and expert knowledge addressing the Roma in Italy", *Identities*.

- Pirkkalainen, Päivi, Petra Mezzetti, Matteo Guglielmo. 2013. "Somali Associations' Trajectories in Italy and Finland: Leaders Building Trust and Finding Legitimation", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 39, Iss. 8.
- Polverari, Laura. 2013. "Policy Rhetoric versus Political Reality: Has the Italian State Given Up on the Mezzogiorno?", *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol. 23, Iss. 5.
- Quaglia, Lucia. 2013. "The Europeanisation of Macroeconomic Policies and Financial Regulation in Italy", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 18, Iss. 2.
- Quaranta, Mario. 2013. "The 'Normalisation' of the Protester: Changes in Political Action in Italy (1981–2009)", *South European Society and Politics*.
- Quartararo, Cristina, Daniela Falcinelli. 2013. "Not only men but also migrants in non-traditional occupations", *International Review of Sociology*, Vol. 23, Iss. 2.
- Riva, Egidio. 2013. "Workplace work-family interventions: Italy in times of welfare state retrenchment and recession", Vol. 33, Iss. 9/10.
- Romano, Bernardino, Francesco Zullo. 2014. "The urban transformation of Italy's Adriatic coastal strip: Fifty years of unsustainability", *Land Use Policy*, Vol. 38.
- Rosa, Paolo. 2013. "The Accommodationist State. Strategic Culture and Italy's Military Behavior", *International Relations*.
- Rose, Patrick. 2013. "Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943–1944", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 36, Iss. 1.
- Sandri, Giulia, Mario Telò, Luca Tomini. 2013. "Political system, civil society and institutions in Italy: The quality of democracy", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 11.
- Schmidt, Vivien, Elisabetta Gualmini. 2013. "The political sources of Italy's economic problems: Between opportunistic political leadership and pragmatic, technocratic leadership", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 11.
- Schmidtke, Oliver, Andrej Zaslove. 2013. "Why Regions Matter in Immigrant Integration Policies: North Rhine-Westphalia and Emilia-Romagna in Comparative Perspective", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.
- Schmitt, Sophie, Eva-Maria Euchner, Caroline Preidel. 2013. "Regulating prostitution and same-sex marriage in Italy and Spain: the interplay of political and societal veto players in two catholic societies", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 20, Iss. 3, 2013.
- Scuzzarello, Sarah. 2013. "Policy actors' narrative constructions of migrants' integration in Malmö and Bologna", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*.
- Stockings, Craig. 2013. "'Something is wrong with our army...': Command, Leadership and Italian Military Failure in the First Libyan Campaign, 1940–41", *Defence Studies*, Vol. 13, Iss. 2.
- Studlar, Donley T., Alessandro Cagossi & Robert D. Duval. 2013. "Is morality policy different? Institutional explanations for post-war Western Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 20, Iss. 3.
- Telò, Mario. 2013. "Italy's interaction with the European project, from the First to the Second Republic: Continuity and change", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 11.
- Thomas, Martin. 2013. "Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East/Britain, Palestine and Empire: The Mandate Year", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 28, Iss. 6.
- Tobia, Simona. 2013. "Did the RAI buy it? The role and limits of American broadcasting in Italy in the Cold War", *Cold War History*, Vol. 13, Iss. 2.
- Toninelli, Pier Angelo, Michelangelo Vasta. 2013. "Opening the black box of entrepreneurship: The Italian case in a historical perspective", *Business History*.
- Ugolini, Wendy. 2013. "'Spaghetti Lengths in a Bowl?' Recovering Narratives of Not 'Belonging' Amongst the Italian Scots", *Immigrants & Minorities*, Vol. 31, Iss. 2.

- Varley, Karine. 2013. "Vichy and the Complexities of Collaborating with Fascist Italy: French Policy and Perceptions between June 1940 and March 1942", *Modern & Contemporary France*, Vol. 21, Iss. 3.
- Veugelers, John W.P. 2013. "Neo-fascist or revolutionary leftist: Family politics and social movement choice in postwar Italy", *International Sociology*, Vol. 28, Iss. 4.
- Visconti, Katia. 2013. "The Historiographical Misfortune of the Cisalpine Republic History", *History of European Ideas*.
- Warner, Carolyn M. 2013. "Christian Democracy in Italy: An alternative path to religious party moderation", *Party Politics*, Vol. 19, Iss. 2.
- Willson, Perry. 2013. "Italian Fascism and the Political Mobilisation of Working-Class Women, 1937-43", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 22, Iss. 1.
- Zanfi, Federico. 2013. "The Città Abusiva in Contemporary Southern Italy: Illegal Building and Prospects for Change", *Urban Studies*, Vol. 50, Iss. 16.
- Zanon, Bruno, Sara Verones. 2013. "Climate change, urban energy and planning practices: Italian experiences of innovation in land management tools", *Land Use Policy*, Vol. 32.
- Zanon, Bruno. 2013. "Scaling-down and scaling-up processes of territorial governance: cities and regions facing institutional reform and planning challenges", *Urban Research & Practice*, Vol. 6, Iss. 1.

Journal Contents

Bulletin of Italian Politics

<http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/socialpolitical/research/politics/journals/bulletinofitalianpolitics/>

4 (2) Winter 2012

- Maurizio Carbone and James L. Newell, "Italy on the Eve of the 2013 General Elections".
- Roberto Fornasier, "The DC and the PCI in the Seventies: A Complex Relation Supervised by the United States".
- Valeria Camia, "The PDS-DS Parliamentary Discourse on Europe (1992-2005): The Cultural Challenge".
- Mario Quaranta, "The Rise of Unconventional Political Participation in Italy: Measurement Equivalence and Trends, 1976-2009".
- Giovanni Barbieri, "The Northern League in the 'Red Belt' of Italy".
- Francesco Marangoni, "The Legislative Activity of Technocrats: An Updating of Indicators at the (Early) End of the Monti Government".
- Christian Ruggiero, "Forecasting in the Politics of Spectacle, from Berlusconi to Grillo: The Narrative of Impolite Politics".

Contemporary Italian Politics

(former "Bulletin of Italian Politics")

<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rita20/current#.Ut9i67Qo7IU>

5 (1) 2013

- James L. Newell & Maurizio Carbone, "Italy in the aftermath of the 2013 general elections".
- Piero Ignazi & Spencer Wellhofer, "Lineages and family resemblances: tracing the Italian DC vote after 1994".
- Donatella della Porta & Massimiliano Andretta, "Protesting for justice and democracy: Italian Indignados?".
- Oswaldo Croci & Marco Valigi, "Continuity and change in Italian foreign policy: the case of the international intervention in Libya".
- Luciano Bardi & Eugenio Pizzimenti, "Old logics for new games: the appointment of the EU's High Representative".

Francesco Marangoni, "From fragile majoritarianism to the 'technocratic addendum': some data on the legislative activity of the governments of the sixteenth legislature".
Piergiorgio Corbetta & Rinaldo Vignati, "The primaries of the centre left: only a temporary success?".

5 (2) 2013 - Special Issue: THE ITALIAN ELECTIONS: the electoral roots and the political consequences of the 24-25 February 2013 Italian elections

Editorial, "The (apparent) calm after the storm".

Sergio Fabbrini & Marc Lazar, "Still a difficult democracy? Italy between populist challenges and institutional weakness".

Roberto D'Alimonte, "The Italian elections of February 2013: the end of the Second Republic?".

Luigi Ceccarini & Ilvo Diamanti, "The election campaign and the 'last-minute' deciders".

Lilia Giugni & Marc Lazar, "The 2013 Italian elections in historical perspective".

Renaud Dehousse, "Negative Europeanisation: European issues in the Italian elections".

Sofia Ventura, "Leaders and parties after the Italian elections".

Sergio Fabbrini, "Solving the government's puzzle: the controversial consequences of the Italian elections of 24–25 February 2013".

Tito Boeri, "Desperately seeking a middleman".

5 (3) 2013

James L. Newell & Maurizio Carbone, "The confidence vote of 2 October 2013: the (final) end of the Berlusconi era?".

Mattia Zulianello, "When political parties decide not to govern: party strategies and the winners and losers of the Monti technocratic government".

Gianfranco Pasquino, "Personalistic leadership, party politics, and the quality of democracy: the case of Italy".

Valentina Reda, "Managing communication in the Prime Minister's Office, 1988–2012".

Michelangelo Vercesi, "Party, coalition, premiership: the role of Silvio Berlusconi in coalition dynamics and its determinants".

Enrico Calossi, Fabio Calugi & Fabrizio Coticchia, "Peace and war in the political discourse of Italian Marxist and post-Marxist parties".

Journal of Modern Italian Studies <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmis20>

17 (5) 2012 - Special Issue: Nationality before Liberty? Risorgimento political thought in transnational context.

Maurizio Isabella, "Nationality before liberty? Risorgimento political thought in transnational context".

Carlo Capra, "The rise of liberal constitutionalism in Italy: Pietro Verri and the French Revolution".

John Robertson, "Pietro Verri between Enlightenment and Risorgimento".

Martin Thom, "The 'hermite des Apennins': Leopardi and the *Antologia* in 1824–26".

Georgios Varouxakis, "The discreet charm of 'Southernness'".

Maurizio Isabella, "Freedom of the press, public opinion and liberalism in the Risorgimento".

Jeremy Jennings, "A note on freedom of the press in Restoration France".

Francesca Sofia, "The Promised Land: biblical themes in the Risorgimento".

Gareth Stedman Jones, "Religion and liberty in European political thought 1800–1860 ca".

Roberto Romani, "Political thought in action: the moderates in 1859".

Anthony Howe, "'Friends of moderate opinions': Italian political thought in 1859 in a British Liberal mirror".

Gianfranco Pasquino & Marco Valbruzzi, "Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability".

18 (1) 2013

Mario De Prospo, "Reconstructing the army of a collapsed nation: the Kingdom of the South of Italy (September 1943–March 1944)".

Penelope Morris, "'Let's not talk about Italian sex': the reception of the Kinsey reports in Italy".
Niamh Cullen, "Morals, modern identities and the Catholic woman: fashion in Famiglia Cristiana, 1954–1968".
Gianluca Passarelli, "Extreme right parties in Western Europe: the case of the Italian Northern League".
Nazareno Panichella, "Migration strategies and occupational outcomes of southern Italian graduates".
Michele Alacevich, "Postwar development in the Italian Mezzogiorno. Analyses and policies".

18 (2) 2013 - Special Issue: Mediating the Risorgimento

Massimo Riva & John A. Davis, "Mediating the Risorgimento".
Alessio Petrizzo, "'The Garibaldi of the sixteenth century'. Francesco Ferrucci and the heroes of the Risorgimento".
Gian Luca Fruci, "The two faces of Daniele Manin. French republican celebrity and Italian monarchic icon (1848–1880)".
Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg, "The Risorgimento in opera: Introduction".
Axel Körner, "Masked faces. Verdi, Uncle Tom and the unification of Italy".
Mary Ann Smart, "How political were Verdi's operas? Metaphors of progress in the reception of I Lombardi alla prima crociata".
Emily Braun, "Easel painting in the age of Italian unification: Introduction".
Roberta J. M. Olson, "Art for a new audience in the Risorgimento: a meditation".
Anna Ottani Cavina, "The landscape of the Macchiaioli. A path towards the modern".
Marcella Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "Marketing 'Garibaldi panoramas' in Britain (1860–1864)".
Giovanni Lasi, "La presa di Roma and Il piccolo garibaldino: the Risorgimento and national identity in early Italian cinema".

18 (3) 2013 - Special Issue: Italy and the Public Sphere

Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi & Richard Kaplan, "An Italian public sphere?".
Paul Ginsborg, "Civil society in contemporary Italy: theory, history and practice".
Marco Revelli, "A fragile political sphere".
Danilo Breschi, "A queen without a sceptre: public opinion and the political-constitutional debate in Italy in the first fifty years of national unification".
Guido Martinotti, "Empty piazze. The waning of urban civism in Italian politics".
Paolo Mancini, "The Italian public sphere: a case of dramatized polarization".
David Forgacs, "Looking for Italy's public sphere".

18 (4) 2013

Walter Adamson & Ernest Ialongo, "Introduction: Reconsidering Futurism".
Ernest Ialongo, "Filippo Tommaso Marinetti: the Futurist as Fascist, 1929–37".
Christopher Adams, "Historiographical perspectives on 1940s Futurism".
Erin Larkin, "Benedetta and the creation of 'Second Futurism'".
Gianfranco Pasquino & Marco Valbruzzi, "Post-electoral politics in Italy: institutional problems and political perspectives".
Daniela Del Boca & Anna Giraldo, "Why has the growth of female employment in Italy been so slow?".
M.F.N. Giglioli, "'Il deputato della bellezza'. Gabriele D'Annunzio's aesthetic politics in the fin-de-siècle crisis".

Modern Italy <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cmit20>

18 (1) 2013

Daniele Albertazzi, "Amici fragili: the alliance between the Lega Nord and the Popolo della Libertà as seen by their representatives and members".
Natalie Fullwood, "Popular Italian cinema, the media, and the economic miracle: rethinking commedia all'italiana".

Federica Mazzara, "Performing post-migration cinema in Italy: Corazones de Mujer by K. Kosoof".
Marcella Rizzo, "The creation of shared space and the definition of a 'light' community in Italian television in the 1980s".
Paolo Mencarelli, "The Tuscan Committee of National Liberation: New directions in research, archives and editions of sources".

18 (2) 2013 – Special Issue: The cult of Mussolini in twentieth-century Italy

Stephen Gundle, Christopher Duggan & Giuliana Pieri, "Introduction".
Paul Baxa, "'Il nostro Duce': Mussolini's visit to Trieste in 1938 and the workings of the cult of the Duce".
Paola Bernasconi, "A fairy tale dictator: children's letters to the Duce".
Enrico Sturani, "Analysing Mussolini postcards".
Sofia Serenelli, "'It was like something that you have at home which becomes so familiar that you don't even pay attention to it': Memories of Mussolini and Fascism in Predappio, 1922–2010".
Stephen Gundle, "Playing the dictator: re-enactments of Mussolini in film and television".
Sandro Busso & Luca Storti, "Social cohesion and economic development: some reflections on the Italian case".

18 (3) 2013

Maria Casalini, "The family, sexual morality and gender identity in the communist tradition in Italy (1921–1956)".
Vittorio Coco, "The pentiti of the Sicilian mafia in the 1930s".
Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli, "Italian foreign and security policy in a state of reliability crisis?".
Valentina Ciciliot, "'Heritage talks. Heritage calls': some instances of the canonisation policy of John Paul II in Italy".
Gianluca Passarelli, "Homogeneity and differentiation in national and regional elections: the case of Italy".
Antonella Seddone & Fulvio Venturino, "Bringing voters back in leader selection: the open primaries of the Italian Democratic Party".

18 (4) 2013

Selena Daly, "'The Futurist mountains': Filippo Tommaso Marinetti's experiences of mountain combat in the First World".
John Champagne, "Sandro Penna and anti-Oedipal impegno".
Andrea Mariuzzo, "Land reform in the 1950s in Italy and the United States: the thinking of Mario Einaudi".
Ruth Glynn, "The 'turn to the victim' in Italian culture: victim-centred narratives of the anni di piombo".
Stefania Tufi, "Shared places, unshared identities: vernacular discourses and spatialised constructions of identity in the linguistic landscape of Trieste".
Nick Dines, "Bad news from an aberrant city: a critical analysis of the British press's portrayal of organised crime and the refuse crisis in Naples".
Sergio Fabbrini, "Political and institutional constraints on structural reforms: interpreting the Italian experience".
David Forgacs, "I Watussi".

The Italianist

<http://maney.co.uk/index.php/journals/ita/>

33 (1), February 2013

Valentina Atturo, Lorenzo Mainini, "Beatrice, Matelda e le 'altre'. Riflessioni dantesche tra rime, vita nova e commedia".
Anna Pegoretti, "'Di retro al sol': nota per una diversa lettura di inferno".
Sharon Wood, "Cristina di Belgiojoso: scholar in exile".
Michał Czorycki, "Figures of ambiguity. Bucharest and the Black Sea in Claudio Magris, Danubio".

Pierpaolo Antonello, “‘How i learned to stop worrying and love the bomb.’ Minaccia nucleare, apocalisse e tecnocritica nella cultura italiana del Secondo Novecento”.

Gloria De Vincenti, “Genio e ambiente nel secondo futurismo fiorentino: Sam Dunn è morto di Bruno Corra”.

Amy Boylan, “Unresolved commemorations: memorials to victims of homophobic violence in Italy”.

Enrico Palandri, “Love for/of/through characters in fiction”.

33 (2), June 2013

Federico Vitella, “Lo spazio scenografico del monumento: racconti romani e la spettacolarizzazione del paesaggio postneorealista”.

David Forgacs, “Preparing and recording audio commentaries”.

Dana Renga, Introduction – “Italy’s Other Mafias in Italian Film And Television: A Roundtable”.

Claudia Karagoz, Stephanie Malia Hom, Anthony Fragola, Ellen Nerenberg, “Contributions by colleagues attending the roundtable panel”.

Robert S C Gordon, Danielle Hipkins, Robin Pickering-lazzi, “Responses”.

Allison Cooper, “Conclusion”.

Alan O’Leary, Introduction – “The Politics of Italian Cinema: Genres, Modes and Scholarship. A Roundtable”.

Simone Brioni, “Migrant stories and Italian colonialism: a report on two documentaries”.

Charles L Leavitt IV, “Recent work on neorealism”.

Riccardo Antonangeli, Luca Peretti, “Panel e paper sul cinema alla conferenza annuale della American Association of Italian Studies (AAIS) del 2012”.

33 (3), October 2013

Shannon McHugh, “Rethinking Vittoria Colonna: Gender and Desire in the rime amorose”.

Eleonora Carinci, “Una riscrittura di Pietro Aretino: la Vita di Maria Vergine di Lucrezia Marinella e le sue fonti”.

Olivia Santovetti, “Neera (1846–1918). The World Seen from the Window: Reading, Writing, and the Power of Fantasy”.

Gigliola Sulis, “Dare voce alle vite marginali: plurilinguismo di genere nella narrativa di Laura Pariani”.

Alessandro Giardino, “Giorgio Bassani e il ‘subalterno’ come esperienza dell’altro: per una nuova lettura degli Occhiali d’oro, Il giardino dei Finzi-Contini, e Dietro la porta”.

Mairi McLaughlin, “News Translation as a Source of Syntactic Borrowing in Italian”.

Luca Marano, “Le strutture con tipo: uno studio di alcune configurazioni dell’italiano parlato”.

Claire E. Honess, “‘Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile’: Henry vii and Dante’s ideal of peace”.

Elizabeth Schächter, “Carlo Alberto Viterbo: A Neglected Figure of Italian Judaism”.

Italian Political Science Journals: Contents

Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica

http://www.mulino.it/edizioni/riviste/scheda_rivista.php?issn=0048-8402

43 (1) April 2013

Giuseppe Ieraci, “Il crollo dei regimi non democratici. Stabilità politica e crisi di regime in Tunisia, Libia ed Egitto”.

Giulio Citroni, Andrea Lippi, Stefania Profeti. “Politica e politiche delle società partecipate. Le aziende dei comuni come unità di analisi della democrazia locale”.

Francesco Olmastroni, “Partecipanti e non partecipanti. Limiti di rappresentatività in pratiche di democrazia deliberativa”.

Arlo Poletti, “Making sense of multiple trade politics: explaining European Union trade policy making in the Doha round”.

Keith Dowding, Giliberto Capano, Filippo Andreatta. "A Guide for «Global» Political Scientists? A Discussion of the International Encyclopedia of Political Science".

43 (2) August 2013

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43 (3) December 2013

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(3) Dicembre 2013

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27 (1) aprile 2013

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27 (1) dicembre 2013

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68 (dicembre 2012)

Andrea Pedrazzani. "A destra, a sinistra... o meglio da soli? Le scelte strategiche ed il rendimento dell'UDC alle elezioni comunali del 2012".

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Aldo Di Virgilio. "Le elezioni in Italia".

69 (giugno 2013)

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1, aprile 2013

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2, agosto 2013

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3, dicembre 2013

"Un ricordo di Walter Santagata".

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ITALIAN AFFAIRS

The 2013 Italian General Election: the End of Bipolarism?

Alessandro Chiaramonte and Nicola Maggini (University of Florence)

Introduction

The 2013 Italian general elections produced a largely unexpected and destabilizing outcome. The major surprise came from the *Movimento 5 stelle* (M5s, Five Star Movement), a brand new, anti-establishment political force which got more than 25% of the valid votes and turned out to be the largest party list in the domestic arena of the Chamber of Deputies. The destabilizing nature of the outcome stemmed from the lack of a real winner which ended up in political stalemate. In fact, the center-left won in the Chamber of Deputies, but not in the Senate and could not form a cabinet by itself. In the end, the *Partito democratico* (Pd, Democratic Party) was left with the only unpalatable option to have to form a 'grand governing coalition' with Berlusconi's *Popolo della libertà* (Pdl, People of Freedom).

Indeed, the widespread expectation was that the center-left would win with a large margin. For a long time before the vote most of the polls had indicated that Bersani's lead was large enough to make his coalition gain the absolute majority of seats in both chambers either alone or together with the Monti's coalition. It was not the case. Actually, what really happened in the ballot box on February 24th and 25th is still unclear to some extent. Here we will try to give a brief and preliminary explanation, analyzing the background to the election, the results and the role played by the electoral systems, the aggregate vote shifts between the 2013 and 2008 elections, the geographical distributions of the vote, and, finally, the transformation of the party system.

The background of the election

In the previous election of 2008, the victory of Berlusconi's center-right coalition was very large and its parties could enjoy a solid parliamentary majority both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. It was actually the largest majority for a coalition in the Second Republic. The cabinet led by Berlusconi remained strong for some time even after the beginning of the economic crisis. However, its popularity started to decline due to sexual scandals related to Berlusconi's private life, the divisions within the Pdl, and the worsening of the financial crisis (Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte 2012). Eventually left without the support of a stable parliamentary majority, Berlusconi was forced to resign in November 2011. He was replaced by Mario Monti, once again (Marangoni and Verzichelli 2012) a technocratic prime minister whose cabinet had the support of parties from across the political spectrum, namely the Pd from the left, the Pdl from the right, and *Futuro e libertà per l'Italia* (Fli, Future and Freedom for Italy) and *Unione di centro* (Udc, Union of the Center) from the center. The new cabinet introduced economic austerity measures to restore the financial stability of the country and markets confidence. One year after the formation of the cabinet, when the financial situation of the country appeared to be improved and finally under control, Berlusconi's Pdl withdrew its support of the technocratic cabinet and attacked Monti's economic policies as too austere and dictated by Merkel's Germany. On 21 December 2012 Monti resigned as prime minister and forced elections a few months earlier than planned. Few days later Monti announced he would contest the incoming

general elections as the leader of a reformist and strongly pro-Europe coalition.

Four main political subjects competed in the election. In the center-left camp a coalition was formed under the leadership of Pierluigi Bersani. It consisted of three main party lists: Pd, *Sinistra ecologia e libertà* (Sel, Left, Ecology and Freedom), and *Centro democratico* (Cd, Democratic Center). In the center-right camp Berlusconi ran once again as the leader of a coalition made up of Pdl, *Lega Nord* (Ln, Northern League), *Fratelli d'Italia* (Fdi, Brothers of Italy), and a number of minor party lists. As for the outgoing prime minister, Monti found his own political party, *Scelta civica* (Sc, Civic Choice), and formed a centrist coalition together with Udc and Fli. The fourth main political actor to contest the election was the M5s, an independent party list created by Beppe Grillo, a comedian who had only been active in politics for the past few years, but who had quickly earned widespread popularity thanks to his anti-establishment position.

Berlusconi led an electoral campaign heavily focused on TV appearances and radio interviews. Despite the fact that he had guaranteed his support for Monti's cabinet over the past year, Berlusconi fiercely went on to attack his work and even promised to refund the property tax (Imu) that, he claimed, Monti had imposed only as a concession to Merkel and to the European bureaucrats. On the other end, Monti tried to make the most of his job as Prime Minister, having restored the financial stability of the country and rebuilt its credibility lost by his predecessor, Berlusconi. Grillo's campaign, led mainly through internet and in the squares, was characterized by a strong anti-corruption and anti-politics rhetoric. The movement's rallies ('tsunami tour') drew hundreds of thousands of angry people who just asked Grillo to 'send them all home', referring to the current parties and politicians. As finally for the center-left, which had supported the Monti's cabinet until the very

end and was now expected to emerge with the most votes and lead a new cabinet, its coalition leader Bersani hoped to present himself as a reliable candidate, the one most fit to govern the country for the following years. His campaign was, however, largely uninspiring and ultimately unsuccessful.

The results: turnout, votes and seats

The date of the election was set for February 24 and 25. According to the polls a significant drop in the turnout rate was to be expected, not only because of the harsh weather in many parts of the country, but mainly because of the anti-political climate. Turnout was actually 75.2%, a record low for the Italian general elections since 1948. It decreased of 5.3 percentage points (2.5 million voters) compared to the election of 2008, the biggest drop between two consecutive elections. It is plausible to connect these figures to the widespread discontent with the state of the economy and anger over almost all the existing parties, perceived to be corrupt and unable to make the institutional and economic reforms necessary for the country. Indeed, turnout fell to a lesser extent than many observers had expected. This is due to the presence of the M5s, which proved to be able to attract a significant number of former and potential abstentionists.

As for the electoral outcome, we need to distinguish what happened in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. Table 1 summarizes the final distribution of votes and seats in the Chamber and, separately, the results in the arena in which the counting of votes serves the purpose of deciding the attribution of the majority premium (340 seats) to the plurality coalition or list. The latter arena accounts for the allocation of 617 out of the 630 total seats, while the remaining seats are at stake in the Valle d'Aosta single-member district (1) and in the 'foreign' constituency (12).

Table 1: Election Results, Chamber of Deputies 2013

Lists and <i>coalitions</i>	Arena of the majority premium				Total			
	Votes		Seats		Votes		Seats	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Partito democratico	8,644,523	25.4	292	47.3	8,932,615	25.5	297	47.1
Sinistra ecologia libertà	1,089,409	3.2	37	6.0	1,106,784	3.2	37	5.9
Centro democratico	167,072	0.5	6	1.0	167,072	0.5	6	1.0
Svp	146,804	0.4	5	0.8	146,804	0.4	5	0.8
Autonomie Liberté Démocratie	-	-	-	-	14,340	0.0	0	0.0
<i>Center-Left, Bersani's coalition (tot.)</i>	<i>10,047,808</i>	<i>29.6</i>	<i>340</i>	<i>55.1</i>	<i>10,367,615</i>	<i>29.6</i>	<i>345</i>	<i>54.8</i>
Il popolo della libertà	7,332,972	21.6	97	15.7	7,478,796	21.3	98	15.6
Lega Nord	1,390,014	4.1	18	2.9	1,392,398	4.0	18	2.9
Fratelli d'Italia	665,830	2.0	9	1.5	668,881	1.9	9	1.4
Others Center-Right	534,034	1.6	0	0.0	534,034	1.5	0	0.0
<i>Center-Right, Berlusconi's coalition (tot.)</i>	<i>9,922,850</i>	<i>29.2</i>	<i>124</i>	<i>20.1</i>	<i>10,074,109</i>	<i>28.7</i>	<i>125</i>	<i>19.8</i>
Scelta civica con Monti	2,824,065	8.3	37	6.0	3,004,739	8.6	39	6.2
Unione di centro	608,210	1.8	8	1.3	609,565	1.7	8	1.3
Futuro e libertà	159,332	0.5	0	0.0	159,332	0.5	0	0.0
<i>Center, Monti's coalition (tot.)</i>	<i>3,591,607</i>	<i>10.6</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>7.3</i>	<i>3,773,636</i>	<i>10.8</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>7.5</i>
Movimento 5 stelle	8,689,458	25.6	108	17.5	8,797,902	25.1	109	17.3
Rivoluzione civile	765,188	2.3	0	0.0	781,098	2.2	0	0.0
Fare per fermare il declino	380,756	1.1	0	0.0	391,664	1.1	0	0.0
Vallee d'Aoste	-	-	-	-	18,376	0.1	1	0.2
Mov. ass. italiani all'estero	-	-	-	-	140,473	0.4	2	0.3
Usei	-	-	-	-	44,024	0.1	1	0.2
Others (tot.)	604,857	1.8	0	0.0	668,390	1.9	0	0.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>34,002,524</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>617</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>35,057,287</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>630</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs

The total results show a difference of 293,506 votes between the center-left (29.6%) and the center-right (28.7%). In the decisive arena where the majority premium is assigned the difference was even lower, with the center-left receiving only 124,958 more votes than the center-right, less than 0.4% of the total of over 34 million valid votes cast. The coalition led by Monti got 10.8% of the valid votes, fewer than he and many expected. As for the individual parties, the Pd is the largest with 25.5%, while the M5s is the second one with 25.1% and the Pdl comes third

with 21.3%. However, if we exclude the votes cast in the foreign constituency, the M5s becomes the largest party having obtained more than 8.5 million votes (25.6%). This is indeed an impressive exploit: in the entire history of the Republic since 1946 a party competing for the first time in a general election has never obtained a similar percentage of votes.

Thanks to the majority premium, the minimal vote difference in favour of the center-left was transformed into a much larger difference in terms of seats: the center-left was

assigned 340 seats (55.1%), the center-right 124 (20.1%), the M5s 108 (17.5%) and the Monti's coalition 45 (7.3%). The results in the 'foreign' constituency were also favourable to the center-left, while a candidate of a local party won the seat in Valle d'Aosta. Overall, the final outcome

of the distribution of seats in the Chamber was such as to give 345 to the center-left (54,8%), 125 to the center-right (19.8%), 109 to the M5s (17.3%), 47 to the Monti's coalition (7.5%) and 4 to minor party lists.

Table 2: *Election Results, Senate 2013*

Lists and <i>coalitions</i>	Votes		Seats	
	No.	%	No.	%
Partito democratico	8,683,690	27.0	109	34.6
Sinistra ecologia libertà	912,308	2.8	7	2.2
Centro democratico	163,375	0.5	0	0.0
Il megafono - Lista Crocetta	138,581	0.4	1	0.3
Partito socialista italiano	57,688	0.2	0	0.0
I moderati	14,358	0.0	0	0.0
Svp	97,141	0.3	2	0.6
Svp-Patt-Pd-Upt	127,656	0.4	3	1.0
Pd-Svp	47,623	0.1	1	0.3
Autonomie Liberté Démocratie	20,430	0.1	0	0.0
<i>Center-Left, Bersani's coalition (tot.)</i>	<i>10,262,850</i>	<i>31.9</i>	<i>123</i>	<i>39.0</i>
Il popolo della libertà ^a	7,050,937	21.9	99	31.4
Lega Nord	1,331,163	4.1	17	5.4
Fratelli d'Italia	592,448	1.8	0	0.0
Grande Sud	122,100	0.4	1	0.3
Others Center-Right	542,178	1.7	0	0.0
<i>Center-Right, Berlusconi's coalition (tot.)</i>	<i>9,638,826</i>	<i>30.0</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>37.1</i>
Con Monti per l'Italia ^b	2,984,128	9.3	19	6.0
Movimento 5 stelle	7,471,671	23.3	54	17.1
Rivoluzione civile	575,391	1.8	0	0.0
Fare per fermare il declino	295,898	0.9	0	0.0
Vallee d'Aoste	24,609	0.1	1	0.3
Mov. ass. italiani all'estero	120,290	0.4	1	0.3
Usei	38,223	0.1	0	0.0
Others (tot.)	712,095	2.2	0	0.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>32,123,981</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>315</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs

Notes: ^a Includes the votes and the seat obtained by the list Pdl-Ln in the Trentino Alto Adige region; ^b Includes the votes obtained by the lists/candidates Udc and Scelta civica con Monti running respectively in the regions of Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige.

The results of the Senate election are shown in table 2. Here the vote difference between the center-left and the center-right was a little larger than in the Chamber: the former coalition got 31.9% of the total votes, while the latter 30%. In spite of this, the final distribution of

seats was such that the center-left emerged in front with 'only' 123 seats (39%), as against the 117 seats (37.1%) of the center-right, 54 seats (17.1%) of the M5s, 19 seats (6%) of the Monti's list, and 2 seats for minor lists. This is a result that placed the winning coalition much below the

threshold of an absolute majority of the Senate's members and just 6 seats in front of the main opposing coalition. The result in the Senate, in other words, made it impossible to form not only a center-left majority, but also a post-electoral majority coalition between Bersani's center-left and Monti's center, which many considered the most likely outcome of this election.

The asymmetric effects of the electoral systems

In the end, the center-left won in the Chamber, but not in the Senate. These asymmetric outcomes are mainly caused by the different electoral systems used in the two chambers (D'Alimonte 2007).

The electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies is 'majority assuring', insofar as the coalition or list most voted at the national level obtains in any case – and therefore independently of the proportion of votes it has

obtained – at least 340 seats, a number equivalent to about 54 per cent of the total of Chamber seats and thus more than the absolute majority of its members.

Conversely, the electoral system for the Senate is not 'majority assuring'. Here the distribution of seats takes place separately and independently in each of the 20 regions. The majority premium is applied in 17 regions and provides for the assignment of 55% of the seats at stake to the coalition with the plurality of votes in each of them, while 45% of the seats are given to the losers provided that they have surmounted the thresholds of exclusion (20% for coalitions, 8% for independent lists). In the remaining 3 regions – Molise, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige – and in the 'foreign constituency' the allocation of seats is done with different rules that take into account their territorial peculiarities.

Table 3. *Number of seats won by coalitions and independent party lists in the multi-member constituencies of the Senate*

Constituency	Center-left	Center-right	Center (Monti)	M5S	Others
Abruzzo	1	4	0	2	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	2	6	0	2	0
Campania	6	16	2	5	0
Emilia Romagna	13	4	1	4	0
Friuli Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	6	0	6	0
Liguria	5	1	1	1	0
Lombardy	11	27	4	7	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Piedmont	13	4	2	3	0
Apulia	4	11	1	4	0
Sardinia	5	1	0	2	0
Sicily	5	14	0	6	0
Tuscany	10	3	1	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Veneto	4	14	2	4	0
<i>Total regions with premium</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>0</i>
Molise	1	1	0	0	0
Trentino Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Valle d'Aosta	0	0	0	0	1
Foreign constituency	4	0	2	0	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>122</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>1</i>

In contrast to what happens in the case of the Chamber, there is no guarantee that the coalition or independent list with the largest number of votes nationally will obtain an absolute majority of the seats in the Senate. This is indeed what happened in the 2013 election. Table 3 shows the actual distribution of seats in the Senate for each constituency. The center-left won 10 regions out of the 17 where the premiums are given. The center-right won the remaining 7 regions, among which the three with the largest number of seats at stake: Lombardy, Campania, and Sicily. The M5s won nowhere. Nevertheless it was the first or second best loser in every region. The Monti's list came fourth, but was able to surmount the 8% threshold and to obtain seats in most regions. Jointly considered, the M5s and the Monti's list got 75 seats, a number equivalent to about 24% of the total. Just for the sake of comparison, in the previous election of 2008 the number of the

Senate seats attributed to the 'third' political forces had been seven, and in the election of 2006 only one. In other words, the multipolar setting of the electoral competition combined to the peculiar nature of the electoral system for the Senate is the main reason why neither the center-left nor the center-right could even approximate the threshold of the absolute majority of seats in this parliamentary branch.

The electoral decline of the center-right and center-left coalitions

One of the most relevant results of the 2013 general elections, compared with those of 2008, is, without any doubt, the electoral decline of the two coalitions of the center-left and the center-right. Indeed, they have collectively lost nearly 11 million votes, as it can be seen in Table 4. In particular, the center-right has lost a little

more than 7 million votes (i.e., 42% of its 2008 electorate), while the center-left has lost more than 3.5 million votes (i.e., 27% of its 2008 electorate). Once again, almost half of the center-right's electorate decided not to vote for Silvio

Berlusconi's coalition. This is mirrored by the center-left, which was abandoned by a fourth of its previous electorate.

Table 4: Electoral performance of the main coalitions in the Chamber of Deputies, 2008 and 2013 general elections (Valle d'Aosta and foreign constituency excluded)

Coalitions	Results
<i>Center-Right</i>	
Berlusconi 2008	17,063,929
Berlusconi 2013	9,923,100
Difference 2013-2008	-7,140,829
Var. %	-42%
<i>Center-Left</i>	
Veltroni 2008	13,686,460
Bersani 2013	10,047,507
Difference 2013-2008	-3,638,953
Var. %	-27%
<i>Center</i>	
Casini 2008	2,050,331
Monti 2013	3,591,560
Difference 2013-2008	+1,541,229
Var. %	+75%
<i>Others</i>	
Others 2008	3,651,539
Others 2013 ^a	1,751,811
Difference 2013-2008	-1,899,728
Var. %	-52%

^a It doesn't include the votes received by the M5S

The inability of the main political coalitions to gather support may be caused by some concurrent phenomena. First, as we have seen previously, the electoral turnout decreased largely with respect to 2008. One can therefore hypothesize that a minor but significant share of the total votes for the two main coalitions in 2008 ended in abstention in 2013. Second, the M5s was successful to a largely unexpected extent. This can be attributed to the ability of

Beppe Grillo to gain votes from both the center-left and the center-right coalitions, as it is confirmed by the analysis of individual vote shifts (De Sio and Schadee 2013). Indeed, the M5s is described as a 'web-populist party' (Corbetta and Gualmini 2013; Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013) cutting across the traditional ideological dimension. The electoral success of the M5s explains also the fall of the 'others' category in the table, which decreased by about 2 million

votes. Third, the Monti's coalition, compared with the Udc in 2008, increased, in absolute terms, by about 1 million and half votes (i.e. +42% with respect to 2008). This was another viable option for the former voters of the two main coalitions.

In terms of votes and percentages, Berlusconi's center-right is the biggest loser of this election. Almost half of its voters defected. They went in different directions, but very few crossed over to vote for the center-left. Actually, one of the reasons why the Bersani's coalition did not win – as expected – is exactly its inability to capture the vote of those electors moving away from the center-right parties, at a time when there were plenty of them. Indeed, the center-

left was not even capable to keep its own electorate. The major beneficiary of the defections from the center-right, as well as from the center-left, was Grillo's M5s, which could rightly claim to be the real winner of this election.

The geography of the vote

The center-left failed to make significant electoral gains in those areas where the Pdl and its allies had their strongholds, specifically the North-East and parts of the South. In these areas, both the center-left and the center-right lost votes but their relative strength did not change significantly, as it is shown in Table 5.

Table 5: *Electoral performance of the main coalitions and party lists in the Chamber of deputies, disaggregated by geopolitical area (differences in percentage points between the 2013 and 2008 general elections)*

Area	Center-left		Center-right		Center (Monti)		M5S
	% votes	2013-2008	% votes	2013-2008	% votes	2013-2008	% votes
North-West	28.8	-9.5	27.0	-19.4	11.7	+6.7	28.5
North-East	27.7	-3.7	33.2	-20.2	12.1	+7.5	21.4
Red Zone	38.9	-10.3	21.1	-14.4	9.2	+4.7	25.7
South	26.8	-9.3	30.8	-16.9	9.8	+2.9	27.3
Italy	29.5	-8.0	29.2	-17.6	10.6	+4.9	25.6

Though it lost heavily, the center-left remained the largest coalition (38.9%) in the regions of the so called 'Red Zone' (in central Italy), where its support has deep historical roots and where it controls local administrations (Diamanti 2010; Florida 2010). The center-right, in turn, maintained a competitive advantage in most of the North (33.2% in the North-East) and in many parts of the South (30.8%). The resilience of the center-right in many regions of the country helped Berlusconi to neutralize the majoritarian effects of the Senate electoral system and create a hung parliament.

The M5s was able to collect votes nationally at a quite homogeneous level. Its best

performances occurred in the North West (28.5%) and in the South (27.3%). However, it did quite well also in the 'Red Zone' (25.7%) and in the North East (21.4%). In general, the M5s cut across the traditional electoral geography, being competitive in all the regions of Italy. Conversely, as we have mentioned above, the three main political coalitions of 2013 (center-left, center-right, and center) showed a distribution of the votes that is more differentiated in territorial terms. The success of Beppe Grillo's movement, for certain, occurred to the detriment of both the main coalitions.

The center-right lost votes in all regions of Italy, but particularly in the North (-20.2 and

-19.4 percentage points, in the North-East and in the North-West respectively). The losses in Piedmont, Lombardy and, especially, in Veneto were particularly marked because many voters defected here from the Northern League. Conversely, the losses registered in the majority of southern regions and in Umbria and Tuscany were below the national average (-16.9 percentage points in the South and -14.4 in the 'Red Zone'). With specific regard to southern regions, the presence of several local list in the center-right coalition partially compensated the losses of the Pdl.

In similar fashion, the center-left electoral decline occurred in all the geopolitical areas of the country. The most significant losses, those above the national average, were in the South (-9.3 percentage points), in the North-West (-9.5) and in the 'Red Zone' (-10.3). In the latter, the fall was especially marked in Marche (-14.9 percentage points) and in Umbria (-11.8). Conversely, the decrease in the North-East (a conservative area from a political standpoint) was small (-3.7 percentage points).


Finally, the Monti's coalition showed a territorial distribution of votes notably different from that of the Udc in 2008. The areas where it saw a greater increase in percentage points were the North-East (+7.5 percentage points) and the North-West (+6.7). Conversely, the electoral growth was below the national average in the South (+2.9 percentage points). In this respect, it is remarkable that the regions where the Monti's list did not reach the electoral threshold of 8% in the Senate were all in the center-south: Lazio, Sardinia, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily. Furthermore, Sicily is the only region where the centrist coalition lost almost 50,000 votes compared to 2008 (-0.8 percentage points).

The end of the bipolar party system?

For the first time after 1994 elections were inconclusive. The Senate was left without a real winner. Both Grillo's M5s and Berlusconi's center-right, the latter in spite of its poor performance, prevented Bersani's center-left – the winner in Chamber for a little more than a handful of votes – from gaining the absolute majority of the seats in the Senate, even with the support of Monti. Moreover, due to the M5s unavailability to cooperate with the Pd and any other party, Berlusconi's Pdl ended up to be the essential partner of the Pd in a 'grand coalition' cabinet formed two months after the election and led by Enrico Letta. This was the inescapable consequence of the Italian party system having entered a restructuring phase, as it had already been evident before the vote (Ceccarini, Diamanti and Lazar 2012).

The economic crisis and the growing disaffection toward politics provided the ground for a sharp increase of electoral volatility, that in the 2013 general election reached the highest value in the history of Italy's Republic – 39.1 based on the Pedersen (1979) index – and one of the highest for general elections in consolidated democracies since 1945. The very high level of electoral volatility indicates that the percentage of voters who switched their preferences in this election was even greater than in 1994, at the time of the transition from the First to the Second Republic. This point is reinforced by the analysis of individual vote shifts according to which 37% of the voters moved away from their previous electoral choice (De Sio and Schadee 2013).

Figure 1: *Bipolar concentration of votes and seats in the 1994-2013 elections for the Chamber of deputies*



As a result of electoral change, new parties emerged and at least one of them, the M5s, proved to be highly competitive and a viable choice for many voters. On the other hand, the concentration of votes and seats on the two largest line-ups was the lowest in the history of the Second Republic. Together, the center-left and the center-right coalitions received only 58.3% of the Chamber votes and 74.6% of the seats. In 2008 the figures were 84.4 and 93.8%

respectively. In 2006, 99.1% and 99.8% (Figure 1). In other words, the bipolar structure of the Italian party system, one that had consolidated during the past twenty years (Chiaramonte 2010), almost collapsed in 2013. One election, however, may be not enough to support the conclusion that this is the end of bipolarism in Italy. Only the next general election will prove the point and we may not have to wait too long for it.

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Territorial Disparities in Italy: The Case of Campania. Appraising the Successes and Failures of 25 years of Cohesion Policy Support

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Introduction¹

Territorial disparities in Italy have been a long-term critical node for the Italian State; a node that lies still largely unresolved. Since the abolition of the centrally-managed Special Intervention, in the early-1990s, European Cohesion policy has represented the most important explicit policy response to the aim of closing the economic and social gap between Centre-North and South of Italy (albeit not the most important tool financially). There is unanimous consensus that this gap is still considerable, but not on the related causes, namely whether and to which extent they can be linked to policy failure. A useful way to frame this question is to appraise *ex post* the 'utility' of this policy, i.e. what it has achieved (irrespective of its explicit goals) and whether it managed to address the 'right' policy needs. We use the concept of utility, rather the more clear-cut (conceptually) 'effectiveness', mainly in response to the diversity, variability and vagueness, particularly in earlier periods, of the policy goals stated in the many programs

¹ We would like to thank all interviewees, survey respondents, workshop participants and other actors who facilitated the research in various ways, by providing information, contacts, data and documents. We were truly touched by the generosity, openness and sincere interest met, as well as the encouragement received in Campania, Rome and Brussels. Sincere thanks go also to Stephen Miller and Immacolata Voltura, for providing tremendous research support during the undertaking of this extensive research project.

through which the policy has been implemented.²

This paper focuses on the region of Campania: the largest region of the Mezzogiorno both in terms of population and GDP, and one of the most lagging regions of Italy and, therefore, historically one of the principal recipients of regional development policy support in the country. In this paper we reflect on the utility of Cohesion policy in this region since the first major reform of Cohesion policy of 1988, and on the key factors which we deem to have enabled or hindered the policy's performance.

We start off with a brief recollection of the ERDF programmes' strategies and investments (Section 2), as a background to our appraisal of utility. Having illustrated our assessment of utility (Section 3), we then discuss the factors that, based on the research undertaken, provide an explanation for this (Section 4) and from which lessons can be drawn for the implementation of Cohesion policy in Campania in the forthcoming programming period, 2014-20.

We undertook this research as part of a wider evaluation for the European

² In the research, utility has been interpreted as 'the extent to which programmes led to impacts that are in line with 'society's needs and to the socio-economic problems to be solved' which may differ from the goals explicitly stated in the programmes themselves or which may not have been stated explicitly in the programmes. This requires a reassessment of the needs that the programmes should have addressed'. The concept of utility is particularly useful where objectives are not explicitly defined or are poorly defined, or when unforeseen effects are anticipated.

Commission (DG Regio)³ which considered a broader range of issues relating to the achievements and impact of Cohesion policy in this region and beyond, namely the relevance and effectiveness of programs, good and bad practices, and lessons learnt. We thus refer the reader to the full case study report, recently published on DG Regio's website,⁴ for a fuller and more detailed account of the results of the study and for a comprehensive review of the research methods used.

1. The Policy Effort: Strategies and investments

Due to its persistent underdevelopment relative to EU averages, Campania has been eligible for ERDF throughout the entire period from 1989 to date amongst the group of regions eligible to receive the maximum intensity of support: the so called Objective 1/Convergence regions.⁵ As such, it could draw upon a range of investment programs: regional programs managed directly by the regional authority; multi-regional/national programs managed by national ministries; Community Initiative Programs delivered under the direct responsibility of the European Commission (e.g. the Urban Community Initiative); Global Grants, entrusted to intermediary organizations (stakeholder groups such as entrepreneurial organizations or local authorities), as well as other forms of support (particularly in earlier years, notably the

'Integrated Operation Naples' and 'Integrated Mediterranean Program' in the first program period, 1989-93). Over the entire period, the region received investments from over forty investment programs (Table 1).

³ Bachtler, J., Begg, I., Polverari, L., and Charles, D. (2013) *Evaluation of the Main Achievements of Cohesion Policy Programmes and Projects over the Longer Term in 15 Selected Regions (from 1989-1993 Programme Period to the Present (2011.CE.16.B.AT.015), Final Report to the European Commission (DG Regio)*, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde (Glasgow) and London School of Economics.

⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/evaluations/index_en.cfm#15.

⁵ Renamed 'less developed regions' for the forthcoming programme period (2014-2020).

Table 1: ERDF inclusive operational programs implemented in Campania 1989-2013

	1989-93	1994-99	2000-06	2007-13
Overarching strategies	Objective 1 Community Support Framework	Objective 1 Community Support Framework	Objective 1 Community Support Framework	National Strategic Document
Regional programs	Pluri-Fund Operational Program Campania	Pluri-Fund Operational Program Campania Operational Program Pianura	Regional Operational Program Campania	Regional Operational Program Campania (ERDF)
National programs	Multi-regional Operational Programs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energy/ gas distribution • Assistance to industry and services • Industrial areas • Telecommunications • Tourism • Water resources • Technological research and development 	Multi-regional Operational Programs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Energy • Industry, craft and services • Technical assistance • Legality and security • Civil protection and public works • Road infrastructures • Water resources • Tourism • R&D, Technological Development and Higher Education • Railway transport • Telecommunications • Airport Infrastructure • Education • Territorial Pact for Employment 	National Operational Programs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legality and security for development • Local Entrepreneurial Development • Scientific research • School • Transport • Technical assistance and systemic actions 	National Operational Programs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research and competitiveness • Mobility • Learning environments • Legality and security • Governance Inter-regional Programs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural heritage • Energy

Fully-fledged program strategies were not in place for the first two program periods, despite the formal existence of Community Support Frameworks. A well-developed strategy for the development of the region emerged only in 1999, informed by the 2000-06 Objective 1 Community Support Framework (CSF). Nevertheless, as required by European regulations, also the early programs enunciated a range of objectives to be reached. For instance, the 1989-93 regional program (POP Campania) had three global objectives: increase in employment levels;

improvements in quality of life; and competitiveness of the regional system.

Regional policy regained center stage in Italy in the late 1990s, after a period of relative decline, through the launch of a new Community Support Framework, devised following a comprehensive process of multi-level and horizontal consultations. The document provided a common strategy and sound rationale for the ROPs and NOPS. In line with the new CSF's strategic approach – which was rooted on endogenous development theories - the Campania ROP 2000-06 had a more comprehensive set of objectives and a

more rounded articulation of priorities than the accumulation of capital stock. The goals were to generate employment; sustainable and equitable development; improvement in quality of life; territorial balance; and to increase the competitiveness of the region's productive structure. Amongst the seven NOPs, the main focus was again on transport (roads, railways, and public rail urban transport), environmental reclaiming and sustainability (water cycle, soil protection, energy, parks and institutional capacity-building in all sectors), as research and innovation but also on cultural heritage and urban renewal.

The 2007-13 National Strategic Framework (NSF) and Campania ERDF ROP represent an evolution of the 2000-06 strategies, but with a further emphasis on quality of life. However, the ROP has recently been the subject of considerable reprogramming, which has reoriented it towards major infrastructure investments, thus altering its original strategic balance. The range of NOPs has also changed compared to 2000-06 but the main focus remains as in the previous period on research and competitiveness (i.e. business support and support to public and private research), transport networks and education, as well as legality and security.

Objectives aside, the allocation of resources in Campania's programs across program periods displays remarkable continuity, being concentrated particularly on the fields of infrastructure and support for firms. Nevertheless, a key change in the intended policy effort across the study period is that whilst earlier programs focused particularly on infrastructure - environmental (water, urban waste and soil protection), transport (with a large share to railways and roads), telecommunications, energy, cultural and urban - following the strategic lines of the Special Intervention - later programs aimed

increasingly at fostering social development and quality of life.

Perhaps more telling than the distribution of financial allocation for the comprehension of the nature of the policy effort is the composition of the actual expenditure, i.e. where the money actually went. According to the reclassification of measures and expenditure undertaken for this study, two themes alone absorbed close to two thirds of the expenditure across the entire period (up to mid-2012): the themes of infrastructure and enterprise. A further sixth of expenditure related to environmental sustainability and just over 10 percent to R&D&I. Tourism development as a means for structural adjustment and social cohesion represent about 8 percent of expenditure each,¹ with further spend concerning investments towards territorial cohesion (urban regeneration and the quality of life in the main urban centers, quality of life in rural areas and interrelation between the two sets of areas), the improvement of legality and security, and institutional capacity.

The total volume of ERDF resources flown to Campania has been substantial.² Across the entire period, the ERDF programs have explicitly allocated Campania a total of c. €19,127 million (2000 prices), between regional programs (representing c. €15,623 million) and multi-regional/national programs (estimated to have represented at least €3,680 million in terms of financial allocations).³ The programs' share of

¹ However, it should be noted that social cohesion is underestimated by the focus of this research which excludes ESF-only programmes.

² Throughout this section, financial allocations and expenditure refer to total EU and nationally co-financed spend combined.

³ Figures relate to allocations of ERDF resources (in both mono- and multi-fund programmes) and of the corresponding national co-financing. It excludes other funds, even when they did co-fund the programmes. The figures relating to allocations from MOPs and NOPs exclude all 1989-93 MOPs, most 1994-99 MOPs, the NOP Local Development 2000-06 and all 2007-13 NOPs and

resources has increased its relative importance in recent periods, in association with a decline in domestic spending, both for regional policy and ordinary expenditure (SVIMEZ, 2011; DPS annual reports, various years; Territorial Public Accounts database).

2. Assessment of utility

For a detailed review of the achievements realized, both on a period by period basis and longitudinally, the reader is directed to the full case study report: this brief paper provides only some overarching conclusions for the entire period. Taking a longitudinal perspective, and appraising achievements by theme, the most significant achievements were realized in the field of infrastructure development, particularly in the transport, telecommunications and in some basic and environmental fields (e.g. water, wastewater, sewage). The programs were also responsible for considerable improvements in the urban fabric of Naples, Salerno and other minor centers; the upgrading of accessibility and usage of cultural heritage sites, parks and natural areas; and supporting the competitiveness of some productive sectors (e.g. aerospace, wine-making). At the opposite end of the spectrum, the interventions in support to legality returned little dividend, whilst in the fields of enterprise (one of the themes that received the most funding across the study period) and R&D&I, achievements were not negligible but without being capable to not deliver the change that was desired or that could have been expected given the volume of resources at play.

When considering the degree to which these achievements met the region's needs, what emerges is that, unsurprisingly, the ERDF programs, in their interplay with other policies and exogenous factors, contributed to address

some of the regional needs but not all. The key conclusions of the research in relation to utility are threefold: first, on the whole, from a marco-economic perspective, Cohesion policy in Campania has not been able to support the desired change in terms of raising regional income and employment, and its catching-up with national and EU standards. Second, and notwithstanding this, the achievements realized in some areas were indeed significant. Needs in many areas of need were met or partially met, but they do require further investments to retain the improvements realized. And, lastly, a third conclusion is that in some fields the policy has been both ineffectual (in terms of addressing needs that were targeted by the policy) and incapable to resolve the problems at hand. They are discussed in more detail below.

2.1 Some needs were addressed, but not all and not durably ...

Almost 25 years on since 1989, some of the initial needs of the region have been met or partially met, notably: the provision of some basic infrastructure (water, wastewater); the endowment of transport infrastructure, and thus the accessibility of internal areas, mobility within the metropolitan area of Naples, and connectivity of the regional poles with the rest of the country and internationally; and the economic diversification and development of interior areas. The case study uncovered strong evidence and examples of the investments made and the improvements realized in these fields. However, meeting these needs in a sustainable way, requires continuing efforts in terms of maintenance and the operation of infrastructure, as well as the ability to capture new emerging trends and conditions that affect the region's socio-economic development potential and life standard.

InOPs. For these programmes, it was not possible to establish the earmarked allocation for Campania.

Considering the entire study period as a whole, Campania now has transport infrastructure that is in line with or above national standards, a level of broadband coverage that is well in line with the national average, its main cities – Naples and Salerno – have improved considerably in terms of living standards (safety, usability of public spaces, image, public transport etc.) and the rural hinterland is more economically diversified than it was 23 years ago. These achievements, which responded to real needs, would not have been possible without the contribution of the ERDF programs.

In other areas, the support provided by ERDF programs has determined achievements that have been useful, on the whole, but which have not been able to fully meet the underlying development needs that they were meant to address. This is the case with entrepreneurial development and structural change, R&D&I, and social cohesion (though for a complete assessment of this theme one would need to consider the ESF interventions in more detail). The ERDF programs failed to fully tackle environmental needs, which were met only in some sectors – e.g. the supply of water to households and businesses. Finally, needs have remained in areas where the ERDF does not intervene, or has little influence (such as health, justice, and housing). Thus, significant challenges and unmet needs persist: the region has consistently shown high rates of poverty, unemployment and worklessness, especially among women and young people, with a high rate of young people not in employment, education or training (SVIMEZ, 2012). The economic structure has not modernized as would have been necessary to set the region onto a path of sustainable growth (other than thanks to price competition); the service sector has remained constantly dominated by a disproportionately high (and rising) rate of public sector employment; the private sector

has remained by the service, trade, hospitality and transportation sectors as the main areas of specialization. Firms in agriculture and the industrial sector have been of smaller average size and utilized higher levels of undeclared work than other areas of Italy (Banca d'Italia, 2012). Traditional sectors (such as garments, footwear, jewelry and ceramics) weren't able to move away from the low competitiveness productions, which have largely been unable to keep up with international trade after the accession of Italy to the EMU/Eurozone. Soil erosion along coasts and rivers, industrial site contamination, water pollution, and urban and industrial waste management - remain severe: over the study period, they have proven most intractable in the highly urbanized areas. The region's high endowment of cultural and natural heritage is at risk of deterioration, but it also offers opportunities for tourism. High levels of 'irregular activities', i.e. legal activities performed outside or in violation of norms, such as in the construction of residential property and industrial localization, resort to the shadow economy and the use of undeclared labor (Banca d'Italia, 2012) continue to characterize the region, weakening the potential for development. Organized crime (*camorra*), which infiltrates the economy directly (e.g. in the public works industry or in urban solid waste management) or indirectly, exacting charges from entrepreneurs, for instance via the forced hiring of staff or purchase of services, via extortions, via the purchase of products and services at manipulated prices, or by forcing firms to abstain from or alter their bids in public procurement (Spampinato, 2012; Maggioni, 2004), continues to exert a strong negative influence on economic activity.

Even where achievements have been greatest, moreover, domestic factors, particularly the unavailability of resources to cover running and maintenance costs and




difficulties in ensuring compliance with rules (e.g. land management), are reducing the overall utility of the infrastructure realized. This is true particularly for transport, culture, some environmental infrastructure (e.g. water cycle management, especially sewage collection and treatment) and industrial infrastructure.

Thus taking a longitudinal perspective, i.e. considering the evolution of need from the early 1990s to date, it is clear that many of the problems and deficits that characterized the region twenty-five years ago are still present and have even exacerbated in some fields (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Degree to which initial needs were met

Field	Need	Evolution	Need largely met?
Services/connectivity/ territorial cohesion	Basic infrastructure/essential services	Significant improvement	No
	External accessibility (physical)	Significant improvement	Yes
	External accessibility (telecom/broadband)	Significant improvement	Yes
	Internal connectivity	Significant improvement	No
	Internal disparities	Significant improvement	No
Labour market/ human capital	High unemployment/irregular labour	Limited improvement	No
	Long-term unemployment	Limited improvement	No
	Weak education levels	Limited improvement	No
	Outmigration of skilled	Situation has remained largely unchanged or even worsened	No
Enterprise	Low skill equilibrium	Limited improvement	No
	Diversification of company size	Limited improvement	No
	Low productivity	Limited improvement	No
R&D&I	Weak public sector R&D	Significant improvement	No
	Weak private sector R&D	Limited improvement	No
Structural adjustment	De-comm./recovery of old industries	Limited improvement	No
	Economic diversification (tourism, culture)	Limited improvement	No
Social cohesion	Social exclusion/poverty	Limited improvement	No
Environment	Environmental problems	Limited improvement	No, improvements, also significant, in some fields or areas, regression in others (e.g. waste)
	Environmental monitoring	Significant improvement	Yes
Context conditions	Low administrative capacities	Limited improvement	No
	High levels of irregular activities	Situation has remained largely unchanged or even worsened	No

Legend:

	Significant improvement
	Limited improvement
	Situation has remained largely unchanged or even worsened

2.2 ... and overall, although investments were able to improve quality of life, especially in some areas, they weren't able to improve the region's longer-term prospects

Further, taking a wider, macroeconomic perspective, over the past two decades the region has seen only marginal improvements in its GDP, production base and employment, and has not become more competitive, as demonstrated by the poor resilience during the recent recession (as the GDP per capita and labor market figures in

Table 3 below show).⁹ Campania remains a lagging region compared to the rest of Italy and Europe: Its Objective 1/Convergence status has not changed, not even after the enlargement eastward in 2004. Indeed, the trend in the region's share of the national GDP has been declining from 1985 to 2010, as has GDP per capita relative to the national average (66 percent at the end of the 1990s, 63 percent in 2011). Productive activities struggle to implement the changes that would

⁹ Notwithstanding diverging trends during the sub-periods.

be necessary to grow. Services based on cultural and natural heritage are far from achieving their full potential. If the challenges affecting the productive structure of

Campania have changed over time - industrial conversion in the 1980s, ability to compete in a globalized economy today – the same difficulty of keeping up with change persists.

Table 3: Evolution of selected indicators – Campania compared to Mezzogiorno and Centre-North

		1990	1995	2000	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
GDP per capita (€, chained values, ref. year 2005)	Centre-North	NA	NA	28,505	28,875	28,848	29,261	29,488	28,861	27,017	27,482	27,490	NA
	Mezzogiorno	NA	NA	16,009	16,390	16,511	16,805	16,966	16,692	15,812	15,775	15,717	NA
	Campania	NA	NA	15,265	15,786	15,809	16,077	16,304	16,029	15,113	14,968	14,834	NA
Added value per labour unit ((€, chained values, ref. year 2005)	Centre-North	NA	NA	55,200	55,281	5,574	56,103	56,457	55,852	53,979	55,789	56,063	NA
	Mezzogiorno	NA	NA	45,300	44,868	45,328	45,604	46,160	46,107	45,597	46,414	46,585	NA
	Campania	NA	NA	45,000	44,274	44,820	45,497	46,595	47,187	47,212	47,982	48,244	NA
Employment rate	Centre-North	NA	56.8	60.7	63.8	64.0	65.0	65.4	65.7	64.5	64.0	64.0	63.8
	Mezzogiorno	NA	42.9	44.4	46.1	45.8	46.6	46.5	46.1	44.6	43.9	44.0	43.8
	Campania	NA	42.2	42.9	45.0	44.1	44.1	43.7	42.5	40.8	39.9	39.4	40.0
Female employment rate	Centre-North	NA	43.7	49.6	53.5	53.8	54.9	55.3	56.1	55.1	54.8	55.1	55.5
	Mezzogiorno	NA	26.6	28.4	30.7	30.1	31.1	31.1	31.3	30.6	30.5	30.8	31.6
	Campania	NA	26.3	27.0	29.1	27.9	28.4	27.9	27.3	26.3	25.7	25.4	27.6
Unemployment rate	Centre-North	NA	7.9	6	4.9	4.8	4.4	4.0	4.5	5.9	6.4	6.3	8.0
	Mezzogiorno	NA	18.1	18.9	15.0	14.3	12.2	11.0	12.0	12.5	13.4	13.6	17.2
	Campania	NA	20.2	20	15.6	14.9	12.9	11.2	12.6	12.9	14.0	15.5	19.3
Long term unemployment rate	Centre-North	NA	2.9	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.2	2.8	2.9	3.7
	Mezzogiorno	NA	9.2	10.9	8.2	8.0	7.1	6.0	6.5	6.7	7.4	7.9	10.5
	Campania	NA	9.6	10.5	8.2	8.6	7.6	6.1	7.2	7.4	8.3	9.7	12.6
Youth unemployment rate	Centre-North	NA	22.6	15.8	15.0	15.3	14.4	13.7	14.5	20.1	22.1	23.3	28.9
	Mezzogiorno	NA	44.8	44.7	37.6	38.6	34.3	32.3	33.6	36.0	38.8	40.4	46.9
	Campania	NA	50.7	49.2	37.7	38.8	35.4	32.5	32.4	38.1	41.9	44.4	48.2
Employment in informal sector (% of total employment)	Centre-North	NA	NA	NA	9.0	9.2	9.2	9.4	9.2	9.4	9.3	9.3	NA
	Mezzogiorno	NA	NA	NA	19.0	19.5	19.3	18.5	18.7	19.8	20.2	20.3	NA
	Campania	NA	NA	NA	21.0	19.8	19.2	17.7	18.5	18.4	18.6	18.6	NA
Employees in R&D (per thousand inhabitants)	Centre-North	NA	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.7	4.0	4.4	5.0	4.7	4.8	NA	NA
	Mezzogiorno	NA	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.8	NA	NA
	Campania	NA	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.2	NA	NA
Business R&D spending (as % of GDP)	Centre-North	NA	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	NA	NA
	Mezzogiorno	NA	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	NA	NA
	Campania	NA	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	NA	NA
Population in households below poverty line (%)	Centre-North	NA	NA	7.3	5.4	4.9	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.4	6.5
	Mezzogiorno	NA	NA	25.5	25.0	24.0	22.6	22.5	23.8	22.7	23.0	23.2	26.2
	Campania	NA	NA	NA	24.9	27.0	21.2	21.3	25.3	25.0	23.2	22.3	25.8
Household internet dissemination (% of households decl. access)	Centre-North	NA	NA	17.4	0.0	37.2	38.7	41.7	45.2	49.6	54.8	57.3	58.1
	Mezzogiorno	NA	NA	11.1	0.0	28.7	29.4	32.6	35.2	42.3	47.2	48.7	50.0
	Campania	NA	NA	12.9	NA	29.4	29.0	33.9	37.2	45.3	48.3	51.8	50.9
Business employees who use internet (%)	Centre-North	NA	NA	NA	22.6	26.5	29.8	30.7	33.3	33.3	35.2	37.6	NA
	Mezzogiorno	NA	NA	NA	14.6	14.3	19.1	19.6	20.9	22.2	22.8	24.6	NA
	Campania	NA	NA	NA	14.8	14.4	18.5	21.0	20.1	22.9	24.4	25.3	NA
Childcare (% of 0-3 year olds who have used childcare)	Centre-North	NA	NA	NA	15.5	15.0	15.9	16.2	16.8	17.9	18.4	NA	NA
	Mezzogiorno	NA	NA	NA	4.2	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.8	5.0	5.2	5.0	NA
	Campania	NA	NA	NA	1.5	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.7	NA

Source: ISTAT.

3. What worked and what didn't? And why?

A number of factors contributed to make the transport infrastructure field probably the most successful within the fields of intervention of the ERDF implemented in Campania. These were particularly true in the

2000-06 period and were: strategic planning and integration, leadership, and knowledge-based policy-making. Strategic planning was ensured by framing all transport investments in a comprehensive regional strategy, a Regional Transport Plan, a novelty in the regional programming landscape, introduced

in the early 2000s. This made it possible to continue to implement projects that had been started in previous program periods; to maximize the use of *all* available resources (from the ERDF programmes, both national and regional, as well as from different strands of domestic sources); and to coherently link transport infrastructure projects that had already been realized in a wider synergic picture (particularly in rail transport). This was one of the few fields of intervention in which integration and synergy between ROP and NOPS was pursued. Second, the existence of strong leadership: the regional minister, an internationally respected expert in this field, had a clear vision of the needs in the field of transport in Campania and what needed to be done to address this, and he could also pursue it, thanks to a team of competent regional officials around him (which was not the case across the entire regional administration) and strong endorsement from the top political level (President Bassolino).¹⁰ Lastly, a solid anchoring of policy on research and data made the policy relevant (including the monitoring and analysis of the effects of the investments realized on the transport preferences of users, via periodic ad hoc analyses and field research, a practice that has since been discontinued).

This has not been free from problems, e.g. increasing costs due to variants to the original plans, the length of time taken to realize investments, the discussed maintenance issue. There are also additional concerns linked to the considerable use of coherent projects¹¹. Nevertheless, the achievements have been remarkable: in this sphere, largely thanks to this approach, Campania today is not even remotely

¹⁰ Similar characteristics, particularly strong political leadership and vision, were at the heart of the positive performance of the urban regeneration measures in Naples and Salerno.

¹¹ These were projects that had already been funded with domestic resources.

comparable to what it was 23 years ago. However, as mentioned, whether these achievements are going to be sustained in future years will depend first and foremost on the political choices made by the governments that will run the Campania region (and Italy) in future.

In other spheres the policy's performance was hindered by factors both endogenous and exogenous to the policy. Endogenous factors include the failed appreciation of certain types of need or inability to translate these in adequate strategic responses (as discussed below); implementation difficulties linked to domestic institutional and cultural factors; and, related, ineffectual delivery arrangements.

3.1 Strategies too wide-ranging and poorly prioritized

A further problem was that although the relevance of programs was generally high - in the sense that the programs' strategies, priorities and goals by and large captured real needs -, the strategies tended to be all-encompassing, objectives too wide-ranging (compared to the financial scale of support) and not always adequately defined (especially in earlier periods), and not adequately prioritized and operationalized (a problem not confined to the Campania programs, as shown by Casavola 2009).

Further, some important needs remained undetected or unaddressed, notably in the fields of entrepreneurial support and labor market/social inclusion. Support to firms, in particular, was not sufficiently geared towards competitiveness; it neglected a section of the region's entrepreneurial class and ERDF programs alone could not (and could not be expected to) overcome the effects of a wider environment that is not

conducive to entrepreneurial activities.¹² Incentives provided over time have allowed firms to remain temporarily in the market, but they did not prompt firms to step-up their game and, in so doing, increase productivity. A role in this was played, particularly since 2000, by an understanding of innovation as a 'high' concept, applicable to high-productivity, high-technology sectors (such as aerospace, automotive, biotechnologies), but not sufficiently geared to the traditional sectors that are still a strong component of the regional productive fabric.

Firms operating in traditional sectors - such as textiles, fashion and leather - continue to be important in the regional economic outlook, and Campanian firms in these fields represent a significant share of the national industry. Yet, there has not been adequate support to embed innovation in these more traditional industries and their clusters (intended beyond the upgrading of

¹² Enterprises in Campania are affected by the low competitiveness of Italy as a whole (the '*sistema Italia*', as it is often referred to), which is due to a number of factors: low economic growth; higher costs of production factors; slow productivity increases; labour market rigidity; high taxation; and low endowment of strategic factors (Maggioni *et al.*, 2004: 11). In the latest World Bank ranking on ease of doing business, Italy is now in 87th position, down four since 2011, overtaken by countries such as Albania or Zambia (World Bank, 2012: 6). However, in addition to this, firms in Campania suffer from a wider set of context-related disadvantages that would need a set of interventions wider than those for entrepreneurial support in the strict sense. Maggioni *et al.* (2004) estimated the differential of costs and revenues faced by a firm operating in the province of Naples compared to a firm operating in a comparator province in the Centre-North of Italy (Parma). This is equal to lower turnover of a staggering 26.5 percentage points and higher management costs of 8.27 percentage points. Seven factors contribute to this differential according to the scholar: the impact of criminality; a less efficient credit market; an inefficient labour market and a labour force mismatched to the needs of firms; a less effectual system of economic infrastructure; less reliable energy supply; a more limited availability of entrepreneurial services (accounting, legal and administrative advice, marketing, feasibility studies etc.); and a reduced effectiveness of the innovation and technology transfer system (Maggioni *et al.*, 2004: 69-75).

machinery, for instance as design, materials and process innovation).

A second, albeit perhaps less important, factor has been the neglect of a section of the region's entrepreneurial class, i.e. the large number of small and micro-firms. The support of ERDF programs has been largely targeted at medium-sized and large firms (e.g. the aforementioned law 488/92 was directed primarily at them). This might have made sense at the time from an economic point of view, but it neglected the employment and social impact of the wide array of small and micro- handicraft firms.

Similarly, with regard to social inclusion the ERDF programs have certainly contributed to improve social cohesion by improving educational infrastructure, by supporting the provision of essential services and of social services (e.g. nurseries, with good performance as shown in Table 3), and by determining a change in approach to regional-level policy-making in this field. However, the programs' utility has been fundamentally hindered by the failure to tackle poverty, organized crime and the shadow economy more widely. In view of these issues, and in the absence of a wider policy response to address them, any support provided by ERDF programs could be no more than palliative. It has been important nonetheless, but not sufficient to fully meet needs. SVIMEZ has estimated that undeclared labor in 2006 - i.e. 17 years into the period reviewed - represented 21 percent of the total workforce (SVIMEZ, 2007: 335). The ERDF programs have injected considerable resources for the improvement of legality and security in Campania, particularly via the multi-regional/national dedicated programs. Yet in this field the desired change has not materialized. The *camorra* and its hold on the economy are still strong. In their analysis of the province of Naples, Guadalupi and Sorrentino (2004: 85) found that 'there isn't

an urban area belonging to the province of Naples in which criminal associations do not operate, whether with more or lesser strength'. Indeed, some observers argue that the *camorra* (just like organized crime in Italy more generally) has strengthened in recent years, for example increasing its presence in legal economic activities (Cantone and Di Feo, 2010). Thus, in this sphere ERDF programs have not been able to contribute to solve the problem. An effective challenge to organized crime is essential to allow economic development to take place and to create the social capital that is necessary to achieve durable and irreversible change. Most of the resources of the ERDF programs were spent on interventions such as video-surveillance systems but this type of support has worked in certain parts of the region, where the problem has largely been one of micro-criminality (petty crimes, drugs use), but is arguably unsuited to solve the pervasiveness of organized crime in parts of the regional territory (INT60). The measures for the re-use of confiscated goods for the provision of much-needed social services have been rather marginal too (because they have received comparatively few funds and have operated at a small scale), albeit symbolically important. Nevertheless, an effective challenge to organized crime would require a systematic and comprehensive policy response aimed at the '*decamorrizzazione*' and '*de-racketisation*' of the territory, i.e. 'bottom-up initiatives to reinstate freedom' and the enforcement of measures to release public procurement from the hold of organized crime¹³ (Grasso, 2004: 72; INT60). Such a systematic policy would include features and investments which clearly exceed the scope of the ERDF.

¹³ For instance, by regulating that acquiescent entrepreneurs are not just fined but also lose the right to operate on the market, thus redressing market asymmetries (Grasso, 2004: 73).

From a wider perspective, and particularly in the 2000-06 period, the research uncovered consensus that there was a *dispersion of the policy effort into too many themes and funding streams* (NVVIP, 2011; INT17, INT18, INT55, INT44, INT70), which exceeded the available strategic and managerial capacity. This complicated implementation and proved detrimental to the achievement of the necessary critical mass, in those field which received relatively limited amounts of resources such as the field of cultural resources (a point also raised by the ex post evaluation of the 2000-06 ROP, Regione Campania, NVVIIP, 2011). This is not a criticism of the size of projects, which does not seem to have been a weakness per se, but a criticism of the lack of prioritization and competence subdivision at strategic level with other, non-cofunded, streams of public spending. In other words, Cohesion policy alone was taken as the solution for all problems, which it cannot be.

In summary, if on the one hand some fields of intervention were not successful due to the inadequate targeting or consideration of underlying factors (as in the field of enterprise support and labor market/social cohesion above discussed), on the other hand, the programs tried to do too much. This leads to the theme of the interrelation with domestic regional policy and wider capital spending, discussed below.

3.2 Unsatisfactory synergies between programs, funds and domestic spending

Except for some examples of complementarity between ERDF programs and domestic spending programs in the field of transport infrastructure - some of the investments in Naples' underground, for instance, and the Battipaglia logistical hub, in the province of Salerno, were funded by a national infrastructure law ('*Legge Obiettivo*')

- and more limited coordination in other fields (e.g. via Contract Framework Agreements), the research did not uncover any real, systematic attempt to coordinate EU Cohesion policy with domestic capital spending. On the contrary, the utility of ERDF programs has been hampered in the last few years by the declining amount of capital public spending that has been assigned to (and spent) in the region. Cohesion policy, alongside with domestic regional policy - the Fund for Development and Cohesion (formerly Fund for Underutilized Areas) should be 'additional' expenditure, i.e. territorially-targeted expenditure aimed at catching-up. As such, by definition it represents only a portion of the total capital spending that should flow to a lagging region. In Campania, it represented a fraction of total capital expenditure. The decline of public capital expenditure net of regional policy resources in the past decades (and particularly in recent years), compounded by the cuts in domestic regional development funding from 2008 onwards (DPS, 2011), have meant that ERDF programs had to compensate for the relative lack of domestic capital spending, that they have lost additionality (Regione Campania, NVVIP, 2011), and that they have been directed to areas of spend that are not directly linked to development, for instance 'maintenance works which are necessary but induce little growth' (INT14; also INT4, INT69). Partly related, the necessity to guarantee *domestic co-financing* has been a problem throughout the study period, and one which has worsened in the current one, contributing to delaying or altering programs, undermining the programs' potential to achieve the goals initially set (INT29). The internal Stability and Growth Pact, in particular, imposed severe constraints on public spending by the local authorities and as such has impacted significantly on Campania's ability to find the necessary domestic co-financing (Regione

Campania, NVVIP, 2011: 3). In 2012, this problem was 'solved' by a temporary modification to the internal Pact and increasing co-financing rates (which, however, has had the negative effect of further reducing the overall value of the programs).

Perhaps even more surprisingly, there was also a lack of coordination and synergy between different ERDF-funded programs (regional and national) and between funds (with some notable exceptions – notably in the fields of transport infrastructure, education and, to an extent, research and innovation - mainly in the 2000-06 period). At the national level, this was largely lacking due to the lack of communication between sectoral ministries and the regional authority, whilst at the regional level the funds were implemented separately (even if within a single, multi-fund program). Complementarity between ESF and ERDF was minimal, except in specific domains, such as education in the 2000-06 and 2007-13 School NOPs, and ICT and business support in the 2000-06 Local Entrepreneurial Development NOP. The separation with which the two funds have traditionally operated in Brussels has exacerbated this problem, cascading the effects of the lack of integration in the programs and on the ground. Even when there were attempts to achieve complementarities and synergies between the two funds, for instance within the 2000-06 Territorial Integrated Projects, such attempts were generally unsuccessful, not least because of the difficulty of reconciling different rules and coordinating actors operating in different administrative units (as also pointed out by Casavola and Bianchi, 2008).

3.3 Implementation difficulties due to low administrative capacities and the wider domestic context

A low level of administrative capacity has characterized the region throughout the study period, affecting the ability of the regional authority to effectively interact with local bodies, to enforce rules, to implement policies and to manage and maintain the infrastructure systems built. During the study period, there have been considerable improvements in the level of institutional capacity within the regional administration, largely driven by the ERDF programs, for instance: better strategic and operational capacities within the regional administration, improved monitoring and evaluation of the outputs and effects of policy, the creation of an institutional infrastructure of sectoral plans, and the institution of a regional 'environmental authority' which monitors environmental phenomena. However, the low initial baseline¹⁴ and the fragility of the improvements made over time¹⁵ (according to many interviewees, Campania is today experiencing an institutional regression), have meant that the day to day management of the regional programs has frequently been challenged by practical constraints. On the whole, implementation difficulties of different sorts were frequent and this had obvious negative consequences for the achievements

¹⁴ This assessment of the inadequacy of the regional machinery in the first two programme periods, both in general and specifically in relation to Cohesion policy, emerged strongly in interviews (e.g. INT1, INT3, INT33, INT37, INT52, INT70) and is reported in evaluation studies and literature (Bassolino, 2011; Giannelli and Profeti, 2006; La Spina, 2003; ISMERI EUROPA, 1995).

¹⁵ Over time, and particularly during the first Bassolino mandate in the 2000-06 period, improvements to the level of institutional capacity in the regional administration were realized (Giannelli and Profeti, 2006; INT1, INT33, INT52, INT56 and various others), but these proved limited to the sphere of actors actively engaged with the implementation of Cohesion policy (Marra *et al.*, 2012) and thus short-lived. The enlargement of the political majority supporting the regional government – largely in response to national political developments (Bassolino, 2011) – meant the reversal of the process and a return to the old particularistic logics of political control of the policy process.

obtained and the timetable over which the policy was able to deliver its outcomes.

3.4 European regulatory constraints

Lastly, just like elsewhere in Europe (Bachtler *et al.*, 2009), EU rules governing expenditure, notably those on expenditure claims and automatic decommitment, have resulted in attention being paid predominantly on the progression of expenditure, rather than on results. This has meant the substitution of novel or innovative projects, which have by nature a longer project cycle (UVAL, 2006), with easy-to-implement projects (irrespective of their added value). For example, in 2000-06, this resulted in abandoning ambitions to achieve integration between ESF and ERDF within the Integrated Territorial Projects (Regione Campania, NVVIP, 2011; INT5). This is an issue that the new regulatory environment for the next cycle of programs intends to address (with its intended focus on results-orientation).

Conclusions

On the whole, the policy's achievements and utility over the study period, summarized in the preceding sections, have been disappointing: despite the policy support, Campania remains a lagging regions compared to both Italian and EU standards. Many of the old challenges continue to afflict the region and the recent crisis has shown all too clearly the relatively low resilience and competitiveness of the productive fabric. Yet, a number of achievements were indeed realized thanks to the ERDF programmes; in some spheres, these achievements positively transformed the region.

Perhaps, for a policy as complex as this one – that relies on the integration with and leveraging of other policies, and that by

definition operates in a context not conducive to growth and development - the point is not so much or not just that ambitions were not realized (as they most clearly weren't), but to draw lessons for the future, to enable the region to make good use of the significant resources that it will continue to receive from Cohesion policy in the next, 2014-20, programming cycle. The first such lessons is perhaps to be frank about what has been achieved so far, realistic about what could have been achieved under the circumstances (i.e. given the resources available and the wider policy context), and daring in drawing and applying lessons on what needs to be done to improve implementation and effectiveness. We hope that this paper and the wider case study from which it was drawn make a useful contribution in this direction.

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RESEARCH TRENDS

Left or Right?

The Complex Nature and Uncertain Future of the 5 Stars Movement

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1. On the left or the right?

On several occasions, when talking about himself and the movement he founded, Beppe Grillo has categorically refused to be placed in any position in the left-right spectrum. On 20 May 2013, he wrote on his blog, *“The 5 Stars Movement (M5s) is not on the left (nor is it on the right). It is a movement of Italian people.”* Similar statements are among the most recurrent leitmotifs of his speeches. In the face of this explicit refusal to be pigeonholed, the left or right connotation of the M5s has been one of the most hotly debated questions surrounding this political force.

On the one hand, parts of the political agenda of the M5s distinctly recall the “silent revolution” of the 1970s and 80s and the left-wing movements (the focus on ecology and democracy, opposition to the multinationals and high finance). Indeed, Beppe Grillo’s ideological development, right from his first steps as a political-social commentator, has centered on these issues, and he has drawn inspiration from social Catholicism (the missionary Alex Zanotelli is one of his inspirers), critical consumerism and the ecology movement. Indeed, Grillo’s writings and shows were always appreciated by the press and public on the left.

On the other hand, however, especially after Grillo’s entry into politics and the participation of the M5s in electoral contests, other themes emerged which seemed to indicate a different political

collocation. Indeed, his stance on immigration (rejection of the principle of *jus soli*; intolerance of the “foreign invasion” manifested on various occasions), the theme of taxes (criticism of excessive taxation; support for forms of fiscal revolt), and his use of language (abandoning the institutional formalism typical of the left-wing parliamentary forces in favor of a style that is often vulgar and not rarely insulting, which seems closer to the aggressive rhetoric of the Northern League and certain right-wing movements) reveal kinship with an electorate that is different from his original public.

The cohabitation of these two different orientations has prompted observers to interpret the M5s in radically different ways, sometimes placing it on the left, sometimes on the right. In the public debate, however, the interpretation that the M5s was not aligned with the left has prevailed for long time. For instance, the influential daily *“la Repubblica”* almost unanimously interpreted the Grillo phenomenon as a “right-wing” movement. In this regard, the words of Eugenio Scalfari, the newspaper’s founder and still today one of its most authoritative political commentators, are emblematic: *“the slogan ‘neither right nor left’ fools no one; it is a slogan proper to the worst element of the right – that populist, demagogic element which seeks a strong leader who can exonerate it from all responsibility”*. The attribution of the labels “populist” and “anti-political” to this movement ever since the first

moments of its history has automatically led to its being associated with the right.

That the M5s is increasingly being interpreted as a right-wing political force (if anything, only superficially and deceptively disguised as left-wing) is also witnessed by the texts devoted to this issue by Wu Ming, a group of social chroniclers and commentators whose orientation differs markedly from that of the founder of *“la Repubblica”* (they can be placed close to the radical fringes of the social movements): *“so-called ‘Grillism’ is a movement that we do not hesitate to define as right-wing”* (Wu Ming 2013a). Or again, the slogan “neither right nor left” hides a right-wing substance (Wu Ming 2012). With specific regard to the affinity of the M5s with movements such as “Occupy Wall Street” or the Spanish “Indignados” (movements to which the M5s is sometimes likened on account of their common criticism of temporary employment contracts, their opposition to austerity policies and their proposal of a minimum income for citizens), all kinship is denied: *“Despite its radical appearance and its revolutionary rhetoric, we believe that, over the past three years, the M5s has effectively defended the present system, acting as a force that has quelled rebellion and stabilized the system. [...] A movement rigidly controlled and mobilized from the top, hijacking slogans and ideas from social movements and mixing them with apologies for an ‘ethical’ capitalism. [...] They created a confused set of proposals, where neoliberal and anti-capitalist, centralist and federalist, libertarian and reactionary could co-exist. Is it possible for a movement born as a diversion to become a radical force, addressing crucial problems and dividing ‘us’ from ‘them’ along true fault-lines? To make it happen, something else must first occur. There has to be an event that interrupts and cracks open the movement. In other words, Grillism should free itself from Grillo’s grip. So far, this*

has not happened and it is unlikely it will happen now” (Wu Ming 2013b).

In reality, however, both these interpretations appear to be based on prejudiced, value-related representations; they stem not so much from a well-founded sociological description as from the fact that Grillo and the M5s are not in line with their own idealized vision of the “true” left. Indeed, empirical analysis reveals a somewhat different picture. The first surveys conducted among the participants in V-Day (Grillo’s anti-political rally – September 8, 2007) revealed a significant prevalence of people of left-wing orientation among Grillo sympathizers and members of the “meet-ups”¹. Similarly, after the first elections contested by the M5s, analyses of voter flows confirmed that the movement had predominantly drawn voters from the center-left parties (the Northern League, especially in the north-east, was the only center-right party that had ceded a sizeable amount of voters to the M5s). Only after its great electoral success did we see a (partial) shift towards a balance in the electoral provenance and political-ideological stance of M5s voters. Just when center-right voters came to make up a significant portion of the M5s electorate is debatable (according to some analyses, this was already the case in the Sicilian regional elections of October 2012;

¹ Implicit in the above-mentioned interpretations is some notion of “false consciousness”, whereby those who assert their position on the left are misled into following Grillo. According to Wu Ming members, who like to use Marxist categories, the idea of false consciousness is more clearly present (for example, when they talk of the “frames of the capitalist counterrevolution that began in the 1980s”, in Wu Ming 2013a) but broadens into a simplistic, Manichaeian representation of the M5s (“good” rank and file and “bad” leader...). According to *“la Repubblica”*, this idea remains implicit (being interpreted as a side-effect of the long-standing Berlusconi mindset and its “television dictatorship”, which is claimed to have infected left-wing culture by implanting in it the seeds of “leaderism”). Whichever way it is interpreted, “false consciousness” clearly remains a problematic notion for *empirical* social science...

others claim that it happened only in the February 2013 general election. On this issue, see Vignati 2013b). In any case, since the February general election, the M5s electorate has become almost undifferentiated; that is to say, it includes considerable numbers of voters from both sides of the political divide (though those from the center-left remain in the majority). Likewise, surveys (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013, Pedrazzani and Pinto 2013, Natale 2013) have revealed that self-placement on the right-left scale has become less distinct over time.

Grillo has proved to be very skillful in appealing to voters who undoubtedly stand on the left – the audiences of Michele Santoro and Milena Gabanelli, the readers of “Micromega” and members of movements that are close to it, such as the “Popolo viola” – even if they were increasingly critical towards the positions held by the traditional left-wing parties. At the same time, he has espoused some of the appeals expressed by those on the right (the “VAT people”, the self-employed, protesters against excessive taxation, etc.). He has been able to hold together these two “populations” by exploiting their common opposition to the political “caste”, which both sees as responsible for their own problems and for the ills of the country. That Grillo has managed to yoke together these two congregations is not only a tribute to his ability as a demagogue and to the novelty of his proposals, it is also the result of political contingencies. And it is this confluence that underlies the sudden surge that has enabled the M5s to become the first party in Italy (up until the municipal elections in April 2012, it could substantially be interpreted as an expression of leftist areas and movements and of the dissatisfaction of this electorate with the traditional parties that represented it).

In its first months of parliamentary and institutional activity, the M5s chiefly

displayed its left-wing features and affinities. In this regard, we need only remember that the M5s proposed Stefano Rodotà as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic and, in line with newspapers such as *Il Fatto Quotidiano* and such associations as *Libertà e giustizia* (Freedom and justice), firmly opposed constitutional reform. In the months between the general election and the municipal elections, Grillo seemed to be betting rationally on the left side in the hope of profiting from the evident difficulty in which the main leftist party (the Pd) found itself after failing to win the election outright – a strategy aimed at enabling the M5s to replace the Pd in a future two-horse race against the right and to depict itself as the only political force capable of beating Berlusconi; indeed, the only one seriously intent on fighting him. The political chronicles of the electoral campaign prior to the municipal elections mentioned Grillo’s repeated invitations to Pd voters to join his movement because “we are the true left” and “we have the same ideas as voters on the left” (E. Buzzi, *Grillo: elettori Pd, venite con noi*, “Corriere della sera”, May, 19, 2013). This strategy, however, was thwarted precisely by the May municipal elections; while the Pd managed to pull off an undeniable victory, the M5s failed to confirm its February election result, garnering scant support in the most important cities (such as Rome) and in those (such as Siena) to which it had attributed a high symbolic value. A part of the electorate probably perceived Grillo’s stance as manipulative, given that, in those same months, the M5s had repeatedly and harshly rejected any form of cooperation with the parties on the left (for a more thorough analysis of the results of the municipal elections, see Corbetta and Vignati 2013 and Vignati 2013c).

2. What does the future hold?

The results of the May 2013 municipal elections marked a setback for the M5s in comparison with its triumph in the general election a few months earlier. However, closer inspection of the May results indicates that they should not be seen as a sign of imminent decline. Indeed, when compared with the municipal elections held in April 2012, the May 2013 elections revealed signs of progress in the territorial penetration of the movement, which increased its ability to present electoral lists in the southern regions of the country and strengthened its support in those same regions. This point is illustrated in

table 1, which, with reference to the municipal elections held in 2012 and 2013, reports three indicators: the percentage of municipal contests in which the M5s presented its lists; the percentage of voters who found the M5s symbol on their ballot papers; and the percentage of valid votes (calculated only on the municipalities contested by the M5s). Almost all regions displayed an increase in the first two indicators (the increase being particularly significant in the South). The third indicator exhibits substantial stability (or a slight decline) in the North and in the “Red Belt” and a clear rise in the South.

2012				2013			
	% of municipalities contested by M5s	% of voters represented *	% of valid votes **		% of municipalities contested by M5s	% of voters represented *	% of valid votes **
Piedmont	18.3	67.8	11.5	Piedmont	6.0	49.4	13.3
Liguria	10.5	82.7	13.6	Liguria	22.2	63.4	11.1
Lombardia	12.7	47.3	9.3	Lombardia	18.9	65.0	8.3
Veneto	28.9	57.1	12.4	Veneto	44.7	70.4	8.8
Friuli-V G.	7.7	25.0	8.7	FVG	23.1	61.2	14.0
NORTH	17.7	59.3	11.7	NORTH	22.0	65.3	9.5
Emilia-R.	23.5	78.7	16.9	Emilia-R.	50.0	85.6	16.3
Tuscany	20.0	61.2	9.5	Tuscany	52.9	90.6	10.6
Umbria	0.0	0.0	0.0	Umbria	60.0	90.4	12.3
Marche	40.0	82.0	12.2	Marche	38.5	83.5	12.0
RED BELT	22.2	68.0	13.1	RED BELT	49.0	87.8	12.0
Lazio	10.2	31.9	4.2	Lazio	38.1	94.9	11.8
Abruzzo	9.4	52.4	3.2	Abruzzo	28.6	68.9	6.4
Molise	0.0	0.0	0.0	Molise	0.0	0.0	0.0
Campania	6.7	27.0	2.7	Campania	21.3	55.2	4.0
Puglia	8.5	34.7	2.3	Puglia	41.9	72.6	5.1
Basilicata	0.0	0.0	0.0	Basilicata	18.2	40.1	9.1
Calabria	0.0	0.0	0.0	Calabria	7.5	25.5	7.5
Sicily	2.0	33.9	4.2	Sicily	32.4	75.4	5.3
				Sardegna	11.4	35.0	13.4
SOUTH	4.7	30.4	3.4	SOUTH	26.1	77.9	8.6
Italy	10.7	44.8	8.7	Italy	26.4	76.4	11.0

* the % of voters represented is the ratio between the number of voters in the municipalities contested by the M5s and that of voters in all the municipalities that voted in 2013


** the % of valid votes has been calculated only on the municipalities in which the M5s participated in the elections.

Source: our elaboration of data taken from <http://elezioni.interno.it/>

Confirmation that it is too soon to sound the death knell for the M5s is provided by surveys conducted on voting intentions in the following months, which have continued to credit the movement with percentages around 20%; on the eve of the February

general election, such percentages would have been unanimously deemed triumphal (fig. 1). Today, the M5s still seems to have considerable appeal for voters, and must therefore be regarded as capable of exerting a significant impact on electoral results.

Fig. 1 Trend in intentions to vote for the M5s (January-November, 2013)



Source: surveys published on www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it (data supplemented with information from www.scenaripolitici.it) (Jan 1 = 1st week of January, etc.)

If, however, we speculate as to the long-term future of the M5s, what emerges is far from a rosy picture. In particular, the heterogeneity of the movement's supporters risks being transformed from a strength to a weakness. Studies conducted on M5s voters and sympathisers have revealed that the movement does not have a precise characterisation in any field. It embraces all classes, a "catch-all party", as the political observers say; it is not associated with a privileged social class (Pedrazzani and Pinto, 2013), unlike Berlusconi's populism, which appealed to the self-employed, to professionals, to the upper classes, to the private sector as opposed to the public. Nor does it have a geographical connotation, unlike the Northern League, which is also a populist movement but with territorial roots (the M5s is the most homogeneously diffuse party nationwide: 25% in northern, central, and southern regions and in both small towns and large cities, www.Cise.Luiss.it). Moreover, its ideological connotations have progressively weakened with the influx of former centre-right voters into the initial core, which had chiefly been made up of ex-voters from the

centre-left (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013, Pedrazzani and Pinto, 2013, Vignati 2013b).

In sum, the 5-stars Movement lacks *unifying ideological principles and sociological vote-stabilizers*. This shortcoming has two consequences. The first is that it does not permit either policies or alliances. Grillo says "We are neither on the left nor on the right". But this is a disadvantage in that, should the party ever take up a right-wing position, it would elicit the discontent of its ranks on the left, and vice versa¹. This is one of the reasons for the political paralysis which afflicted the M5s after the February general election: if the leadership had adopted clear political positions – e.g. in the field of economics, which today poses the greatest challenge – it would have risked splitting the movement. The only unifying themes that the movement might have are the environment and political morality. But these are not the most important guidelines for a government today,

¹ As in the proposal to abolish the crime of illegal immigration made by two M5s senators and immediately disavowed by Grillo on his blog (October 10, 2013): Grillo's peremptory intervention caused considerable confusion among the party's MPs.

which is called upon to deal with the dramatic situation of economic and political-institutional crisis facing the country.

The second consequence is that the movement's absence of social anchor-points exposes its support to facile evanescence. The populism of Bossi and that of Berlusconi proved able to give rise to long-standing parties, not least because of their respective bonds of territory and class. From this standpoint, the M5s seems more closely to resemble the far more fragile populist movements of Guglielmo Giannini (who appeared in Italian politics in 1946) or Antonio Di Pietro (ex-magistrate and public prosecutor in trials against Berlusconi, he founded the party named "Italia dei valori" in 1998 in the wake of the Mani Pulite scandals and public indignation against political corruption).

It could be argued that the 5-stars Movement cannot last long because it does not have a project, a vision, a utopia; or rather, a *positive* utopia to hold up before its followers: be it a classless society, home rule for "Padania", the welfare state, a society free from state interference, and so forth. The Movement has nothing of this kind. The M5s is only a movement of negative vision (the political parties are corrupt and the system is rotten). It is a protest movement within which many cohabit, for example those who protest against high taxes and those who protest against cuts in public services. It is clear that, in such circumstances, no political proposals can be made without upsetting one group or another. It would be banal to say that rejection is the easiest element to coagulate, in that it is indifferent to its internal heterogeneity. However, a country cannot be governed on pure protest, nor can alliances be forged, whether they are in government or in opposition. Indeed, Grillo has often said that he will not enter into any alliances; but this refusal guarantees impotence and paralysis (his own, if not indeed of the whole system, as

is happening in Italy). And it is probably this inanity that was not accepted by those who voted for him in the February 2013 general election and abandoned the M5s in the following May 2013 municipal elections.

In reality, however, there is a positive utopia in the political proposal of Beppe Grillo: the utopia of web-based democracy; the idea of "direct democracy", in which citizens no longer delegate decisional power to representatives – the end of representative democracy as we have known it in the modern era. This is an ancient idea which dates back to Rousseau at the very least. It had its advocates and saw attempts at its realization during the French Revolution. Nevertheless, in Grillo's conception, it does contain an element of true novelty: the Internet. Thanks to its extraordinary potential, the Internet would seem to be able to transform both society as a whole and politics. In an interview for "The Guardian" (March, 1, 2013) Gianroberto Casaleggio, (co-leader of the Movement) M5s said observers had been wrong to see the huge vote for the M5s purely as a reaction to the economic crisis or the austerity policies favored by Germany. Though the crisis had accelerated the movement's progress, it was essentially a product of the Internet, he claimed, as it enabled the direct democracy that the movement espoused and practiced. In his opinion, "*What is happening in Italy is just the beginning of a much more radical change: it's a change that is coming to all democracies*" (see: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/01/five-star-movement-italy-elections>).

Without going into this complicated matter, and to return to the concrete issues of Italian politics at the present time, we can only conclude that the web-based democracy of the M5s has so far turned out to be a great disappointment. As has been acknowledged even by newspapers that sympathize with the M5s, the "parliamentaries" (online election of

parliamentary candidates, who then automatically become deputies owing to the mechanism of the “frozen lists” implemented by Italian electoral law) have proved to be anything but a triumph for direct democracy; many candidates got onto M5s ballot papers (and consequently into Parliament) with only a few hundred votes, and in several cases even with less than 100 (Vignati 2013a, 98-99).

Thus, the Internet has so far proved inefficient in ensuring the participation of the movement’s adherents. It also lacks transparency. Here, we need only think of the management of the so-called “Quirinarie” (online indication of the M5s candidate for the Presidency of the Republic): the organization did not reveal how many votes were really cast for the various candidates, nor the true reasons why the first round of voting was annulled. Moreover, with regard to those who actually manage the procedure, there is no guarantee that the result cannot be manipulated; with regard to voters, there is no certainty that a given vote has actually been cast by the person entitled to cast it. What is more, many M5s voters are not Internet users (the data reported by Biorcio 2013 indicate that only 32% of M5s voters obtain political information from the Internet).

The way M5s has used the Internet so far has therefore proved *inefficient* (little participation) and *opaque* (little transparency): the exact opposite of its aims. Indeed, leaving aside the rhetoric, facile triumphalism and naivety, the Internet has been overestimated as a tool of democracy and a means of direct participation. This may be because the tool is as yet immature. Nevertheless, the disappointment is evident.

Conclusion

The above-mentioned inability, or unwillingness, of the M5s to choose between right and left may continue to pay, as long as Italian politics remains in its current state of fluidity. The M5s seems to be betting on the progressive de-institutionalization of the Italian political system.

However, a change in electoral law and/or the reorganization of the two main political coalitions around strong leaderships may enable the political system to regain some of its solidity (ability to form stable governments, mutual recognition between the two coalitions, etc.). Although such developments are uncertain, they are nevertheless possible, especially since, for the first time within the Pdl, a group of leaders have emerged who seem able to free themselves from Berlusconi’s unopposed dominion. Should these eventualities come to pass, the M5s’ inability or unwillingness to choose would turn out to be a serious handicap and might well drive the Movement down those same pathways that have characterized the affairs of many “flash-in-the-pan” populist political forces.

On analyzing the February elections, D’Alimonte (2013) considered them to be the possible (but not certain) beginning of a process of realignment: *“The 2013 vote might also be another critical election. The level of electoral volatility clearly indicates that the percentage of voters who switched their preferences in this election was even greater than in 1994. Actually, in no other case since 1948 have we seen so much electoral change driven by a wave of popular dissatisfaction – a wave that resembles that of the period between the end of the First Republic and the beginning of the Second. And, of course, in this election, too, we have witnessed the rise of new parties, the most important of which is the M5s. Grillo’s party gained almost nine*

million votes that had previously gone to other parties or had been lost in abstention. It did so running alone against the two dominant left and right coalitions and overcoming the bias against third parties of an electoral system with a strong majoritarian component. Many of the ingredients of a major political realignment are present. But one election is not enough to support the conclusion that such realignment has in fact taken place”.

In the light of the May municipal elections, it may be more appropriate to speak of de-alignment rather than realignment (on these concepts, see Dalton *et al.* 1984). Indeed, the May elections indicate that the M5s has not yet managed to create a solid identity and a solid organizational bond with its electorate. In the February election, only a minority of its votes came from “committed” voters; most support seemed to stem chiefly from rejection of the traditional parties rather than a positive endorsement of the Movement’s proposals. Research conducted by Biorcio (2013) indicates that little over a third of the M5s electorate is made up of “committed” voters. The remainder is equally divided between those who, though not committed, have a certain liking for the movement (the “sympathizers”) and those who voted almost randomly, for want of something better, or just to see what would happen (the “occasional” voters)².For

² Each of these categories could be represented by a few public figures who, in the last year, have explicitly expressed their support of the M5s. The “committed” could be represented by Nobel prizewinner Dario Fo or by the philosopher Roberta De Monticelli, both of whom have recently written tracts (Fo 2013, De Monticelli 2013) championing the cause of the Movement, which they regard as a unique resource capable of rejuvenating the country. The “sympathizers” could be represented by the photographer Oliviero Toscani or by Carlo Freccero, a television director and sociologist of communication, who have both evinced sympathy for the M5s, albeit while maintaining a certain critical and ironic detachment from it. The “occasional” voters could be represented by Giuseppe Cruciani, the presenter of a very successful radio program, *La zanzara*, whose announcement that he would vote for the M5s seems to

this reason, its consensus for the moment remains fragile, extremely volatile and subject to the whims of the political scenario.

On the other hand, to continue the argument that a de-alignment is taking place, it is clear that the traditional political parties are going through a phase of seriously weakened identity and organization. The Pdl seems to have reached the decisive and delicate moment (from which we do not know how, or whether, it will emerge) when its founder and undisputed leader will have to be replaced. This handover will also have repercussions on the Pd, given the importance that opposition to Berlusconi has had in shaping its identity. Moreover, it is taking place at a time when the party is deeply split and apparently unable to agree upon a leadership. Dwindling voter turnout and the drastic, generalized decline in trust in the parties complete the political picture of marked fluidity.

Within this framework, the M5s appears for the moment to be still a long way from developing an organization that will enable it to withstand the test of time. Rather, it seems more prepared to keep soldiering on in a state of weakness and organizational instability that allows its leader complete freedom of movement (thereby preventing the creation of an internal structure that can give rise to the emergence of a political class endowed with autonomous resources of power). In other words, the M5s has not yet managed to achieve institutionalization, for example by creating real places for debate and discussion where diversified positions can be formed and compared or by establishing entry procedures and career pathways. These features are proper to a party structure; can the M5s endure without them? In *normal* times, certainly not. But these are not *normal*

have been dictated more by a taste for provocation and by a desire for something “new” than by true endorsement.

times. It seems that, by betting on the *deinstitutionalization* of the political system and the protraction of its crisis (economic and institutional), Grillo wants to oppose any

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institutionalization of his "movement", believing that it would be more of a liability than an asset.

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Beyond Mario Monti: Austerity Policies and Path-Dependence. A Comparison of the Spanish and Italian Health Care Sectors

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The sweeping implementation of austerity policies in affluent democracies, particularly in Southern Europe, is an important pivot in the political and economic development of these countries. Countries that previously adopted Keynesian approaches to economic development are now responding to crisis by cutting government spending. However, austerity policies can be disaggregated into a menu of policy options. Cutbacks vary both by extent and by design. History can help explain why.

Most state-oriented health systems depend on a single source of financing. Commonly known as National Health Services (NHS), these are systems in which the state provides and finances health care. But in the Italian NHS, austerity policies are transferring more costs onto the market. Italian officials have responded to the crisis by increasing or introducing user charges in their NHS, while Spanish officials have not taken the same approach to reduce costs in the Spanish NHS (Mladovsky, et al., 2012, p. 17). Thus, austerity cutbacks in the Spanish and Italian NHS are quite distinct, despite the similar design of the two health systems.

User charges, also known as out-of-pocket payments or co-payments, are direct charges to users for health services. Proponents of this type of cost-sharing arrangement argue that they make the health system more efficient by guiding demand to appropriate care. If revenues generated from the fees are re-allocated to address the health needs of the poor, cost-sharing can even improve equity. Opponents, however, argue that user fees can actually price out the poor.

Thus, the extensive use of copayments in a universalistic NHS system makes the Italian reforms both unique and controversial.

Italy and Spain share similar political-economic frameworks, and as such typically adopt similar policy approaches. As Southern European welfare states, both countries adhere largely to the characteristics of occupationalist social policy regimes, yet they maintain universalistic health sectors. In the health sector, per capita expenditures are nearly identical: expenditures average \$2,345 per capita in Spain, and \$2,282 per capita in Italy (OECD, 2012). Beyond user fees, both countries have similar cost control policies, such as capping physician payments and centralizing price negotiations with pharmaceutical companies. In both cases, the state has used its leverage as the principle payer of health care to negotiate lower health care costs. However, despite experiencing similar pressures from the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), only the Italian government has used this leverage to transfer costs onto users. The Spanish government has not. Since countries with similar welfare models adopt similar approaches to retrenchment, this difference is puzzling.

Part of the difference is attributable to the fact that Mario Monti and his technocratic government were able to withstand the popular, anti-austerity discontent. Spain's elected officials have certainly been more cautious when implementing unpopular reforms, but austerity policies have much deeper historical roots. Tracing the historical

development of copayment policy in Spain and Italy, this article demonstrates that contemporary austerity measures can be the result of path-dependent policymaking. The introduction of copayments into the Italian NHS during the formative stages of its development and implementation has made it a viable policy option during austerity. In Spain, the absence of copayments during these initial stages places most of the responsibility to finance the system in the hands of the state.

Origins

Examining the historical roots of austerity requires investigating the health systems that preceded the contemporary NHS in Spain and Italy. In comparing the two former health systems, it is clear that the state was much less involved in Italy than in Spain. Before Italy's adoption of the NHS in 1978, private physicians provided health care services, and employer-sponsored insurance companies financed them. Although nearly one-hundred insurers existed, few fully covered their policyholders' health care costs. Moreover, approximately 7 percent of the population remained uninsured (Donatini, et al., 2001). In other words, as the state neither financed nor provided care, citizens expected to pay out-of-pocket for health care services, either partially or in full.

In contrast, the Spanish government had begun to develop a public health system well before the establishment of its NHS. In the 1960s, the military regime expanded the social security system by adding medical coverage (Guillen, 1996).¹ This was prompted by "the combined influence of bureaucratic pressures, economic expansion and mounting opposition to the authoritarian regime" (Rico,

¹ Previously, a means-tested public health insurance system covered 25 percent of the population (Guillen, 1996).

1997, p. 118). It also coincided with the Spanish "boom" period, in which economic liberalization reversed many of the regime's former policies, which furthered Spain's economic development. These reforms set up a social insurance system. Furthermore, in a particularly unique social policy effort, the regime coupled the expanded social insurance system with a large expansion of the public hospital and clinic network. This arrangement combined elements of social democratic health systems (where the state provides health care) as well as elements of conservative social insurance health systems (where the state directly or indirectly finances the health system.) The result was the establishment of a substantial professional civil health service and near-universal coverage.² In other words, the military regime in Spain had begun to develop the large, state-oriented public health institutions that would eventually serve as the foundation for a universalistic health care system. The Italian NHS lacked such building blocks.

The Politics of Implementation

Economic and political openings brought about numerous reforms in Southern Europe. In 1982, after the democratic transition, the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) took office. Combining former regime policy and contemporary programmatic policy, the new government established the Spanish NHS. Set in motion by the PSOE Minister of Health, the eight-year preparation process deliberately built the system on the regime's clinic network. PSOE leaders separated the public health clinics and hospitals from the social security system (Rico,

² Between the 1940s and the 1970s, spending on public health care provision rose from 3 percent to 75 percent of the national health budget. In addition, approximately 80 percent of the population benefit from the expanded health care system (Rico, 1997) (Guillen, 1996).

1997). Meanwhile, in Italy, *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC), the Christian Democratic Party, and the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI), the Communist Party, took up similar reforms and established the Italian NHS. But the legislative reforms in Italy lacked the practical authority to formally remove cost-sharing from the new system. The following section explains how the distinct politics of implementation in Spain and Italy contributed to the formation of two very different NHS.

Finances

In Italy, Left parties were unable to levy the taxes necessary to fund the NHS, so the fiscal health of the system relied on payroll taxes. Meanwhile, in Spain, PSOE politicians aimed to finance the public clinics through general taxation. Combining tax reform and anti-tax evasion policies helped the state raise revenues by 6.6 percent of GDP (Rico, 1997). These additional revenues helped to fund the implementation of the Spanish NHS. But in Italy, nearly 40 percent of the health care system was financed by contributions (Granaglia, 1997, p. 159). These contributions were insufficient.³ User fees, therefore, offered one solution to closing the financing gap.⁴

Coalitions

The successful implementation of health care reforms requires the support of key actors. In Spain, PSOE effectively leveraged the support of the Autonomous Communities, which would oversee the new system, and the medical community, which

would operate it. The party's strategy was to back the administrative decentralization of the NHS, while simultaneously preparing the regions for greater political autonomy. The two types of decentralization, the PSOE argued, would be mutually re-enforcing. Eager to develop their autonomy, the regions became supportive of the health care system. Many physicians also supported the reform, perhaps because many were former employees of the military regime's health system. Nearly two-thirds of Spanish hospital physicians endorsed the reforms (Rico, 1997). Thus, paradoxically, the expansion of centralized public health care provision was built on authoritarian policies, but the administrative decentralization of the health system was appealing to regionalists who were wary of the center.

In Italy, the central government gave doctors, medical professionals, and other health-affiliated government employees few guidelines for implementing the new system. Although the lack of oversight originally helped garner physician support for the 1978 reform, there was a large void between the central government and the medical profession during implementation. Many professionals were left untrained, and politicians in the center did not distribute sufficient information regarding how to meet the objectives of the reformed system. Doctors continued to rely on the models and practices of the former system. For example, many physicians saw private pay patients in public hospitals. Also, some doctors who joined the NHS continued to practice—usually illegally—in private hospitals. This meant that the government would sometimes pay for care at private hospitals, and patients often would pay out-of-pocket for care at public hospitals. The central government, again, neglected to make medical professionals accountable to the NHS, and users who were entitled to free medical care sometimes paid

³ This is a departure from the way that other National Health Services finance care, as these systems typically rely on general revenue, not payroll taxes.

⁴ Since implementation, the central and regional governments have levied additional taxes to balance expenditures and revenue, but these taxes also remain insufficient.

out-of-pocket for it. Even in its earliest stages, the Italian NHS seemed like a mixed, public-private system. Without the support of the medical community, the system could not become wholly public.

The Italian NHS also lacked the full support of the Italian regions, or the very bodies designated to implement the law. Not unlike Spain's Autonomous Communities, the Italian regions acquired the responsibility to implement and administer the NHS around the same time that they acquired a great deal of political power. But local Italian health authorities were said to be more concerned with building local consensus than building a health system—and the system of intergovernmental transfers boosted this tendency (Granaglia, 1997). The central government would dispense a capitated payment to the regions, but the regions were not required to report what they did with the payment. Although the administrative infrastructure of the Italian NHS was similar to that of the Spanish NHS, the opaqueness of regional payment transfers in Italy gave policymakers reason to consider alternative, more transparent methods of payment, such as user charges.

Health Ministers

The lack of accountability to the Italian NHS is related to the fact that the health system was not implemented by those politicians who originally backed and passed the reforms. The universalistic system was established by a government that *included* the Left party, but it was implemented by a government that *excluded* the Left party—and, perhaps more importantly, included the Right-wing, Liberal party. Shortly after the 1978 reform, the Liberal Party replaced the PCI in the governing coalition. Liberals were hardly committed to implementing the NHS, but the Health Ministry largely would be

overseen by the Liberal Party in subsequent years. Various programmatic decisions would sidestep the NHS's social democratic origins. In Spain, long-term support for the universalistic health care system was secured as PSOE politicians continued to win the parliamentary elections throughout the 1980s, winning with an absolute majority several times. Governing alone, Socialists appointed Socialist Health Ministers to oversee the implementation of the NHS. Thus, the distinct programmatic agendas of the Health Ministers implementing the reforms made a critical difference for the formation of the Spanish and Italian NHS.

Renato Altissimo, a Liberal Venetian businessman, oversaw the Health Ministry for the majority of the legislative term following the reform's enactment (1979-1983) (Ministero della Salute, 2011) (Parlamento Italiano- Legislature Precedenti, 2008).⁵ The health system's financial disarray was highly visible, so it was not difficult for Altissimo and other Liberals to promote alternative and transparent forms of payment. Cost-sharing arrangements became attractive to these policymakers. The first copayment was a flat-rate fee on pharmaceuticals in 1979, and it was expanded in 1981-1982, when copayments for specialist outpatient services also were introduced. Users were required to pay 15 percent of retail prices (Donatini, et al., 2001). The resistance from the Left was negligent at the time. The strength of the PCI had begun to decline, and trade unions supported the introduction of market reforms into the health system ---just as long as universal access was maintained (Granaglia, 1997). In effect, the balance of power had changed from Left to Right in 1979, allowing a

⁵ Altissimo's tenure was broken only once, by Aldo Aniasi, from April 1980 to June 1981. A Socialist, Aniasi attempted to implement a universalistic NHS, but his efforts were stunted by his relatively short tenure in office.

different set of interests to set a tone for future policy.⁶ Moreover, the co-implementation of the NHS and user fees would make it difficult for citizens to distinguish between the two sets of reforms.

Then, in 1983, the balance of power once again shifted to the Left, although Christian Democrats remained the largest party in the legislature. Copayment increases halted during the following legislative term (1983-1987), as well as for part of the subsequent term after that (1987-1992). The Prime Minister was, for the first time in Italian history, a Socialist. He appointed a Christian Democrat to head the Ministry of Health, and the renewed strength of the Left called for a return to the universalistic origins of the NHS.

During this time, DC politicians did consider several cost-sharing proposals, but they were met by popular and union resistance (Donatini, et al., 2001). The inability of more moderate politicians to implement copayments may be seen as counterintuitive, but it is important to note that the DC proposals were somewhat more extreme than those put forward by Altissimo and the Liberals.⁷ The more extreme proposals may have motivated the Left to mobilize against the copayments, but resistance was quite widespread and spanned the political spectrum. Unlike their Liberal counterparts, DC Health Ministers were far more reluctant

6 Cost-containment in health care was a top agenda item, but Liberals overseeing other ministries implemented similar market-oriented policies during this time period. A number of Liberal Finance Ministers, for example, implemented restrictive economic policies which attempted to stabilize inflation and reduce the public deficit (Donatini, et al., 2001).

7 For example, in the mid-1980s, the Health Minister proposed that citizens could opt out of the public system in favor of private provision, as long as they had paid a "solidarity contribution." Later, the Secretary of the Treasury would propose that only hospital care remain universal, while the other services would be for the poor. (Granaglia, 1997). Several attempts were made to introduce copayments for inpatient and primary care, but popular protest also deterred these copayments from implementation.

to accept the blame for inserting cost-sharing into the NHS.

Once the Right regained its authority in the following legislative term (1987-1992), Liberal politicians again were able to propose and implement new user fees. In 1988, on the grounds that health care costs were rising, Right politicians raised copayment rates to 40 percent for pharmaceuticals and 30 percent for specialty outpatient visits (Donatini, et al., 2001). In addition, they extended the fees to a set of pharmaceutical products that were previously exempted. These reforms were met with popular protest, and considerable resistance from the trade unions, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Liberals, who relied less on trade unions than their DC counterparts, implemented the user fees without remorse.

Cost-sharing was expanded in 1989, when the Liberal physician Francesco de Lorenzo was appointed Minister of Health (Ministero della Salute, 2011) (Parlamento Italiano- Legislature Precedenti, 2008). Under de Lorenzo, cost-sharing increased and government revenue decreased. Higher income groups were able to opt out of NHS coverage in favor of private insurance. This, in turn, would reduce their public contribution rates by 60 percent. Copayments became tax-deductible (Lo Scalzo, Donatini, Orzella, Cicchetti, Profili, & Maresso, 2009). Users and physicians were penalized for fraudulent use of exemption cards (Donatini, et al., 2001) (Lo Scalzo, Donatini, Orzella, Cicchetti, Profili, & Maresso, 2009).^{8,9} In these ways, De Lorenzo

8 This was a response to the fact that, between 1988 and 1989, the share of prescriptions issued to exempted users increased from 45 percent to 75 percent.

9 Even though user fees could be considered an important – and immediate- source of revenue, organized physician interests generally have remained quiet about copayment policy. What's more, at the micro level, Italian physicians practice "negative privatization," which occurs when doctors "privately decide how to allocate resources, irrespective or even contrary to public health goals" (Granaglia, 1997, p.

realized policies which favored cost-sharing, expanded private sector utilization, and weakened the public revenue base of the health system. Thus, the NHS continued to deviate from its social democratic origins, making more room for copayment policies.

As a result, by the early 1990s, copayments were both part of citizens' recent memories of the prior health care system, as well as part of their current experience in the reformed system. Liberal Health Ministers were especially influential in the latter. Leveraging existing policy feedbacks, as well as the gaps in the NHS reform, Liberals introduced their party's programs into the health system.

Policy Feedback

Thus, copayments had become part and parcel of the Italian health care system. In the early 1990s, most Italians agreed that the "government should only provide *essential* [health] services" (Rhodes, 1997, emphasis added). When a massive corruption scandal broke out in 1992, Italian citizens became all the more skeptical of government and the services it provided. The scandal --which

157). The 1990 crack-down on exemption cards occurred because doctors could attribute one of the many exemptions to non-exempt patients. But this is not the only example of the physicians' micro-level influence. Physicians can decide when to collect copayments for non-urgent emergency visits, or when to waive user fees for particular medical devices. The explanation for physicians' deviation from policy may be attributed to the Italy's broader clientelistic socio-political model—that is, physicians waive formal copayments and other fees in exchange for informal payments or services. Alternatively, fragmented professional associations might be to blame (for a historical overview of the Italian medical profession, see Krause, 1988). Although the NHS actually unified physician interests by establishing one payer, the interests of the large generalists' lobby are rarely aligned with that of the specialists' lobby. In addition, the regional devolution of health care has made regional organizations influential. At the same time, the "implicit, unspoken concordat" might be responsible for physicians' silence about national copayments (see footnote 10).

implicated all the Italian politicians mentioned in this article as well as many more-- required that a technocratic government take office. At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty had imposed control over European Union member states' inflation rates, debts, and deficits. Facing internal pressures from the public to reform corruption and external pressures from the Union's restrictive economic policies, technocrats searched for market-oriented health and welfare reforms.

One such reform was the implementation of user fees. In a period of restructuring from 1993-1994, the technocrats raised copayments on pharmaceuticals (to 50 percent of retail price), and required full payment for specialists visits, and diagnosis tests (Donatini, et al., 2001). This was an especially dramatic jump, considering that specialty visits previously required that users pay 30 percent of retail price.¹⁰ Again, trade unions and the public opposed the reform. In one case, the opposition did prevent the government from introducing copayments in new areas, such as emergency hospital services and primary care services. However, copayments for services that already involved cost-sharing were more easily accepted. Since copayments were not foreign to the NHS system, users became less resistant to additional fees.

Around the same time, an economic downturn negatively affected the sustainability and expansion of social programs in Spain. The Spanish Socialists, who had held office for over a decade, were replaced by PP politicians in 1996. In light of economic constraints, the PP and their growing voter base did favor reforming the NHS, but user fees nonetheless remained

¹⁰ Certain groups did remain exempt, and the new fees were subject to a ceiling. Later, the income selectivity was replaced with age selectivity, and then reversed again to income selectivity. The current system is currently income-based, age-based, and occupation-based.

absent from national policy. Most of the Spanish public remained opposed to sharing health care costs. Spaniards had developed a favorable opinion of the health system and its method of financing care. In 1992, only 24 percent of Spaniards agreed that “only employers should have responsibility for their employees' pension and health insurance arrangements. In contrast, 64 percent of Italians agreed with this statement (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). Unlike in Italy, copayments simply were not a policy option at this time in Spain.

This is not to suggest that copayments were popular in Italy. They were not. Rather, they were more easily *accepted* than they were in Spain. In 1992, more than two times as many Italians believed that visiting a specialist was a “high but bearable” cost than their Spanish counterparts (42 percent of Italians, compared to 16 percent of Spaniards.) (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). The delicacy of market reforms at the national level was exemplified during the debate to extend the opt-out clause of the late 1980s. The political reforms of the early 1990s removed the previous parties from the political landscape, and moved Italy towards a fully “bipolar” political system where parties cluster around Left and Right poles (Foot, 2003, p. 201). Previously, in the 1980s, minor parties were able to blame Right governments--- and Liberal politicians in particular--- for retrenching the social democratic elements of the NHS. The shift to bipolarism, however, meant that neither the Right nor the Left was willing to claim credit for retrenchment. In the following years, health policy would evolve so that the national Left and Right umbrella coalitions would blame not themselves, but rather the regions, for implementing the unpopular market reforms.

In 1996 and 2001, two Budget Laws shifted financial control of the health system

to the regions, and thereby shifted the blame for cost-sharing policies away from the center and towards the local health authorities. Just before the 2001 elections, the outgoing government abolished user fees for a particular set of drugs (Donatini, et al., 2001). After the elections, a rapid rise in health expenditures made politicians consider reinstating the copayments, but no Left or Right leader wanted to risk the blame of doing so.¹¹ Thus, in October 2001, legislation changed to allow regions to choose whether or not to introduced copayments.¹² This was a blame-avoidance strategy as, just a few years prior, the 1996 Budget Law had removed the regions' political control, and replaced it with financial control (Rhodes, 1997).¹³ Thus, this move heightened the visibility of the regions' financial accountability, but weakened their ability to advocate for national changes to the health system. Politicians in the center deflected copayment policy to the regions, and the regions were unable to retaliate.¹⁴ In the end, copayments remained part of the Italian NHS, only to be expanded under austerity.

¹¹ Two-thirds of the rise in health expenditures was explained by the loss of copayment revenue.

¹² 11 of the 20 regions introduced copayments as a flat rate or percentage of retail price. Health expenditures then rose sharply in the regions. Between 2001-2008, drug expenditure decreased by 5 percent in regions that implemented copayments, compared to the regions that did not. This amounted to about 74 percent of the total revenue from before (France & Taroni, 2005).

¹³ At the same time, it is important to note that the central government did not relinquish all financial power to the regions. Regions were required to keep spending at target levels, so as to comply with EU standards for health spending. Nonetheless, this move would have exacerbated the existing inequalities in the health system. Whereas decentralization helped to lower the health care inequalities in Spain, regional inequalities increased as Italy moved towards a financially decentralized (and politically centralized) system (Rhodes, 1997).

¹⁴ Other laws—including the Budget Law for 2007— have attempted to raise copayments. However, strong debate has followed—particularly because patients complained about the rising costs of specialty care. The law has since been moderated.

Conclusion

The provision and financing of health care is broadly similar in Italy and Spain, so the existence of extensive copayments in the Italian system – and their absence in Spain-- is odd. However, the structures of the prior medical systems and the politics of implementation play a role in contemporary cost-sharing arrangements. The historical institutional variations of the two health care systems set the reforms on distinct paths, which were solidified by the subsequent balances of political power. Policy feedbacks have nearly institutionalized the presence or absence of user fees. Today, no Spanish austerity policy, even those backed by Right parties, has proposed to extend copayments to health care services. In Italy, Mario Monti's technocratic government --- which was not accountable to an electorate --- was able to expand user fees. Regional leaders continue to expand them as well. Despite their similarities, the two countries' distinct policies towards user fees are the product of a much longer history.

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IERI E OGGI: THE STUDY OF ITALIAN POLITICS

Contemporary Italian Politics: A Journal for the Twenty-first Century

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Introduction

There can be little doubt that Italian politics has attracted considerable and growing levels of interest both in academia and beyond in recent years. The causes of this growth are not hard to find and range from the colourful and the spectacular – *Tangentopoli* and Berlusconi, the Five-star Movement and Beppe Grillo – to the sombre and more prosaic – growing European integration; expansion in the teaching of politics in higher education; the growth in air travel and tourism; the explosion of information available thanks to development of the Internet – all of which has increased the demand, in an increasingly globalised world, for information about each of its individual parts. My purpose in this article is therefore to provide information about *Contemporary Italian Politics*, a journal which I edit with Maurizio Carbone of Glasgow University, and which seeks to respond to this demand by providing a forum for discussion and debate about all aspects of political events and processes taking place in the peninsula.

So often dubbed a “democratic anomaly”, Italy has throughout its history frequently been the site of unusual political developments and the progenitor of political novelties taken up elsewhere in the world. It is therefore, I think, of importance that there should be a journal providing a vehicle for the dissemination, in English, of research into these matters and consequently that information about the journal should be brought to the attention of those potentially

interested in reading and contributing to it. That, then, is the purpose of this article in which I describe the origins of the publication, its aims and scope, its audience, and the criteria used to select articles for publication. In this way I hope to provide information potentially useful not only to those with an interest in writing about this specific country but to anyone who for whatever reason needs to know something about the politics of the EU’s fourth largest state and one of the most significant players on the world stage in the early twenty-first century.

Origins

Contemporary Italian Politics (CIP) originated with the founding, within the UK Political Studies Association (PSA) of the Italian Politics Specialist Group in 2002 by me and Felia Allum. PSA specialist groups, supported and funded by the Association, are designed to bring together academics with research and teaching interests in specific areas of politics, in order to enhance the quality of activities within the given field by providing opportunities for group members to network, organise conferences and carry out joint publication projects. The aim in establishing the Italian Politics Specialist Group was therefore to create a vehicle for the further development of the study of Italian politics in the UK. As such, the Group has, it is fair to say, been highly successful. Since 2002 it has sponsored panels at each of the Association’s annual conferences. Drawing on papers presented at these panels, Group

members have published some eight journal special issues; the Group has sponsored six conferences or panels/roundtables within the framework of the annual meetings of organisations such as the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica (Italian Political Science Society, SISP); it has recruited fifty members; it has brought to the UK a number of internationally known Italian political scientists – including Gianfranco Pasquino, Alfio Mastropaolo, Mauro Calise, Carlo Fusaro, Luca Verzichelli and Salvatore Lupo – to speak at its events thanks to its success in bidding for funding over and above the standard levels of financial support provided to specialist groups by the PSA.

On the back of this success, in 2009, Maurizio Carbone and I set up the journal's predecessor publication, which was called the *Bulletin of Italian Politics*. This was a publication that tapped into the growing level of interest we have seen over the past 25 years in Italian politics as attested to by the growing number of English-language books, both academic and popular, focussing on the area or some aspect of it. The past 25 years have seen the appearance of roughly one new Italian politics book every eighteen months. 1986 saw the start of the series of annual volumes reviewing Italian political developments over the previous twelve months: *Italian Politics*, now published by Berghahn and also published in Italian; 1995 saw the launch of the *Journal of Modern Italian Studies (JMIS)*; 1996 saw the launch of the journal *Modern Italy (MI)*, by the Association for the Study of Modern Italy (ASMI).

Beside the factors mentioned above, the expansion in interest has clearly been driven by the party-system transformation that came in the early 1990s and by the various concomitants and consequences of that transformation. In particular, the activities, political success and dominance of

the political scene of Silvio Berlusconi was associated with political forces whose emergence and growth have been unprecedented, not just in Italy but in Europe in general if not more broadly. From being widely viewed as a country of “stable instability” – one where (for all that its political arrangements were fragile, inefficient and unpopular) the Christian Democrats were always in power and nothing important ever really changed – since the early 1990s the situation has almost been one of “permanent revolution”. Consequently – and as the February 2013 elections confirmed – the future always appears to be completely open, with developments even in the near future incredibly hard to predict – the more so in the aftermath of February which saw the election of a parliament consisting of three large minorities among which no governing combination seemed possible, and which was able to install a government only thanks to the need to keep happy the international financial markets and the country's EU partners as well as pressure from the President.

In short, for several years now, Italian politics has been characterised by chronic uncertainty and it seemed, in setting up the *Bulletin* that the need to decipher and interpret Italian politics and to update existing interpretations would therefore continue to be keenly felt by analysts with the proliferation in the number of analyses mentioned above seeming likely to be reflected in a level of interest in the Italian case among academics, policy makers and journalists that would continue.

So the *Bulletin* aimed to provide a forum for discussion and debate for scholars in Italian politics as well as a useful research resource for them. To achieve this twin objective, it published articles, opinion pieces, book reviews, conference reports and news.

The *Bulletin* was a publication that was launched using the University of Salford's

reprographic services, a University of Glasgow web site (www.gla.ac.uk/bip) and desk-top publishing: a “homemade” product. It came out twice a year and the response it received, in terms of the number and quality of submissions and therefore the likelihood of its being quoted, suggested that it was successfully filling a gap in a market that was then catered to by only two journals focusing on contemporary Italy in the English language – *Modern Italy* and the *Journal of Italian Studies* – neither of which, however, had a specific focus on the country’s *politics*. It was then that the decision was taken to approach a commercial publisher with a view to having the journal professionally produced and thus raising even further its profile and the quality of the pieces it could attract.

Aims and scope

The purpose of the journal, published by Taylor and Francis since the beginning of 2013, remains that for which the *Bulletin* was founded. The main discipline covered is therefore political science, but work in the fields of economics, sociology and contemporary history is likely also to be relevant. Further details can be found here: <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rita20>

The journal encourages a comparative perspective in the analysis of Italian politics, and welcomes articles with a comparative coverage, especially given the extent to which Italy is viewed – with varying degrees of justification depending on the specific issue – as exceptional or anomalous among democratic countries. The journal seeks to attract articles that adhere to the methodological criteria and intellectual standards of practitioners of the social sciences and humanities so that the intellectual level of pieces will be such as to appeal to those with exposure to undergraduate levels of education and above.

The editors are also keen to ensure the uniqueness and topicality of the journal by seeking to attract articles that will fill what they perceive as a significant gap in the currently available writing and analyses on Italian-politics topics in the English language. That is, those with an interest in the most recent developments have available to them two types of resource: newspaper and magazine articles on the one hand and “conventional” academic articles on the other. While the former will provide readers with information about the most up-to-date matters, they are unlikely to provide analysis and interpretation of the incisiveness required by most academic publications. The latter, by contrast, find it difficult to make available analyses of the most recent matters. This arises partly from the lead times to which academic publications typically work and partly from academics’ concerns to explore general trends and to draw from the study of specific instances, conclusions of a general nature. That said, the success of the annual *Italian Politics* series has already demonstrated that incisive, academically rigorous analysis of the most recent events and trends is both possible and appealing in terms of its capacity to attract an audience. With this in mind, the frequency of the journal’s publication – three times per year – is designed to ensure that the utility of pieces focussing on specific events or processes currently salient in public debate is maximised for those wanting access to interpretations of the current situation.

Two further features are designed to increase the journal’s utility. By offering regular series of articles devoted to specific topics – notably the legislative performance of recent governments – it can act as a research resource for readers by supplying information that is cumulative and that allows the reader to make comparisons across time. By publishing translations of high-quality

material that would otherwise only be available in Italian it can respond to the considerable demand among non-English speaking political scientists to see their work published in English owing to the growing internationalisation of the discipline and the growing impact of research assessment exercises, university league tables, measures of “impact” and so forth – giving publication in the English language definite and considerable advantages to authors.

Readership

CIP is aimed at Italianists, academic political scientists (especially those needing, for comparative purposes, access to material on the Italian case, but lacking the requisite language skills), and undergraduate and postgraduate students of politics – but also at journalists and policy-makers employed by – for example – the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the European Parliament and international organisations.

With the shift to Taylor and Francis it was decided to change the name of the publication from *Bulletin of Italian Politics* to *Contemporary Italian Politics* to reflect the desire to attract pieces that would appeal both to academics and to non-academic readers. In 2010, for example, just a year after the *Bulletin* had been launched, it carried a symposium on Italy’s second-generation immigrants, thus speaking to the implications for citizenship law with which Italian policy makers were then, and still are having to grapple; to issues of racism, and to various other demographic and social issues arising from the country’s recent history of immigration – just as policy-makers have had to do elsewhere in Europe where the situations of immigrants and their children are as major a political issue as in Italy. In the United Kingdom, for example, one of the most salient issues in the election campaign that

year concerned Conservative proposals for an annual limit on the number of non-EU economic migrants as well as Liberal Democrat proposals to allow “law-abiding families” without the correct papers but in the country for ten years, to “earn citizenship” – precisely the issues high on the policy-making agenda in Italy at the moment. So it seemed that as debate got under way in Britain about the details of new controls that looked set to come into force after 2010, members of the coalition government such as Teresa May and William Hague might have wanted to explore how these matters had worked out in Italy. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for example, retains researchers who regularly analyse the internal politics of countries with which the UK maintains diplomatic relations and it often calls on the expertise of outside academics.

Publishing in the journal

CIP seeks to attract articles from all writers with an interest in Italian politics – from those inside and outside academia; from those at an early stage of a political-science career as well as from established academics. With this in mind the following reflections are offered – in the hope that they may be useful when contemplating submitting to *CIP* and to journals generally – as suggestions to those relatively new to publishing in learned journals.

Writers need first to satisfy themselves that what they are proposing to submit to a journal is in scope. *CIP* has rather few restrictions in this respect. Perhaps the only thing worth mentioning is that since it is a journal of contemporary Italian *politics* the editors might find it difficult to accommodate pieces that are closer to being works of Italian *history* (although it and its predecessor have carried pieces by historians on events and processes of the recent past).

One must target one's articles correctly, seeking to make sure that proposed articles fit both the *remit* and the *style* of the journals to which one sends them. I was once co-editor of a journal called *European Political Science (EPS)* whose remit was to publish pieces on how the discipline is, can be and ought to be. Articles [needed to] address research matters (including debates in the discipline, research projects, political science information sources, funding opportunities) professional matters (such as career structures and prospects, external evaluation, higher education reforms, accreditation issues); doctoral training and teaching matters; and relations between academia and politicians, policy-makers, journalists and ordinary citizens.

What this meant was that we were not interested in articles dealing with substantive political science topics. Thus, when, as we frequently did, we received pieces analysing some aspect of the EU for example, we used reject them out of hand – not as a comment on their substantive merits, which may well have been very great in many cases, but simply because they were irrelevant to the journal's needs. By the "style" of a journal, I mean something that is difficult to state precisely but which has to do, for example, with whether it expects articles to use quantitative data, whether it only publishes empirical work or whether it also publishes theoretical pieces that do not offer new empirical evidence, and so forth. *CIP* publishes pieces that fall into all of these categories.

Second, having established what the paper is about, as an editor I look for the author to tell me why it matters and will return papers for revision or reject if the authors don't give any indication as to why they are writing the paper, in other words, if they give no indication as to the answer to the "So what?" question.

Third, when authors submit pieces to *CIP* these are sent to referees who provide comments on the piece in question and conclude with a recommendation that falls into one or the other of four categories, namely,

- accept unconditionally
- accept with minor revisions
- revise and resubmit
- reject

Referees, in my experience, vary in terms of the tone they adopt. Some are highly professional, offer constructive comments and express even the most devastating criticisms in positive terms. Others, unfortunately, cannot resist taking advantage of the opportunity to find fault with others' work to show off how clever they are, and/or cannot resist taking advantage of the cloak of anonymity to offload anger by indulging in sarcasm. Such behaviour is, in my opinion, unacceptable – but unfortunately, there is little one can do about it; and, indeed, one is in the position of needing to view referees as the most important members of the audience whose needs must be satisfied if one wants to get one's work published.

In my case, this means that, as a writer, I tend to make a point of attending to everything – and I mean everything – I can think of that might influence the referees' verdicts. Thus, besides other good standards of writing to which I always try to adhere anyway, I take special care to ensure that my work is free of grammatical and spelling errors, ambiguities and anything else I can think of that might possibly annoy a reader. Also, if the verdict is "accept with minor revisions" or "revise and resubmit", I always make sure that when I submit the revised version, I do so together with a covering letter outlining, point by point, how I have taken account of each of the referees' comments

and, where I have not taken account of a comment, why not. This strikes me as something that assists the work of referees and editors and therefore as something that is likely to help my cause. I never feel myself obliged to take account of a referee's comment if I genuinely disagree with it, but in such cases I do feel that I have an obligation to explain why this is the case. Moreover, I always feel obliged to couch such explanations in positive terms that exude reasonableness, avoiding the temptation to respond to the more arrogant referees in kind – this on the assumption that, if the editors go back to the referees with my revised version before making a final decision, or even if they don't, I am more likely to get the outcome I want if I avoid language that might annoy.

Fourth, I always think it a good idea to remember that editors are busy people and to help my cause by acting on the conclusions that follow from that. This means that I always follow religiously the journal's style sheet and instructions for authors; I do not write to editors asking if they would be interested in a piece on this or that topic, I just send it in.

Conclusion

The origins, the scope and the audience for the journal have given rise to aspirations for the publication that are a continuation of those that have matured as a result of experience with the *Bulletin* and they are three.

The first is relevance. There could, I think, hardly be a better example of the real-world significance of work on Italy even to those who may not be especially interested in that country *per se* than the immigration symposium mentioned above – and Maurizio and I will welcome practitioners' feedback: in today's increasingly utilitarian world, academics are under constant and growing pressure to justify what they do in terms of its

bearing on the concerns of outside "end users". This means that academics have the right to expect such end users to take at least some time – if not to be proactive – in telling academics what their concerns *are*. As editors of the *Contemporary Italian Politics*, we will be highly delighted to publish research on Italian politics – like, for example, Francesco Marangoni's regular updates on the legislative activity of the Italian government – that in whatever way addresses the needs of non-academics outside that country: we, like the vast majority of our colleagues, actively *want* to feel that we are making a real contribution to the collective well being. But in that case, policy-makers have to tell us what research they seek from us!

Second, therefore, we aspire to provide informed analysis of current events, processes and trends in Italian politics to as wide an audience as possible. This means that we seek to attract pieces that are analytically rigorous, but also accessible. For this reason, though our purpose in publishing the journal is not primarily to serve a didactic function, we would include teachers in higher education institutions among the potential audience for the publication.

From this follows our third aspiration, an expansion of the readership. The aforementioned growing interest in Italian politics has been due, among other things, to the dramatic expansion of politics as a discipline in general – reflected in the dramatic growth in the number of acceptances for politics degree courses in the UK and elsewhere in recent years. According to UCAS data, the number of acceptances for politics degree courses in the UK rose from 903 in 1986 to 4,250 twenty years later while Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) data indicate that there were 33,910 undergraduate and postgraduate students studying politics at higher education institutions in the UK in 2008/09: up from

17,234 in 1996/97. In the United States, the number of Bachelors' degrees awarded in political science rose from approximately 33,000 in 1988 to over 50,000 in 2006 (<http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/Demographics%20Data%20BA%20degrees%2088%2006.pdf>).

There is little doubt, then, that the potential audience for *CIP* is large – as there is little doubt that a heightened understanding

of Italian politics has both relevance and importance extending beyond academia and the borders of Italy itself. Publishing the journal is therefore a worthwhile endeavour. Readers who wish to contribute to it should send papers either to me, at j.l.newell@salford.ac.uk or to Maurizio at maurizio.carbone@gla.ac.uk. We look forward to hearing from you!

BOOK REVIEWS

Giovanna Procacci, *Warfare-Welfare. Intervento dello Stato e diritto dei cittadini (1914-18)*, Rome, Carocci, 2013

By Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University)

To her many contributions to the study of Italian state and society during the *Grande guerra* and its aftermath (see the sources below) Giovanna Procacci has added a slim but synthetic new book. While some of the chapters in *Welfare-Warfare* are adaptations of articles published elsewhere, and many historians have gone over this familiar ground, seldom are the connections made so clearly between two generally-distinct *filoni* of scientific work about the war-- its social impacts, and especially the birth of something resembling the modern welfare state; and the repressive turn of the state during and after the war. Of equal interest, Procacci takes us beyond the peninsula with carefully-drawn comparisons to the effects of the war on welfare and state repression in Britain, France, and Germany.

Among the many important findings of the book, six of the most interesting are:

First, the reduction in civil liberties that is usually associated with war making in fact began in Italy *before* the government entered the war. One in particular, the *Piano di difesa*, actually dates from 1904 and was formulated in response to labor unrest and only later used as a means of social control during the war – not the first time that repression of pacifism and socialism came together.

Second, the internment of resident aliens – common to all of the participants in the war – was in Italy extended to “internal enemies” – a term that was broadly expanded

to include pacifists, socialists, trade unionists, and even people overheard to question the success of Italian arms. In the decision of whom to intern, the military acted very much on its own and the judiciary appears to have been effectively sidelined.

Third, in its wartime reductions of civil liberties, Italy resembled more closely the autocracies that were defeated in the war – Austria-Hungary and Germany – than the democracies on whose side the Italians fought. In fact, in some ways – for example the abandonment with which it interned citizens – “Liberal” Italy went beyond the central powers in its move to repress dissent.

Fourth, although reforms in social welfare were attempted both during and after the war, these were hampered by the *liberista* mentality of many the country’s leaders – especially Salandra, the Prime Minister who took Italy into the war -- and by a lack of coordination and fiscal effort. For example, with the exception of *impiegata*, most of the women who took jobs in the wartime economy were promptly *licenziate* at war’s end.

Fifth, although there was conflict between the civil and the military authorities throughout the war, many sectors of the state were effectively militarized – far more than in the “democratic” states of France and Britain, or in autocratic Austria-Hungary and Germany. Militarization appears to have both emboldened the officer corps to think of itself as the dominant part of the state and fed into

its resentment in the war's wake at the attempts of the Giolitti and Nitti governments to return the country to civilian control. As is well known, when asked to step in against the fascists, the military, sat on its hands, at best, and, at worst, were guilty of conniving in the destruction of the Liberal state in the name of suppressing "subversives."

Finally, Procacci's book is mainly about the state, but of equal interest to this reader is her demonstration of the interaction of state and civil society.

In Anglo-Saxon political sociology, Italy passes for a country with a weak civil society. However, the decades preceding the Great War saw a ripening and expansion of Italian associational life, especially in the Center-North (Riley 2010). But rather than demonstrating the autonomy and independence of civil society, the period of the First World War shows how easy it was to manipulate civic associations for political purposes. First, "patriotic" associations were mobilized by the Right to facilitate intervention in the war; second, they were used as sources of information by the intelligence agencies to denounce those suspected of disloyalty; and, finally, after the war, the associations of big landowners were instrumental in supporting the fascist *squadre* that destroyed the Left and ultimately democracy.

If I must criticize, it would be to wish that Procacci had given more attention to the relationship between wartime "welfare" – poorly-conceived and implemented – and "warfare" – in the form of state repression, which was all too well administered. For example, was the well-known failure to provision the civilian population simply the result of the loss of foreign sources of food by the war, or was it also the result of the tight repressive structures that the state imposed? And why – in contrast with Britain, in which repression and welfare went hand in hand –

did the strong hand of the state fail to produce lasting gains – for example, for women, who entered the workforce in large numbers to take the place of male workers who went off to fight?

But this is to cavil: Procacci's book has the great virtue that in a period in which many historians have taken the cultural turn, it puts politics back at the center of attention. In the debate about how much Mussolini actually contributed to the destruction of the liberal state, her view is largely *continuista*; but it is also intensely political. In her view, the war was the hinge that revived and expanded older forms of autocratic state behavior, which were transmuted into full-blown authoritarianism in war's wake.

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Ilvo Diamanti (ed.), *Un Salto nel Voto.*
Ritratto Politico Dell'Italia di Oggi, Rome, Laterza, 2013.

by Dwayne Woods (Purdue University)

To describe contemporary Italian political system as being in a state of "flux" would strike many as an understatement. The relative electoral and party stability that many had assumed had been ushered following the collapse of the First Republic and the demise of Italy's two post-war political behemoths – the Italian Christian Democratic and the Communist parties – in 1993-94 was swept aside in the February 2013 elections. Diamanti's edited volume *Un Salto nel Voto* does not attempt to provide any theoretical or analytical reasons for the sudden break with the bi-polarism that had emerged during the Second Republic. The book can best be described as a good, detailed, and descriptive account of the "leap into the unknown." The authors do not attempt to predict the future nor do they engage in analysis of the past. Instead they provide an empirically rich description of the February 2013 election and how it shook up some of the traditional

patterns of voting that had emerged with the end of the First Republic and the emergence of the second. While most of the players, Berlusconi, the Northern League and the Democratic Party, still figured prominently in the election and its aftermath, they are, in many ways, no longer the pillars of the political system. If there is an analytical theme that emerges from the volume, it is that there are no pillars that remain. Italy is, once again, in transition. What it is transiting to, the volume makes no attempt to provide an answer. However, the election was not entirely a break with the past in the way that the 1993-94 elections were. The three major pillars of the post-1993-94 suffered significant electoral setbacks in the election but they did not disappear. The setbacks were not simply at the national level, but more importantly they saw important erosions in their territorial fiefs. In the north, both the Northern League and Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* saw a significant

decline in their electoral support. The Northern League essentially went back to being a political force only in Lombardy. The inroads that it has been making in northern Emilia Romagna evaporated. *Forza Italia* declined throughout the north and even in parts of its base in southern Italy, especially Sicily. The Democratic Party experienced voter defection in central Italy. In other words, all of three parties lost votes among their “core constituencies.” Bepe Grillo’s 5 star Movement was the only political force that succeeded in not only gaining voters, but doing so in every region of the country. In this respect, the newly created protest movement emerged as the only national party and political force from the election.

Diamanti has put together a book that provides the reader with a lot of detailed information about the last election; its winners and losers; and many of the unknowns that resulted from it. We learn who voted, where, in what numbers and from which social category. We are provided with a critical view of the political parties, the personalization of electoral contests in Italy, the role of the media in the election, the emergence of the social media in Italian politics with the 5 star Movement, and the failure of the political center led by Mario Monti to gain any traction in the election. The wealth of information paints a mosaic. Like a mosaic, we get the image of a country that is fragmented with the source of the fragmentation not entirely clear. While the traditional left-right divisions have not disappeared, they were much less the source of fragmentation than in the past. Clearly, regional and sub-regional divisions are still pertinent but the collapse of the Northern League indicates less saliency than in previous

elections. The merit of this book is the questions that it asks. It does not turn to the data to provide any definitive answers. The election disrupted things to such an extent that it is too early to discern the longer-term implications.

Several things, however, are clear. First, no party, with the partial exception of the 5 star Movement, came close to galvanizing a majority of support. Second, the precarious bi-polarism that emerged in the early 1990s between coalition of parties on the left and right anchored by two major parties seems to have ended. More than 40 percent of voters voted differently in the 2013 election than they had in the 2008 elections. Third, the protest vote represented by 5 star Movement emerged as a new political actor onto the Italian stage. It was the only party able to capture a truly national vote and to cut across left-right and socio-economic divisions. They did this, however without emerging as a solidly implanted national party. Only future elections will show whether it is simply an ephemeral protest vote. Finally, the election suggested a sharp decline in trust by Italians in their political institutions that are on par with the collapse of the First Republic.

Overall, *Un Salto nel voto* is a necessary read for the rich and varied data it provides on the last election and the questions that it raises about the implications of the last election for the future institutional characteristics of the Italian political landscape. If the last election signaled the death of the Second Republic, it provided confused messages as to the contours of the Third Republic. As the intended pun in the title of the book suggest, it was truly “a leap into the unknown.”